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Abstract
This thesis presents an analysis of workplace relations in a British-based,
Japanese manufacturing company. The extent and nature of managerial
hegemony within Japanese transplants, and the ability of workers to pursue
informal means of 'counter-control', are both highly contested issues within
the 'Japanisation' debate. It is these two related issues that are addressed
here. The research is based primarily on a nine-week period of participant
observation as a shopfloor worker. This was supplemented by interviews and
'shadowing' of key personnel in the case study company. In addition,
interviews were held with staff in buyer and supplier firms trading with the
case company.
This thesis devises a framework based on embeddedness
(Granovetter, 1985) to analyse the research data. Using the constructs of
networks and social relations which constitute embeddedness, four network
structures and three categories of social relations are applied to workplace
relations in the case study company. It is argued that the embeddedness
framework provides a way of resolving concerns not addressed satisfactorily
by other academic studies of the labour process in Japanese transplants. As
this framework has not previously been applied to the labour process debate it
represents a novel contribution to academic debate.
A number of key conclusions emerge. First, workers have retained the
capacity to engage in resistance in at least some high-surveillance
organisations. This illustrates the significance of setting control and
surveillance systems in the organisation's social and economic context.
Second, a 'holistic' approach is required in order to understand the complexity
of the labour process and to establish why workplace relations take their
specific form in particular contexts. Third, in analysing Japanese transplants,
the policies of the companies and actions of management need to be
explored with awareness of their potential shortcomings and tensions, rather
than solely from a perspective of coherence and effectiveness.
Introduction
The post-war revival and expansion of Japanese manufacturing
industries led White and Trevor to accord them the accolade of 'economic
miracle-workers of our era' (White and Trevor 1983:1). While this may seem
somewhat sanguine given the current problems facing the Japanese
economy, the Japanese achievements have been considerable. Gross
national product in Japan showed an annual average per capita growth rate of
3.6% between 1963 and 1996, compared with 1.9% for the United Kingdom
and 1.4% for the United States of America ( World Bank 1998). What has
been particularly noteworthy is the ability of Japanese manufacturing
industries to penetrate successfully the former bastions of Western industrial
strength, such as the motor vehicle industry, and also to secure a large share
of emerging customer markets in industries such as electronics. Moreover,
this has been achieved without the advantage of any significant indigenous
raw material resources.
A variety of explanations have been advanced to explain the success
of Japanese companies. These have included the role of the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry in both protecting the domestic
economy and selecting 'winning' companies (Dicken 1998), the development
of strong interfirm links within oligopolistic structures which allowed Japanese
companies to compete effectively in wider world markets (Sako 1992) and the
superiority of Japanese management (Pascale and Athos 1982). One
consistent feature in many explanations of the 'Japanese miracle' is the
2apparent commonality of interest between the organisation and its workforce.
Japanese workers are viewed as more committed than their Western
counterparts; they strike less, take fewer holidays, work longer hours and
contribute more to suggestion schemes (Koike 1988; Lincoln and Kalleberg
1990; Lorriman and Kenjo 1996) As Lincoln and Kalleberg observe 'a
pervasive theme in studies of Japanese industry has been the extraordinary
commitment, identification and loyalty exhibited by employees towards their
firms' (1990:3). The basis of this alleged enterprise loyalty is however a matter
of academic dispute. On the one hand is a perspective that interprets this
commitment as willingly given and the product of the country's unique culture
(Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Morishima 1982). Set against this is a 'darker' view
of the labour process in Japanese companies which argues that the high
levels of worker effort are not willingly volunteered but are extracted from the
labour force as a consequence of both incorporated trade unions and
employment practices that involve intensive managerial control and
surveillance at the point of production (Dohse et a1.1985;Kamata 1983).
Dohse et al. argue that the Japanese employee relations model 'is only
possible in an industrial relations environment in which there are hardly any
limits to management prerogatives' (1985:140).
Notwithstanding the controversies surrounding the basis of Japanese
industrial achievement, this success has led to a burgeoning academic
interest in Japanese companies (Dore 1989). This interest has been
sustained by the establishment of Japanese transplants in the West and also
by attempts of Western companies to emulate Japanese practice. These
3parallel developments of transplant and emulation have generated a
significant body of academic literature relating to 'Jeoanisanon''. From the
point of scholarly activity in Britain and America, this academic literature can
be divided broadly into two phases. The initial phase, located mainly in the
1980s and early 1990s, focused on issues relating to the potential
transferability of Japanese ideas and policies (Abo 1994; Bratton 1992;
Dunning 1986; Milkman 1991; White and Trevor 1983; Reitsperger 1986) 2.
The second phase debate moved away from discussions surrounding the
issues of transfer per se, to an analysis of the impact of Japanisation on the
labour process, both in terms of managerial motives and employee outcomes.
It is this second phase of the Japanisation debate which concerns this
study most directly. Initially, this debate mirrored the discussion surrounding
the nature of the labour process in Japan, in that it polarised into two
opposing stances. On the one hand is a 'high-commitment' perspective that
emphasises the generation of commitment stemming from an egalitarian
regime and employee involvement (Adler 1993; Adler 1994; Wickens 1993).
Set against this is a 'heightened-control' perspective which views the
personnel and production policies of Japanese transplants as representing a
regime of increased subordination for the workforce (Delbridge and Turnbull
1992; Morris et a1.1993;Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b; Sewell and
I It is recognised that the term Japanisation is a contested one. For the purposes of this study the term
will be used to denote the debates that surround the transfer and transplant of methods associated with
Japanese manufacturing.
2 These two phases are broad working categories which reflect the overall balance of published
material; it is acknowledged that academic interest in issues rarely has fixed 'cut off' points. For
example there has been a recent revival of academic interest in the (non) use of Japanese methods by
British manufacturing companies (Proctor and Ackroyd 1998; Scarborough and Terry 1997, 1998).
4Wilkinson 1993). This polarisation of opinions is exemplified by observations
on Nissan's Sunderland factory whose guiding principles have been
described by Wickens (1987) as 'quality, flexibility and teamwork' and
reinterpreted by Garrahan and Stewart as 'control, exploitation and
surveillance' (1992:111).
While the heightened-control perspective provided a valuable
'corrective' to the view that management is able to engineer a convergence of
interests and hence worker consent to new work practices, in stressinq the
efficacy of managerial control systems it can be viewed as overstating the
degree of employee subordination. Thus, although the high-commitment and
heightened-control perspectives are diametrically opposed in their diagnosis
of consent/coercion, it has been argued that they generated a teleological
analysis based on shared assumptions that managerial strategies work and
that management appeared to have resolved the age-Old 'problem' of worker
resistance (Stewart 1996; Stewart 1998).
Recent studies have presented a more nuanced account of workplace
relations in Japanese transplants, either accounting for management control
by locating control systems within their overall firm-specific context or
recogniSing the limits to management hegemony and illustrating that worker
resistance continues to present a challenge to management (Babson 1993;
Babson 1996; Delbridge 1998; Graham 1995; Grant 1996; Stephenson 1996).
There has been an increasing recognition that, despite two decades of a
political and economic climate that has been generally unfavourable to labour,
management have not simply had things all their own way.
5However, notwithstanding these valuable re-appraisals of the labour
process in Japanese transplants, there are important issues that remain
under-researched and unresolved. The vast majority of in-depth case studies
of transplants have been set in final manufacturing companies; there has
been little exploration of workplace relations in Western-based, Japanese-
owned first tier suppliers. This is a lacuna as recent developments in buyer-
supplier relations have posed considerable challenges for first-tier suppliers
and have had an influence upon the labour process in these companies
(Danford 1998a). A further issue concerns explanations of compliance and
resistance. While worker resistance has been linked to specific factors such
as local labour market conditions, strong trade unionism and a mistrust of
management, there has been little by way of a holistic analysis of workplace
relations. By 'holistic' is meant an analysis that includes the motives and
behaviours of a" groups of actors (workers, supervisors, support staff and
managers) and which explores influences upon the labour process both in
terms of factors at the point of production and also the company's wider
commercial environment. Relatedly and finally, there is a need to develop an
adequate framework in which to discuss and analyse the labour process.
Early accounts of Japanese transplants stressed the synergy between
manufacturing and personnel policies (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992;
Reitsperger 1986; Trevor 1988). However, these have proved inadequate as
the academic literature has begun to illustrate the conflicts between policies in
Japanese transplants and, in particular, the way in which worker actions have
exposed these tensions (Eiger and Smith 1998; Grant 1996; Smith and Eiger
61998). More recent analytical perspectives have provided useful accounts
which have recognised some of the key factors in resistance-compliance but
have not produced a satisfactory holistic analysis of workplace relations in
Japanese manufacturing transplants. For example, Graham's (1995) study of
Subaru paints a valuable and graphic picture of life on the line but focuses its
analysis solely on factors at the point of production, ignoring potentially
significant issues such as product markets.
It is these issues that inform the three aims of this ethnographic study
of workplace relations at 'Telco', a British-based Japanese manufacturing
company. First, to deepen academic knowledge and understanding of
workplace relations in Japanese transplants by presenting data from a
Japanese-owned, British-based first-tier supplier. Second, to develop a
holistic analysis of workplace relations. Third, to devise and apply a analytical
framework for understanding the labour process in Japanese transplants.
As well as outlining the aims of the study it is important to delineate its
boundaries. There are a number of issues that are not pursued in this study.
One of these is the significance of trade unions in Japanese transplants. This
is not addressed here because the case study that forms the basis of this
thesis is non-unionised, as are a number of Japanese transplants in both
Britain (Smith and Eiger 1998) and America (Milkman 1991).
Second, an analysis based on gender relations in the workplace has
not been incorporated into this study. Some explanation for this decision is
required. The underlying approach taken here is not a 'unisex' one which
denies any gender-specific influences. In chapter two of this thesis, the role of
7gender is recognised and discussed in relation to the consfrucuon of identity
for both males and females within the analytical framework of embeddedness.
What is 'absent' from this thesis is a theorisation of gender relations within the
specific context of Telco. Whilst recognising that gender relations can have an
implicit effect on workplace relations, the approach taken in this thesis is to
focus the analysis around the central concerns raised by the actors in the
case study company. This approach is consistent with other recent studies of
workplace relations which have not included a gender-based analysis (Scott
1994). At Telco gender relations issues were seldom raised by the workers
themselves; when they were, these instances have been recorded. Gender-
specific actions, such as the form of escapist 'marriage rituals' noted by
Westwood (1983) were absent from the shopfloor at Telco. So, the
embeddedness framework does not deny the existence of gender on
workplace relations, indeed it provides an opportunity for such an analysts, if
the empirical data suggests this is a key issue. In the specific context of Telco,
as a matter of empirical observation, gender issues were an occasional rather
central feature of the patterns of control and compliance, therefore gender is
not addressed as a theoretical concern.
This study is presented as follows. Chapter one discusses and
analyses the major research contributions concerning the labour process in
Japanese manufacturing transplants in Britain and America. It identifies the
strengths and shortcomings in this literature and uses these to construct the
key empirical and theoretical issues to be developed by this study. Chapter
two develops the analytical framework of embeddedness which forms the
8basis of this study. This framework is derived from the work of Granovetter
(1985) and uses his concepts of 'networks' and 'social relations' to construct a
series of categories through which the labour process can be analysed. This
approach is novel in two ways: it devises specific categories relating to
networks and social relations and it also applies these to the labour process
debate. The third chapter provides a critique of the methodologies employed
in some accounts of Japanese transplants and considers the appropriateness
of single-case ethnographic research to achieve the aims of this study.
Chapters four to eight present the empirical data. The focus of chapter
four is on workers' experience of personnel policies. In the main, the workers
see these policies as being neither fair nor consistently applied, generating a
distrust of management. A further feature of the personnel policies is that they
are characterised by a lack of coherence and, consequently, they undergo
continuous adjustment as the company seeks to rectify the tensions and
conflicts which arise. Chapters five and six present a linked account of
managerial control systems at the point of production. These control systems
provide an extensive array of surveillance mechanisms which include
'traditional' methods such as personal control as well as those based on the
electronic monitoring systems. The findings illustrate that despite the intensive
nature of control, workers still find ways of resisting through 'fiddles'. The
debate then moves on in chapter seven to consider the role of the
supervisors. Supervisors were under significant pressure to attain output
targets but were simultaneously faced with major logistical problems on the
shopfloor. To help resolve these production dilemmas they would often
9engage in reciprocal alliances with workers which involved the circumvention
of formal operating procedures. Thus supervisors were a key factor in
facilitating resistance. A further key influence on the labour process was the
company's relationship with its buyers and suppliers, and it is this which is
discussed in chapter eight. The company was subject to a high degree of
market pressure exerted by a small number of powerful customers, but it was
unable to replicate this pressure with its own key customers. In addition,
management failures to resource and to monitor company operating
procedures exacerbated supply problems. As a consequence of these factors,
there was a climate of uncertainty on the factory floor which allowed workers
the opportunity to engage in 'fiddles'.
The final chapter forms the conclusion. In the conclusion the
embeddedness framework is discussed in relation to the case study
presented here. It is argued that the framework has provided an effective
analytical base throuqh which to explore the complexities of workplace
relations. More broadly, the framework is used to consider current issues
within the wider labour process debate by addressing concerns over the
disappearance of collective labour from recent studies (Martinez-Lucio and
Stewart 1997). The conclusion also summarises the key findings in relation to
resistance, management and Japanisation. It is not proposed to replicate this
discussion here but it can be broadly synthesised into three points. First,
workers have retained the capacity to engage in resistance in at least some
high-surveillance organisations. Studies of resistance/compliance need to set
control and surveillance systems in the organisation's social and economic
10
context. Second, in analysing Japanese transplants, the policies of the
companies and actions of management need to be explored with awareness
of their potential shortcomings and tensions, rather than solely from a
perspective of coherence and effectiveness. Third, a holistic approach is
required in order to understand the complexity of the labour process and to
establish why workplace relations take their specific form in particular contexts
11
Chapter One
The Japanese Factory Floor in Britain and America: Evidence.
Controversies and Shortcomings in the Debate.
This chapter presents and analyses research concerning workplace
relations in Japanese transplants in Britain and America. The chapter has two
inter-related aims. First, given the extensive nature of the research material
and its conflicting and contested nature, the chapter organises, outlines and
evaluates the main issues and debates. Second, the chapter provides an
assessment of some of the shortcomings in the Japanisation literature in order
to generate the research issues to frame the study. The evaluation of both
case study material and theoretical perspectives generates a series of key
questions that inform the analytical basis of this study.
Research focussing on Britain and the United States of America has
been selected as this reflects the significant position of these two countries as
the 'home' to more Japanese foreign direct investment than any other nations.
In addition, while this choice allows the material to be kept within manageable
bounds, much of the literature on Japanese transplants concerns these two
countries, thus providing a rich resource base.
The chapter is organised in the following manner. It begins with a brief
analysis of the significance of the labour process under Japanisation and the
implications for managerial control within what has been characterised as a
'high dependency' production system (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992;
12
Schonberger 1982}. It then moves on to evaluate two contrasting perspectives
which emerge from academic studies of managerial control systems within
Japanese transplants. One view emphasises worker commitment and
empowerment, while the opposing perspective stresses heightened control
and surveillance. A critique of these studies leads to the next section which
discusses evidence suggesting that the shopfloor of transplant companies
continues to represent a frontier of control. Finally, there is a concluding
section which presents a summary of the chapter's findings and outlines
criteria that an analytical framework needs to meet in order to explain the
labour process in Japanese transplants.
Japanisation and the labour process
Before entering into the debates concerning workplace relations, it is
important to establish why the labour process in Japanese manufacturing
transplants has become an issue of contention. The starting point here is the
nature of the manufacturing system associated with Japanese companies. It is
argued that this system has a particular significance for the labour process by
making the firm more dependent upon their workforce than in previous
production regimes (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). It is a system which, despite
different practice at the level of the firm (Cusumano 1986), is organised
around three basic principles: muri (the avoidance of excess), muda (the
elimination of waste) and mura (the removal of unevenness) (Schonberger
1982). The implementation of these principles, whilst offering advantages over
traditional Western manufacturing systems, produces a more fragile
13
production process. For example, the avoidance of excess can be pursued
through just-in-time (JIT) supply and production systems which reduce or
eliminate buffer-stocks between workstations. This demands that operators
perform their tasks consistently and efficiently, as the effects of any deviations
from the norm quickly ripple along a production system shorn of any excess
work in progress. Similarly, the use of quality circles and kaizen programmes,
which can yield less material waste and higher product quality, relies on the
operators contributing their own knowledge and ideas to the improvement of
the production process (Wood 1989). This increased dependency on the
workforce gives it 'extra scope to cause disruption whether by accident or by
design' (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992:83).
For the firm to neutralise this dependency, it becomes imperative to
develop systems for the management of labour which render workers either
unable or unwilling to act against the company's interest. In the case of
Japanese manufacturing transplants there are two differing accounts of how
this dependency relationship is managed. On the one hand, there is a view
which emphasises the generation of worker commitment stemming from an
egalitarian regime and employee involvement and empowerment (Wickens
1987; Womack et aI.1990). Set against this is a critical perspective which
sees the personnel and production policies of Japanese transplants as
representing a new regime of subordination (Delbridge and Turnbull 1992;
Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b; Sewell and Wilkinson 1993). These two
competing perspectives can be named the 'high-commitment workforce' and
14
the 'tightly-controlled workforce' (Palmer 1996). This chapter now moves on to
explore and evaluate these two viewpoints.
The high-commitment workforce.
This perspective contends that Japanese transplants have successfully
changed workplace relations from an adversarial climate based on a conflict
of interests between managers and workers, to a unitarist culture based on
mutual respect and joint benefit. This is summarised by Wickens' maxim that
managers can change corporate culture from 'them and us to simply us'
(Wickens 1987:7).This realignment of sectional interests is achieved, it is
argued, through two broad sets of policies, HRM practices and work
organisation. Table one lists HRM and work organisation practices associated
with Japanese companies, which are consistent with the high commitment
model (Walton 1985)
Table 1
Japanese practices and the high-commitment model.
Workforce strategies Commitment Model AspecbofJapanese
Practice
Job design principles: Individual responsibility Kaizen
extended to upgrading Quality circles
system performance TQM
Frequent use of teams Team structures
as a basic accounting Cellular production
unit
Flexible definition of Functional flexibility.
duties contingent on
changing conditions.
15
Management Flat organisational Flat management
organisation; structure with mutual hierarchies.
structure, systems and influence systems. Two-way
style: communication
systems.
Minimum status Single-status.
differentials to Shop floor 'offices'.
de-emphasise inherent
hierarchy.
Compensation policies: Individual pay linked to Pay partially based on
skills and mastery. appraisal of skills and
performance.
Employment Assurances that No redundancy policy.
assurances: participation will not
result in loss of job.
Priority for training and Functional flexibility.
re-training existing On the job training.
workforce. Promotion through
internal labour market.
Employee voice policies: Employee participation Team briefings.
encouraged on a wide Kaizen.
range of issues. Quality circles.
Attendant benefits Company councils.
emphasised, New
concepts of corporate
governance.
Business data shared Written and verbal
widely. reports to employees
on regular basis.
Labour - management Mutuality in labour Company councils.
relations: relations, joint planning Single unions.
and problem -solving on
expanded agenda.
Unions, management No-strike
and workers redefine arrangements.
their respective roles. Union membership
recommended by
management.
Source: Palmer 1996.
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Advocates of Japanisation assert that the human resource
management policies of the transplant companies are a key factor in
generating worker loyalty, transforming the principles underlying the
management of labour from the imposition of direct control to the pursuit of
commitment. This HRM approach emphasises, amongst others things, careful
and extensive selection procedures to recruit employees not merely with the
required skills but also with the appropriate mix of attitudinal and personality
characteristics (Perruci 1994), harmonisation of terms and conditions of
service, abolition of overt status barriers and the development of effective two-
way communication channels, emphasising that workers at all levels have a
'voice' in the organisation (Trevor 1988).
The work organisation standpoint emphasises the (at least partial)
departure of Japanese production methods from the predominantly
FordistlTaylorist systems, with the subsequent 'empowerment' of workers. In
essence, it contends that employee commitment is achieved through the
contribution that workers are able to generate within the production process,
either through enlarged and more challenging task content or through kaizen
programmes and quality circles which encourage ideas and innovation from
the factory floor. A number of commentators have emphasised the enhanced
role for operators of Japanese-style work organisation. For Womack et al.
(1990), 'lean' production (essentially the Toyota production system) has
replaced the routine drudgery of the Fordist production line with a factory floor
staffed by 'highly skilled problem solvers whose task will be to think
17
continually of ways to make the system run more smoothly and productively'
(Womack et aI.1990:102). Likewise. Wood (1989) has emphasised the
problem-solving potential of employees under the Japanese production
system. arguing that their role becomes transformed into one of 'industrial
engineers' .
Other commentators have been similarly positive if somewhat more
circumspect. Kenney and Florida (1993) argue that the Japanese production
system can be characterised as an innovative-mediated model of production,
which is differentiated from Fordism by an emphasis on mental rather than
manual labour. They accept that innovative-mediated production can function
to 'pump more work from employees' (1993:275). but argue that the authority
and responsibility delegated to the team unleashes new forms of worker
initiative and creativity. Their view is that this 'trade off of greater effort for
intellectually stimulating employment can be of benefit to the worker.
However. they recognise that the transfer of this model. whilst. in their view,
offering advantages to employees, is not unproblematic but can rest on
management's ability to persuade workers to hand over their creative
potential and also on the actual extent of transfer of Japanese practices.
A variation on the Fordist versus Japanisation debate has been
promoted by Wickens (1993). He argues that for many companies such as
Nissan, most production processes remain necessarily rooted in Taylorist
methods in order to retain control over the production system. However, he
contends that commitment is generated by the involvement of operators in the
design and continual improvement of standard operating procedures:
18
Job satisfaction arises from performing the prescribed task well,
achieving high levels of productivity and quality, and, at the same time
being involved with changes in the process and the range of
discretionary tasks. This results in a much higher degree of integration
between the worker and the process, with workers being involved in
decisions which affect the company. The distinction between white-
collar and blue-collar workers becomes blurred, and the relationship
between workers and managers changes .... a controlled Taylorist
system need not alienate if workers are able to contribute (1993:38).
Support for Wickens' view that the technical and social organisation of
production associated with Japanisation represents a more worker-
empowered version of Taylorism, comes from Adler's study of the NUMMI
plant in America. Under its previous owners, General Motors, the factory was
described as 'the worst plant in the world', with 'low productivity, abysmal
quality, drugs and alcohol abuse and absenteeism of over 20%' (Adler 1993:
98). The plant was relaunched as a joint GM !Toyota venture and underwent a
transformation in industrial relations; productivity doubled and absenteeism
and measured grievances fell dramatically. Adler comments that:
the overall proportion of employees describing themselves as 'satisfied'
or very satisfied has risen progressively to more than 90% (1993:99).
Adler argues that this significant improvement in industrial relations was
achieved against a background of tighter work discipline and increased
standardisation of tasks. However, what also occurred was that workers were
19
allocated responsibility for the process of task standardisation. It was the line
operators who timed jobs, decided on the best way to perform individual tasks
and consequently wrote the detailed work specifications. In addition, the work
teams embraced the principle of continuous improvement and problenrsolving
through the kaizen process. Thus, for Adler, the critical explanation for the
increase in worker morale and the transformation of industrial relations at
NUMMI 'lies in the production system itself and in the policies and practices
which buttress it' (1993:102).
While it is apparent therefore, that there is no clear view amongst
advocates of Japanisation on the extent of the break from Fordism, there is
general agreement on the superiority of Japanese-style work organisation for
workers and that high levels of employee commitment can be an outcome of
these policies.
The goal of these high-commitment strategies is a reconfiguration of
worker-management relations into a high trust, positive-sum game where
conflict is replaced by mutual interest and co-operation. Control is not absent,
but for individual workers it is self-generated rather than imposed through
direct supervision. The pivotal element in generating and managing a high
commitment workforce is a synergy between HRM and manufacturing
strategies. Policies relating to the management of people are viewed as an
essential element of business strategy and seen as operating in support of
and in cohesion with production policies. Thus Oliver and Wilkinson (1982)
have argued that Japanese manufacturing transplants in Britain are
characterised by a 'goodness of fit' between their personnel and
20
manufacturing strategies, while Reitsperger (1986), in a study of Japanese,
British and American companies in Britain, concludes that the Japanese
transplants are distinguished by a 'careful fit' between manufacturing and
personnel policies. Similarly, research from America suggests that there is a
better 'fit' between the personnel and production policies of Japanese
transplants than of American emulators (Doeringer et al. 1998). This
coherence is echoed by Trevor in his study of Toshiba, who views personnel
and manufacturing policies as forming an 'interlocking system'. He comments
that:
it cannot be too strongly emphasised that a major aim of Japanese
management is to get the two systems in balance: what they would
call the 'hard' systems of quality control and production management
and the 'soft 'systems of employee motivation and personnel
administration. Those who look at only the 'hard' or the 'soft' are
missing the point. Hard and soft are not opposites but are two sides of
the same picture (1988:18).
In summary, the high-commitment perspective expounds significant
claims concerning the joint benefits of Japanisation to both workers and
management which emanate from an interlocking set of policies. Implicit in
this analysis is the assumption that these policles can transform employee
relations around an inclusive consensus culture where workers embrace the
organisation's objectives and resistance is absent. This raises the question of
whether these high-commitment strategies achieved their objectives. There is
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a considerable amount of material to suggest that they have not always
achieved the impact claimed by their advocates. It is this material which is
presented next.
The ability of management to change unilaterally an employee relations
culture from one of suspicion and adversarialism to that of commitment and
inclusion should not be overestimated. In a critique of culture management
models, Collins (1998) argues that culture-change perspectives present an
over-socialised model of change. By over-socialised, Collins means that it
overstates the ability of management to change attitudes which are historically
and socially embedded. He comments that:
Any model which claims that managers can effectively manage culture,
can change how people think and act must therefore, be viewed
academically, as over-socialised ...each person or group will tend to
adhere to the reality of organisational life as they perceive and
experience it. We must therefore be realistic about the extent to which
managers could effectively erase such a complex deep-rooted and
plural and socially maintained set of values. Similarly, we must be
realistic about the extent to which management could then impose a
new and monolithic set of values, attitudes and beliefs on any
population (1998:127)
Collins' argument provides a valuable counter-weight to accounts which do
not recognise the socially embedded nature of employment relationships. This
is not to argue that employees are not supportive of individual elements of the
'Japanisation package'. Evidence suggests that some workers have
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responded positively to single status (White and Trevor 1983), employment
security (Palmer 1996) and job rotation (Saso 1990). However, it is important
to differentiate between employee approval for specific measures and a more
comprehensive attitudinal change. As Kelly and Kelly (1992) found, workers
can approve of particular high-commitment strategies without changing their
underlying view that the employment continues to be characterised as 'them
and us'
In addition to social values presenting difficulties for culture-
management initiatives, the instrumental way that both workers and managers
in Japanese transplants have manipulated specific high-commitment
strategies has also militated against culture change in the workplace. In the
case of management, Broad's (1994a) five-year study of the operation of a
company council at a Japanese electronics transplant concludes that it was
unsuccessful in achieving management's objective of a 'consensus culture'.
Management's use of the council as a mechanism for passing information
down to the shop floor, rather than as a forum for joint negotiation of any
contentious issues, led to employee demands for the recognition of a union to
represent their interests. Similarly, research by Grant (1994) at two
electronics transplants operating 'new-style agreements (single-union
recognition, no strike agreements, company advisory body, single-status and
labour flexibility), suggests that they did not achieve their aim of creating a
high-trust environment. The pattern of workplace relations in both companies
was adversarial, as management failed or refused to grasp the 'spirit and
intention' of co-operation underpinning these agreements.
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Workers have also exploited strategies aimed at generating high
commitment. For example, the sophisticated selection process at Subaru,
which was aimed at producing employees with the 'correct' attitudes, was
manipulated by applicants who 'cheated' during the selection process by
supplying the answers they felt the company wanted to hear, rather than ones
that were necessarily true. Graham describes her own actions in so
manipulating the responses to a selection questionnaire:
In most instances the answers that matched the qualities the company
was seeking in employees seemed fairly obvious (and this was later
confirmed by other applicants). For example, when responding to the
statement: 'problems can be solved between employees and
management through talking', I felt that the 'correct' answer was pretty
straightforward. My only dilemma was how strongly should I agree
(Graham 1995:23).
(Potential) workers cannot therefore be seen simply as 'cultural dopes',
unaware of the broader political context of recruitment procedures; rather they
can demonstrate a strong instrumental manipulation of the system.
The degree of success or failure of high-commitment strategies is also
related to other factors. There is extensive case study evidence from
Japanese transplants to illustrate that young workers have not 'bought-into' a
unitarist corporate culture, rebelling against the high levels of discipline
existing in most transplants and exhibiting high levels of labour turnover and
absenteeism (Morris et al.1993; Palmer 1996; Smith and Eiger 1998). Some
transplants have sought to resolve this problem by changing policies away
24
from the recruitment of young workers towards hiring older, mature staff, who,
it is argued, are more likely to appreciate the carrot of employment security
and consequently demonstrate their commitment through regular attendance
and 'appropriate' behaviour on the shop floor (Palmer 1996).
The literature has also identified a further barrier to the development of
high commitment, namely, lack of managerial competence. Management's
inability to ensure the smooth organisation of production can engender a lack
of trust and commitment from the workforce (Batstone 1986). One such
example emerges in Grant's (1996) study of Renko, where the factory floor
was bedevilled by breakdowns in technology and poor quality supplies, and
consequently workers became disillusioned and demotivated. Grant
comments:
Workers believed them (production methods) to be poorly organised
and managed. Their willing participation in production methods
designed to ensure high standards of production had given way to
resentment, cynicism and a lack of commitment (1996:227).
That is not to argue that all Japanese transplants are characterised by poor
management. Indeed, there is evidence that in some companies management
has achieved an effective and efficient production organisation and that this is
viewed positively by shop floor workers (Trevor 1988). The point at issue is
that, despite the plethora of management literature proclaiming the superiority
of Japanese management, it is unacceptable merely to assume that
management in Japanese transplants are highly competent.
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Finally, it needs to be recognised that not all Japanese transplants
practice high-commitment strategies. Milkman's (1991) study of small
Japanese companies located in California found that these factories were
characterised by a simple production processes, staffed by low paid, mainly
immigrant workers with few of the HRM or work enrichment policies discussed
above. The only 'high-commitment' policy that was a consistent feature of the
sample was the non-contractual 'no-layoffs' policy which, Milkman argues,
was fairly meaningless given the regular turnover of labour in many
companies. Moreover, not only was high-commitment not practised, in some
cases it seemed to be positively discouraged. Managers in several plants
complained that labour turnover was too low which caused problems with staff
motivation and the inability of older workers to sustain the required pace of
work. Nor is it the case that the lack of high commitment strategies is limited
merely to a tranche of geographically specific small companies. Mair's study
of Honda U.K. found little evidence of employee involvement or job
enrichment. He comments that:
The preponderance of evidence from HUM in the 1990s points towards
a theory X interpretation of production systems and organisation of
work, which were found to be tightly controlled, with little variety of work
or scope for individual initiative (1998:300).
In summary, what assessment can be made of this high-commitment
perspective? While there is some support for it from certain high profile cases,
such as NUMMI, and possibly from some older workers and for some specific
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policies, the balance of evidence seems to suggest that employee
commitment is not the unproblematic outcome of particular sets of HRM or
production policies. Several reasons for this have emerged. It may be that
workplace relations are so engrained in adversarialism that culture change is
not possible, that managers and workers seek to manipulate these policies to
their advantage, that the incentives on offer do not compensate some workers
for the realities of an intensive and highly disciplined work environment, that
management are able to ensure a correctly functioning production
environment or, finally, that the policies themselves are not in place outside
'showcase' transplant companies.
The tightly-controlled workforce
This perspective sees the social and technical organisation of
production employed by Japanese manufacturing companies not as a vehicle
for generating high levels of commitment, but as providing the mechanism to
enhance the power of management over the workforce. For Wilkinson et al.
(1995) Japanisation represents the 'iron fist in the velvet glove', while
Delbridge and Turnbull comment:
Teamworking, job rotation and flexibility are not the means of releasing
the untapped reserves of human resourcefulness by increasing
employee commitment, participation and involvement as the soft
versions of HRM suggest. Rather, they are tools of work intensification
and heightened management control (1992:28).
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The fragility of the production system within Japanisation, it is argued,
requires that operator compliance cannot be risked on the willing co-operation
of a committed workforce, but rather, that control and surveillance are
necessary elements of the production regime. The social and technical
organisation of production associated with Japanisation is viewed as
increasing the subordination of labour in three interconnected ways: by
extending managerial control over the workforce, through the intensification of
the pace of work, and through heightened surveillance at the point of
production.
The extension of managerial control of the workforce is seen as
stemming from intensive selection procedures aimed at ensuring docile and
malleable staff, 'untainted' with a history of unionism or militancy (Delbridge
and Turnbull 1992), while the location of factories often in areas of high
unemployment acts as a disciplinary measure assuring compliance from any
potential malcontents (Kerrin 1998). Similarly, the use of diverse channels of
communication, such as team-briefings and company councils is seen as
mechanisms for muting any independent voice through trade unions
(Stephenson 1996).
Work intensification is linked in part to the use of JIT production
systems which reduce the amount of work-in-progress between work stations,
thereby thwarting operators' attempts to 'make out' or build up a 'kitty' and
eliminating their capacity to create time for themselves at the point of
production (Delbridge 1995). In addition, workers may be expected to
participate in kaizen activities, small incremental 'improvements' in the
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production process, which can have the effect of further paring down any
'non-productive' time in the working day (Fucini and Fucini 1990). A further
feature of work intensification is the widespread use of bell-to-bell working to
indicate periods of starting and finishing work and breaks. The significance of
bell-to-bell working is noted by Danford in his survey of Japanese transplant
companies in Wales. He comments that
Few analyses of Japanese working practices dwell to any extent on the
discipline of bell-to-bell working. Yet the manner in which this is
imposed on the transplant workforces makes it one of the most obvious
manifestations of the Japanese obsession with reducing idle time and
squeezing out sixty minutes of useful work from every worker in every
hour (1998b:49).
The use of bell-to-bell working in conjunction with a strict attitude to
punctuality and a fast pace of work can lead to operators working significantly
harder in Japanese transplants. The extent of work intensification is illustrated
by Fucini and Fucini's observation of the Mazda's American factory where
workers were involved in their work for 57 seconds out of every minute,
compared to the 45-second-a-minute pace of the Big Three worker. At Mazda
the working day 'included more work than a Ford or GM workday - 12 seconds
every minute, 12 minutes every hour, 96 minutes every 8-hour day, and one 8
hour day more every 5-day week' (Fucini and Fucini 1990:148).
The third objective, that of heightened surveillance at the point of
production, stems from total quality manufacturing (TOM) and teamworking.
Turning initially to TOM, while some studies have reported an increase pride
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and involvement as workers are allocated responsibility for ensuring a fault-
free product (Saso 1990), the main contentions surrounding the impact of
TOM on the labour process have concerned increased managerial control.
The objective of TOM is 'zero defects', which, when translated into factory
floor practice, means that deviation from standard operating procedures is
rigorously identified and punished. Where TOM is linked with the
establishment of an internal customer ethos, operators are made responsible
for the quality of the work that they pass on to their workmate. The
consequence of this philosophy is that if quality is deficient, then, as a
'customers', the worker receiving the defective work will complain to their
colleague. This creates a situation which promotes peer surveillance as it
leads to operators policing the performance of their colleagues (Kerrin 1998).
The link between TOM and heightened surveillance has been argued
forcefully by Sewell and Wilkinson in relation to Kay Electronics, a British-
based, Japanese-owned manufacturing company, where a number of
procedures have been implemented to identify, publicise and hold to account
operators who produce defective work (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b;
Sewell and Wilkinson 1993). Above each operator's work-station is a
coloured card indicating the number of faulty operations they had performed
the previous day, making individual performance highly visible to managers
and workmates alike. A tagging system is used, whereby operators mark their
own work to certify that it is of the required quality standard. If any defect is
subsequently discovered when it goes through an electronic check at the end
of the line,it can be traced back to the individual operator concerned. Sewell
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and Wilkinson view the traceability at Kay as analogous to the prison
panopticon described by Jeremy Bentham. Just as the prisoners became self-
disciplining due to the their constant (perceived) visibility to the warders, so, it
is argued, shop floor operators under the continual panoptic eye of electronic
and visual surveillance systems will regulate their behaviour in line with
managerial demands. The significance of the panoptic model of surveillance
is described by Grey:
The model of the panopticon draws attention to the use of techniques
of surveillance which render visible, or potentially visible, the most
minute details of individual's behaviour. Panoptic techniques ean
therefore serve as the basis for interventions in behaviour which is
judged to be undesirable or unproductive. Perhaps more importantly,
panoptic techniques ean have the effect of creating self-disciplined
behaviour amongst those subjected to surveillance (1994:479).
It is further argued that increased surveillance stems not only from
TaM but also from the pressure created by the delegation of responsibility for
targets to workgroups (Garrahan and Stewart 1992; Graham 1995; Sewell and
Wilkinson 1992a). For example, Graham contends that teamworking
represents a major feature in the 'social control' achieved by Japanese
transplants and that it is a key factor in ensuring managerial hegemony. She
argues that team working enforces compliance through a hierarchy of three
levels of discipline. The first is self-discipline, where workers accept the
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responsibilities of team membership. If this fails, peer pressure is used to
bring recalcitrant workers back into line. Graham comments:
Even though 'teaming up' and 'pulling together' were part of SIA's
official management philosophy, unkind acts towards team members
were not officially discouraged by management and at times were even
encouraged' (1995:99).
If this fails, then the third level of discipline, the team leader, exerts his or her
authority.
A key question raised by this tightly-controlled perspective is how
workers react to this new regime of subordination. A few proponents of this
perspective have argued that operators have engaged in some acts of
resistance in order to ameliorate the impact of heightened surveillance and
the intensification of work (Fucini and Fucini 1990; Graham 1995). However, a
significant body of research has claimed that these systems of control and
surveillance have not been challenged by operators, and that management
has been successful in eliminating many of the covert practices used by
workers to gain time and space at the point of production (Delbridge and
Turnbull 1992; Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a; Sewell and Wilkinson 1993). It is
assumed that dissent has been stifled and that informal resistance remains
dormant. As Delbridge et al. comment, 'worker counter-control (in the sense
described by Roy and many others) is effectively eliminated' (1992:105).
What are we to make of this Bravermanesque portrayal of impotent
workers and omnipotent management? There are problems with this claim.
First, in contrast to the over-socialised account of the high-commitment
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perspective, this radical viewpoint assumes an under-socialised explanation
of workplace behaviour. For Collins:
under-socialised models of organisation and change fail to
acknowledge the extent to which management as an activity, and as an
ideology, is delimited by social conflicts and pressures, and so, must
be extremely limited accounts of organisation and change (1998:82)
The problem with under-socialised models of change is that they fail to
address the essentially social nature of change and the significance of human
agency in frustrating or reinterpreting managerial designs. This analysis is
relevant to the heightened-control perspective, because while this perspective
acknowledges a conflict of interests between workers and management, it
relegates human agency to a role of near imootence'. It assumes there is no
distinction between managerial objectives and policy outcomes.
This tendency to conflate policy intention and outcome is illustrated by
the way in which accounts of the demise of resistance are often based on the
assumptions that 'read off the impact of policies from their stated aims,
ignoring the possibility that policies may not work as designed and that they
may be manipulated by actors in support of their own interests. For example,
Defbridge and Turnbull (1992) claim that the extensive selection methods
employed by some Japanese transplants provide a mechanism for recruiting a
3 Stewart (1996) argues that this management control perspective presents an over-socialised view of
labour as it views the institutions of employee representation, especially trade unions, as incorporated
by capital. The designation 'under-socialised' is preferred in this study because it provides a way of
contrasting the ideological differences underpinning the commitment/compliance standpoints.
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compliant workforce, citing Mazda's recruitment procedures at their Flat Rock
plant as a case in paint. But, there is evidence to suggest that Mazda's
workers recruited through this extensive process have been anything but
compliant and have challenged managerial authority over a range of issues
(Babson 1993; Fucini and Fucini 1990). Similarly, Garrahan and Stewart's
study of Nissan which portrays a compliant workforce has been criticised by
Allen (1994) for inferring in a mechanistic way the actual effects of policies
from their objectives. Allen comments that she 'remains sceptical that Nissan
has cracked the old employer problem of turning human beings into robots to
the extent that the authors convey' (1994:121).
A further problem with accounts that have emphasised the demise of
resistance is the role allocated to technology. There are two paints here. First,
the surveillance function associated with technology (Sewell and Wilkinson
1992a) is an analysis which is constructed on technological determinism, and
does not recognise the mediating influence of human action on technology
(Grint and Woolgar 1997). As Wilkinson (1982) has illustrated, management
objectives to increase control through technology can be thwarted by workers.
More generally, there is little attention given the operational fallibility of
technology. In some accounts technology is central to the intensive pace of
work and to the monitoring of team and individual performance, but there is no
mention of the technology malfunctioning. There is evidence to suggest
however, that the production process within Japanese transplants can
experience difficulties arising from with unreliable technology (Fucini and
Fucini 1990; Grant 1996). It may be the case therefore that the reliance on
34
technology as a key element in the managerial control processes is far from
unproblematic.
The case for resurrecting worker resistance in the discourse of control
and surveillance has been made by several commentators (Ackroyd and
Thompson 1999; Stewart 1996; Stewart 1998; Thompson and Ackroyd 1995).
Stewart agues that despite the fact that the control perspective has different
ideological underpinnings from the high commitment approach, they both
present an unacceptable teleological account of employee relations in that
they stress workplace consensus, be it based upon quiescence or
subordination. He suggests that 'Japanisation' research needs to look beyond
consensus by recognising the managerial initiatives do not operate in a social
vacuum, that they are likely to be challenged by labour and that 'conflicts and
social struggles must be seen to be inherently part of Japanese employment
relations' (1996:16).
Similarly, in a wide-ranging critique of the tightly-controlled workforce
perspective, Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) argue that within a capitalist
mode of production, workplace relations cannot be adequately understood
and theorised without the recognition of worker action in pursuit of their
particular interests. Resistance represents a significant feature within the
historical development of the labour process, and despite a series of
managerial innovations to impose control over the shopfloor, employees have
used formal and informal ways to renegotiate the effort-bargain and to gain
some control over their own working time. Thompson and Ackroyd suggest
that to deny the presence of effective resistance is to fall into the trap of
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accepting the assertions of managerial literature and then re-interpreting
these within a different ideological framework. Whilst recognising the impact
of economic, political and technological change in constraining worker action,
Thompson and Ackroyd claim that the basic conditions for resistance remain.
In particular, workers retain their ingenuity in subverting control systems and
use their knowledge of the production process to buy pockets of time and
space on the shop floor. This leads Thompson and Ackroyd to argue that
there is a need to 'recognise that innovatory employee behaviour will continue
to subvert managerial regimes' (1995:629).
In summary, what assessment can be made of this control perspective?
There seems little doubt the technical and social organisation of production
associated with Japanisation has the potential to extend managerial control
and surveillance and to intenSify the pace of work. In some cases this may
have been at least partially achieved. The extensive marginalisation of
resistance is however somewhat more problematic. In particular, a distinction
needs to be drawn between the intention and outcome of policies; attention
needs to be paid to the impact of human action and technical fallibility upon
managerial objectives. There is a growing body of evidence both from Britain
(Broad 1994a; Grant 1996; Palmer 1996; Stephenson 1996) and from
America (Babson 1993; Babson 1996; Fucini and Fucini 1990; Graham 1994;
Graham 1995), which illustrates that workers have managed to mobilise and
sustain some challenges to this new regime of subordination. This suggests
that workplace discipline is not solely shaped by managements' actions and
that the factory floor continues to be a 'frontier of control' (Edwards 1990).
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Control. compliance and resistance: The transplant as a 'frontier of control'.
The term 'frontier of control ' is used by Edwards to capture the
dynamic nature of workplace relations. Control systems can be viewed as
processes through which management attempt to negotiate order in the
workplace. Management cannot simply rely on workers doing as they are told;
rather they are actively involved in the supervision and motivation of labour in
an attempt to ensure that their objectives are met. How successful
management is in achieving this will depend upon factors such as the
technical organisation of production, the nature of product and labour markets
and also by the histories of particular workplaces, workgroups and industries
(Edwards 1986). It is these contingent factors that characterise workplace
relations as a frontier because outcome of managerial policies is often
indeterminate, with their impact being mediated by previous and current
structural and ftrm-speciftc factors.
In the context of the Japanisation debate this analysis of the factory
floor as a frontier of control generates a requirement to look beyond over-or
under-socialised accounts of workplace relations and recognise the
contingent nature of managerial hegemony and worker dissent. This is well
illustrated by Stephenson's study of the varying fortunes of trade unions in two
Japanese transplants. She argues that in one company, Nissan, the influence
of organised labour has been marginalized as traditional trade union functions
of 'communication and problem solving have been replaced by the team
leader, the company council and the kaizen meeting' (Stephenson 1996:219).
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By contrast, at Ikeda-Hoover trade unionism proved more effective. Ikeda-
Hoover is a first tier supplier to Nissan, delivering parts every fifteen minutes
to the Nissan production line, with stringent penalties for non-compliance. A
strongly unionised group of skilled workers, aware that disruptions to JIT
could present problems for Ikeda-Hoover, used this knowledge to extract
concessions from management. Stephenson's study is important in that it
explores the capacity of workers to engage in dissent both through factors at
the point of production and also through influences external to the factory
floor, such as labour and product markets.
A further example of successful worker opposition through the
institutional channels of trade union representation occurred at Mazda's
American plant. Here the company rhetoric of 'welfare paternalism' was
contradicted by the actions of management, sowing the seeds of worker
dissent. At the Flat Rock plant the lack of any respite from production
activities became a major focus of worker resistance, especially as the actual
working conditions deviated from the promised work environment. As Fucini
and Fucini observe:
The company talked about treating workers with respect and dignity and
making everyone part of the Mazda family, while it refused to give them
fans and cold drinks on a 90-degree day (1990:170).
A further focus of worker dissatisfaction stemming from the high levels of work
effort at Mazda was health and safety. As consequence of this growing worker
dissatisfaction at the Mazda plant a more militant group of union officials were
elected with a mandate of gaining concessions on health and safety and to
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obtain input from workers and the union into shop floor organisation (Babson
1993).
Successful worker resistance to highly intensive work regimes is not
limited to formal representation. Graham's (1995) study of the non-unionised
Subaru plant in America illustrates how a number of individual and collective
strategies were employed successfully by workers, both to gain some respite
from the intensive pace of work and also to counter what were seen as
unacceptable managerial demands such as compulsory overtime. These
actions ranged from veiled and symbolic protest, such as the ridiculing of
company rituals, to direct confrontation including leaving the moving line
without permission. However, these strategies of resistance were set against
powerful management control techniques, leading Graham to conclude that
both compliance and resistance were features of the Subaru shop floor.
Further support for the existence of worker resistance in non-unionised
companies comes from my previous research based on interviews with British
and Japanese managers in three Japanese transplants located in two 'new'
towns (Palmer 1996). In each of the three companies workers engaged in
strategies which challenged management's right to determine unilaterally
levels of effort and conditions of employment. In some instances worker
dissent took the form of quitting and absenteeism. On other occasions
resistance involved contesting managerial surveillance strategies more
directly. For example, in one of the case study companies management
introduced a policy of record cards above individuals' job stations, indicating
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how many mistakes they had made that day. The production manager
commented that this policy:
Caused problems to start with and then after the initial reaction it was
ignored. People would say "you had two today, I only had one", and
that was it. It became more of a joke. It didn't work so we scrapped it
(Palmer 1996:138)
More broadly, informal employee action in all three companies meant that
management were forced into significant policy amendments.
This issue of Japanese transplants having to take ongoing and
remedial action to manage workplace relations is most clearly illustrated in
Eiger and Smith's studies of transplant companies in Telford (1998). Their
research shows how, in the context of a buoyant labour market, tight
workplace discipline and perceived managerial 'unfairness', the companies
had difficulty in recruiting, retaining and regulating employees. Management
in the transplant companies were forced into a number of policy amendments
and developments in order to obtain a 'mandate' to manage. This mandate did
not give management complete control over workplace relations but,
according to the authors, represents 'a tacitly negotiated pattern of qualified
compliance with management prerogatives' (1998:192).
What emerges therefore from case study findings is that resistance in
Japanese transplants has not been totally marginalised. Workers have
engaged in resistance both through formal channels of labour representation
and through more informal means. Management still have to contend with the
'problem' of labour control. That is not to argue that worker resistance will be
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a feature of every transplant company. In some instances management may
have been successful in stifling resistance or overt dissent. One such
example is provided by Delbridge's (1998) study of Nippon CTV. Through a
short period of participant observation, he illustrates how a JITfTOM regime
was successful in marginalising employee resistance. Given the strictures and
criticisms levied against the demise of resistance in the previous section, why
should Delbridge's account be accepted? The answer is twofold. First, the
nature of the data, based on ethnographic research, means that Delbridge
was able to record and report actual workplace practice. More significantly,
Delbridge is able to account for the context in which managerial control
systems were able to operate effectively. The key to managerial control at
Nippon was the production environment which was characterised by the
steady flow of reliable parts under the company's 'bounded JIT' system, by
reliable technology and by a predictable demand schedule as a supplier to the
company's own commercial division. Delbridge argues that this stable
production environment allows management to isolate the factory floor from
uncertainty thus clOSing down the gaps and spaces at the point of production
which workers may have exploited to their own advantage.
Delbridge's analysis is also valuable in raising the role of management
in the negotiation of order on the shop-floor. He argues that at the junior
management level, supervisors have a key role in maintaining this climate of
discipline. The predictability of production and support for the supervisor from
senior managers meant that supervisors did not have to enter into any
informal negotiations with workers to achieve production targets.
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Consequently supervisors kept a tight rein on the shop-floor and were
instrumental in marginalising worker 'misbehaviour' (Delbridge and
Lowe1997). Within this overall climate of managerial control, workers at
Nippon were still able to engage in minor rule-breaklnq, but here again this
was with the tacit approval of management. Where workers' opportunistic
behaviour would help the achievement of targets then supervisors and other
managers would either conspire with workers or 'turn-a-blind-eye' to their
activities. Moreover, Delbridge contends that this pattern of indulgence was
also practised by senior managers who chose to ignore minor rule-breaking,
as they felt that to punish every incident of misbehaviour may provoke worker
antagonism.
In summary, this section has illustrated that both resistance and
compliance exist in Japanese transplants. What emerges is that neither
commitment nor compliance is the necessary outcome of specifiC sets of
managerial policies. The key points to understanding the nature of worker-
management relations are: the need to study control systems in action, to
acknowledge that their impact can be mediated by factors both internal and
external to the point of production and to recognise the influence of a range of
actors on the labour process. This contingent nature of workplace relations is
one of the key themes addressed in the following section.
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Summing up and moving on
Summing up
The detailed consideration of case study evidence has produced a
complex and varied picture of workplace relations in Japanese transplants. By
comparing cases it is possible to identify clusters of policies which are
associated with commitment, compliance and resistance, These are outlined
in table two.
Table 2.
Factors associated with varying employee responses.
Commitment Compliance Res~Btance
Consistent application of High levels of Tensions between policy
HRM policies unemployment in the and practice
locality
Employee voice on wide Isolation of production Young workforce
range of bargaining issues process from external and
internal uncertainty
Opportunities to Managerial indulgency Japanese management
participate freely in suspicion of 'local'
problem solving activities industrial relations
JITrrOM production Lack of managerial
methods competence
Supervisors enforce Supplier subservience to
workplace rules major customer
Independent trade union
Productivity targets
inconsistent with
resources
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This table provides a means of classifying the features most commonly
associated with particular types of employee response. Where features in one
particular column predominate, the workplace is likely to be characterised by
that employee response. It is also important to recognise the broad range of
contingent features, and that these include factors not only at the point of
production but also wider commercial considerations such as product and
labour markets. In addition, the actions and motives of supervisors and
managers need to be acknowledged.
It is important to distinguish between this contingency analysis and the
previously criticised 'tightly-controlled workforce' approach which assumed
that the outcome of policies could be derived from their objectives. There are
a number of important distinctions between these two approaches. The
contingent analysis does not infer that compliance/commitment/resistance are
mutually exclusive within one setting, nor does it claim that where features in
one column prevail, all employee responses will be of that single dimension.
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the factors identified in table two have
their own, sometimes contradictory, internal dynamics. Thus, for example, the
message of commitment portrayed by single-status can be contradicted by a
disregard for health and safety practice. What the analysis in table two does
represent is progress, both in moving away from simple over-or under-
socialised accounts of workplace relations and also by providing, at least, a
tentative explanation for the myriad of reported responses relating to the
labour process in Japanese manufacturing transplants.
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Moving on
In order to take the Japanisation debate forward, it is necessary not merely to
provide a summary and assessment of case study evidence but crucially to
provide an analytical framework to explain this diversity of workplace
relations. As Thompson argues it is important to avoid the position where the
,J
abandonment of theory 'is leading inexorably towards the revival of the largely
dead body of one-off plant-level studies' (1990:108).
The two currently published ethnographic accounts of the labour
process in Japanese transplants do combine the detail of shopfloor relations
with an overall conceptual framework. Although these offer useful progress in
both detail and conceptual understanding, both have shortcomings. In a study
of Subaru, Graham (1993, 1994, 1995) formulates seven dimensions of either
technical or social control with which to analyse data generated through an
extensive period of covert participant observation. While this provides an
interesting and innovative form of analysis, it neglects two key points. First,
Graham ignores factors external to the point of production; these factors such
as labour and product markets can, as has been demonstrated earlier, playa
key influence on workplace relations. Second, other key actors apart from
workers are confined to the margins. The motives of managers are not
explored, while supervisors are largely relegated to the role of 'little corporals'
implementing the wishes of management.
The second account to integrate the detail of shopfloor relations within
an analytical framework is Delbridge's (Delbridge and Lowe 1997;
Delbridge1998) study of Nippon CTV. As discussed above, Delbridge links
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management's capacity to marginalise resistance with their ability to isolate
the shop floor from uncertainties. This study is particularly valuable as it sets
the operation of surveillance systems within the organisation's product market
environment and also explores the role of supervisors and managers in
maintaining workplace order. What Delbridge's account does not provide
(J
however, is any comprehensive analysis of the context and operation of HRM
policies. Scant attention is given to issues such as Single-status, employment
security or company communication strategies. In a separate study of Nippon
some ten years earlier, Significant claims were made for the importance of the
company council in generating co-operative worker-management relations
(Trevor 1988). Whilst recognising that the council might no longer be in
operation, the lack of any reference to its existence by Delbridge is indicative
of the low priority he allocates to Nippon's HRM policies.
What then would a satisfactory analytical framework of workplace
relations address? Drawing upon the debates raised in this chapter and the
shortcomings in current analytical models it is possible to identify four key
paints which are central to a comprehensive framework:
• Any analytical framework should avoid either oversocialised or
undersocialised accounts of workplace behaviour.
• It should embrace an analysis that includes factors both external to the
point of production in addition to firm specific issues.
• It needs to include the motives and actions of a range of actors not just
those of operators.
"
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• It needs to recognise the contingent nature of resistance, compliance and
consent.
It is an aim of this thesis to develop a comprehensive analytical framework for
understanding the labour process in Japanese transplants. A framework that
G~
meets the four requirements set out above can be provided by
embeddedness. It is the development of the embedded ness framework that
forms the basis of the next chapter.
"
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Chapter Two
The Embeddedness Framework
Having set out the requirements for an adequate analytical framework to
G
explore the labour process in Japanese manufacturing transplants, this
chapter develops such a framework. The framework chosen is based on the
concept of embeddedness. The application of the term 'embeddedness' to
workplace relations is not entirely new. It has been used in the general
meaning of the word to explain how workplace relations are 'embedded' in the
realities of local labour markets (Eiger and Smith 1998), and how worker
resistance is embedded in the manner in which they view themselves as
subjects (Collinson 1994; Gottfried 1994). However, within this study the term
'embeddedness' is taken to have a more specific meaning as defined by
Granovetter (1985).
The argument presented here is that the embeddedness framework
offers a suitable structure for analysing the labour process in Japanese
transplants as it fulfils the requirements identified at the end of the previous
chapter. The framework helps to resolve the shortcomings in current
theoretical perspectives and provides a set of analytical categories through
which case study material can be explored. Therefore, the link between the
current and the previous chapter is that this chapter presents a framework
which attempts to remedy the deficiencies discussed in chapter one.
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In order to both outline the embeddedness framework and justify its
value, the chapter is organized in the following manner. It begins with a
discussion of the antecedents and principles of embedded ness. Then,
following Granovetter's model, two dimensions of embeddedness are
identified, namely networks and social relations. The chapter outlines and
I_).,
discusses four types of network structure and three categories of social
relations that impact on the labour process. It concludes with a
diagrammatical representation of the embeddedness model and a discussion
of how this model fulfils the requirements identified in the conclusion of the
previous chapter
Embeddedness: antecedents. principles and application
There are two key interrelated elements to Granovetter's conception of
embedded ness: the existence of formal and informal structures and ties which
bind actors together, what Granovetter labels 'networks', and the interaction
and influence of individuals within these structures, which he refers to as
'social' or 'personal' relations. In using these concepts Granovetter built upon
the work of a number of sociologists in the 1970s and early 1980s who were
developing network theory as a way of explaining social interaction within
groups (Burt 1980; Burt 1982). The thrust of these sociological explorations
was to develop analytical approaches which relied upon algebraic
formulations to identify differing patterns of network structures and to analyse
the interaction of actors within them (Burt 1980; Burt 1982; Knoke and
Kuklinski 1982). This early analysis represented an attempt to reconcile the
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debate between structure and agency as determinants of action. Network
theory (as it was then named) recognised the capacity of individuals to exert
influence and impose meaning on their actions, but also that these actions
were set within broader social structures within which individual's were
located. Burt comments that 'actors are purposeful under social structural
constraints' (1982:330) and that network analysis provides a 'connection
between micro and macro level social theory' (1980:79). It was also argued
that network theory could provide a useful vehicle for empirical investigation
of any situation that involved individuals in social interaction, from small
informal gatherings to corporate groups. Network analysis was used to
explore relationships as diverse as the study of the 'black economy' in a
Swedish village (Hansen 1981) to sanctions applied to 'deviant' members in
primitive societies (Southard 1981).
The use of network analysis by sociologists appeared to atrophy in the
early 1980's. Interest in networks was revitalized with the publication of
Granovetter's seminal article 'Economic action and social structure: the
problem of embeddedness' (1985). This differed from previous work in that it
focused specifically on interaction between individuals and groups within and
between firms. Additionally, Granovetter coined the term 'embedded ness' as a
means of explaining and exploring economic relationships. By
'embedded ness' he refers to the manner in which 'attempts at purposeful
action are embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations'
(1985:487). Embeddedness can be viewed as having two interconnected
dimensions. One is the formal and informal systems or structures which are
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present in economic life and through which transactions are conducted. The
name given to these structures by Granovetter is networks. The second
dimension of embeddedness is social relations. In part, social relations refers
to the ongoing pattern of interaction within networks. Also, implicit in
Granovetter's use of the term social relations, is the ability of individuals to
shape the outcomes of network transactions, for example through knowledge
or self-interest. So, the outcomes of networks cannot be determined from their
existence, rather they are dependent upon the interplay of social relations
between constituents. As Granovetter observes, networks can be
characterised by trust, conflict or malfeasance. Following this line of
argument, social relations will be used in this thesis to refer to the purposeful
action of constituents which takes place within network structures.
Granovetter develops the concept of embedded ness as an alternative
to what he describes as 'over-socialised' and 'under-socialised' accounts of
economic behaviour. By 'under-socialised' he refers to the analysis offered by
classical and neo-classical economists which treat individuals as atomised
actors influenced only by rational economic decision making. By 'over-
socialised' he alludes to arguments which infer current, past and future
behaviour of individuals from broad social, political or economic categories, to
which they are viewed as 'belonging'. He argues that:
under- and over-socialised approaches are paradoxically similar in
their neglect of ongoing social structures of social relations (1985:481)
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Granovetter contends that the concept of embeddedness recognises the
manner in which social structures can shape behaviour whilst avoiding the
pitfalls of over-deterministic or reductionist perspectives.
In order to 'operationalise' his use of embeddedness he formulates a
critique of markets and hierarchies as means of conducting transactions. An
analysis based on markets, he argues, represent an under-socialised account
of exchange because it focuses solely on the current price of goods and
services and is underpinned by a view of action premised solely on economic
rationality. It is an analysis that ignores the significance of social relations
between individuals in trading organisations and the history of past
exchanges between these individuals. Granovetter observes that:
It is, for example, a commonplace in the literature on industrial
purchasing that buying and selling relationships rarely approximate to
the spot-market model of classical theory .....A moment's reflection will
suggest several reasons for this behaviour, including the costs
associated with searching for new suppliers and establishing new
relationships, the fact that users are likely to prefer sources, and the
likelihood that the buyer has established personal relationships that he
values with representatives of the supplying firm (1985:496).
Commenting on the concept of hierarchies developed by Williamson's
transaction-cost analysis, Granovetter argues that this can produce an over-
socialised view of behaviour, in that it is based on the understanding that
participants within an organisation share and act upon a common interest
which is defined by management. Granovetter comments that:
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The over-socialised view that orders within a hierarchy elicit easy
obedience and that employees internalise the interests of the firm,
suppressing any conflict of their own, cannot stand scrutiny
(Granovetter 1985:501)
While not denying the operation of markets and hierarchies, Granovetter
argues that many transactions are more appropriately pursued within inter-
firm networks and are subject to personal interactions within these networks;
embeddedness, it is contended, permeates all aspects of economic
transactions.
Granovetter's analysis stimulated a shift in emphasis from research into
social networks to that of industrial networks (Hakansson and Johanson
1993). It has stimulated a significant amount of interest from scholars of
organizational studies and business management seeking to explore the rapid
growth of inter-firm trading which has been stimulated by developments in
technology, the pursuit of organizational flexibility and by broader economic
and political change (Dicken 1998; Parker 1998). The shift in emphasis from
social to industrial networks has stimulated research into such diverse areas
as managerial practice within the British N.H.S. (Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996),
supply-chain management (Harland 1996), and post-socialist structures in the
former Communist states of Eastern Europe (Grabher and Stark 1997)
Indeed, the use of network analysis has become so ubiquitous among
researchers investigating inter-firm relations, that the editor of one text on
networks felt obliged to use the introduction to justify the rationale for 'another
book on networks' (Grabher 1993:i).
'I
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In summary, this section has traced the antecedents of
embeddedness, explained the embeddedness model as developed by
Granovetter and explored briefly how this model has been applied in recent
academic work. Despite the mushrooming popularity of embeddedness,
Granovetter's analysis that has not been applied to studies of management-
worker interaction. This raises questions about its applicability to workplace
relations: it is this issue that the chapter addresses next.
The embeddedness framework and the labour process: explanation and
justification.
There are clear grounds for arguing that the concept of embeddedness,
as outlined by Granovetter, has relevance to the labour process. It has long
been accepted that employee behaviour cannot be simply reduced to under-
socialised accounts based on the atomised actions of individuals and
premised solely on economic rationality (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and
Dickson 1964). Also, the danger of over-socialised explanations of employee
actions based on broad social categories such as culture has been
recognised (Clegg 1990). Furthermore, the significance of structures both
internal and external to the firm, in shaping the labour process has long been
established, as illustrated by Lupton's (1963) study of the interaction of
product and labour markets and the internal organisation of production.
Similarly, the significance of social relations in generating trust or dissent is
exemplified by, for example, Edwards' argument that workplace relations
'have histories of their own' (1988:202), with worker attitudes ariSing out of
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and developing in response to the transmission of internally constructed
social relations.
In order to use the concept of embeddedness it is important not only to
establish that it has broad relevance to the labour process, but also to devise
a sustainable framework which can be applied to workplace relations. To do
this the two key concepts underpinning embeddedness, namely networks and
social relations, need to be discussed in more detail and developed further to
provide a specific and rigorous framework for labour process analysis. The
following two sections provide an empirical outline and justification for the
embeddedness framework with reference to case studies of workplace
behaviour. The empirical material used, deliberately excludes data on
Japanese transplants. This approach has been chosen in order to locate the
embeddedness framework within historically recognised debates concerning
workplace relations. It also acknowledges arguments which suggest that the
social relations which underpin Japanisation have an essential continuity with
other production regimes (Danford 1998b).
Networks
In order to use network analysis, the question of what constitutes a network
needs to be addressed. At the broadest level:
The notion of a network can be employed to characterize any set of
recurring ties (e.g. resource, friendship, informational ties) amongst a
set of nodes {e.g. individuals, groups, organizations, information
systems and so on (Fombrun 1982, cited Ebers, 1997:15).
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Although this generic definition is helpful in understanding what constitutes a
network across a range of disciplines and contexts, a more precise set of
descriptors is required in order to apply network analysis to a business
environment. Following Hakansson (1987), networks can be viewed as
consisting of three interlinked dimensions. Although Hakansson's analysis
was devised for industrial networks, the three dimensions are equally
appropriate for labour process analysis. First, they consist of actors, who can
vary from individuals to groups of companies. This breadth of recognition is
significant in the context of workplace relations because it allows an analysis
of the factors influencing the labour process to incorporate individual action
but is not constrained by this and can also include corporate and inter-firm
influences. A second dimension of networks is that they concern both 'the
transformation act' and the 'transaction act'. Again, this analysis recognises
the essential nature of the labour process. The transformation act involves the
activities of workers, using tools and physical labour, to transform materials
into products for exchange or sale (Thompson 1989). The transaction act
involves the process of establishing the terms and conditions under which
labour is put to work, and also the interaction between constituents in the
value chain through the buying and selling of goods. A final dimension of
networks is that they involve the use, control and knowledge of physical and
human resources and that there is a degree of mutual dependence. This issue
of resources and mutual dependence underlines the basic contradictory
nature of the labour process. On the one hand, workers and managers have
stocks of knowledge and expertise which they might seek to use to their own
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advantage. But, also, there is a point beyond which seeking self-interest
becomes counter-productive, as there is normally a basic shared concern in
the firm's continuance in business.
The principles relating to industrial networks therefore seem
specifically applicable to workplace relations. The question remains as
whether to classify workplace relations as a single network process
characterised by a number of activity chains (Hakansson and Johanson
1993), or to delineate a number of networks which impact upon the point of
production. This latter approach has been adopted here in order to allow the
varying influences upon the labour process to be traced and evaluated more
effectively. Also, the delineation of networks is more valuable in facilitating
comparison with other studies. There is the danger that in identifying a
number of separate networks the analysis will present a fragmented and
compartrnentalised view. To avoid this the approach taken will be to recognise
the discreet but interrelated nature of these networks
This raises the question of what network structures are appropriate.
There is a body of evidence that indicates product markets and buyer-supplier
relations are significant factors in influencing workplace relations (Kelly 1985;
Lupton 1963), therefore one suggested category is that of commercial
networks. At the point of production the significance of both official and
informal interactions between workers, and also between workers and
supervisors, in shaping the labour process has been identified (Burawoy
1979; Gillespie 1993; Roy 1954), leading to two further categories, namely
workgroup networks and supervisory networks. A final issue concerns the way
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in which management seek to direct and control the workforce through
reward, sanction, motivation etc. In part, this is contained within and emerges
out of workgroup and supervisory networks. But, this process of direction and
control is also shaped by the written and unwritten policies and practices
which structure the employment relationship. These written policies,
concerning pay, conditions of service, grievance procedures etc. constitute
the formal contract. The unwritten policies and practices comprise the
psychological contract (Rousseau 1995). The unwritten psychological contract
is perceptions of both the employer and employee of the expectations and
commitments which characterise the employment relationship (Mullins 1996).
Just as the contents of formal contact are often determined by the personnel
department, so personnel policy and practice has a central influence upon the
psychological contract (Grant 1999; Rousseau 1995). Thus, the final network
structure presented in this framework is the personnel network.
The section now considers evidence from recent and traditional
material to both justify these four network structures and to identify some of
the impact that each of them has played on the labour process.
Workgroup networks
It has long been recognised that workgroups and workgroup norms
have played a major influence on workplace relations (Roethlisberger and
Dickson 1964). As the Hawthorne experiments of more than fifty years ago
illustrated, one of the early managerial concerns was the ability of informal
workgroups to exert control over effort levels, often in conflict with the
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interests of management (Gillespie 1993). Workers in the bank wiring room at
the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company developed a series of
informal group norms concerning output levels, resisting managerial attempts
to increase productivity. Similar workgroup power developed in some
industries in the context of the relatively tight labour markets of the 1950s and
1960s. Beynon cites one such example of the workgroup on the 'Wet Deck' at
Ford's Halewood plant:
if there was a problem on the Wet Deck, a manning problem, speed-up,
if the foreman had stepped out of line, they always had a comeback.
They could sand the paint off the style lines - the fine edges of the
body that gave it its distinctive shape. And nobody could know
(1973:141).
It is perhaps significant that one agenda of the Donovan Commission (1968)
was to explore ways in which management might regain control of the shop-
floor. The changing political and economic environment of the past twenty
years has increased management's control over effort-levels (Metcalf 1992),
however, that is not to argue that workers have become totally disempowered
or completely lost the capacity to resist managerial initiatives which they judge
not to be in their own interests (Gabriel 1988; Scott 1994).
Where workgroups exert a collective purpose this does not always
operate against the interests of management. In some cases workgroup
action can be beneficial for management. For example, Harris (1987), in an
analysis of workgroups in the petrochemical industry, concludes that one of
the outstanding factors was the extent to which there was willing co-operation
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by the workgroup with management in meeting the functional requirements of
production.
The most recent development relating to workgroup has been the
growth in the use of team working. Several key points are relevant to this
development. First, it has largely been a managerially sponsored initiative,
based on the premise that some controlled delegation of responsibility and
autonomy can enhance productivity. Such developments have often been
linked to the physical reorganisation of production, such as cellular
manufacturing, and also on occasions to cutbacks in staff (Danford 1998a). In
this sense it is philosophically different to the Quality of Working Life (QWl)
initiatives of the 1970s, which were more concerned with achieving workforce
stability. Second, team working can take a number of distinct forms. Buchanan
(1994), identifies two different configurations of team working, one based on
the Anglo-Scandinavian model and another on the Japanese model, both of
which delegate varying levels of responsibility to workers and have different
physical arrangements. Finally, team working can have disparate effects on
the workforce. Some studies have emphasised team working as a means of
work intensification (Danford, 1998), some have stressed the potential
benefits for employees (Wright and Edwards 1998), whilst yet others have
argued that workers are enjoying benefits from teamwork while at the same
time working harder (Clark 1993).
While the preceding analysis has suggested that workgroups have a
strong impact on the labour process, it is not claimed that workers always
present a coherent group. For example, workers at the Wye clothing company
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studied by Lupton (1963) failed to develop any collective control system due
to a range of factors such as the individualisation of pay rates, the layout of
production and the minute sub-division of tasks. What is being argued here is
that in a large number of workplaces the workgroup network plays a
significant role in fashioning day-to-day shop floor activity.
Supervisory Networks
By 'supervisory networks' it is meant the relationships that supervisors
develop with other members of an organisation and how these relationships
impact on the labour process. One important influence on supervisory
networks is the views and attitudes of managers towards supervisors. Again,
the Hawthorne experiments provide an early illustration of this, as Gillespie
observes:
A new group of personnel managers now focused their attention on the
social relationships between workers and their supervisors, convinced
that a change in the supervisors' treatment of subordinates would
improve employee morale and hence production. As they saw it, the
most practical way to intervene in the employee-supervisor relationship
was to concentrate on re-defining the role of the supervisor and then to
inculcate that role through a rigorous supervisory training programme.
The Industrial Research Division at Hawthorne was established to
study supervisors as well as workers. (1993:143).
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In other cases managers' influence on the actions of supervisors have
much less benign consequences for the workforce. For example, in the case
of the shoe company studied by Armstrong, supervisors were not highly
regarded by senior managers. Supervisors were assessed on their ability to
get work out of the workforce and their capacity to do this was monitored
closely by management. This led supervisors to impose a rigorous regime of
discipline on the shop-floor, which for the workforce 'involved definite
deprivations: the needless (from any point of view) loss of natural breaks in
production, the unpaid performance of purely cosmetic work and so on'
(1983:352). This is not to suggest that supervisors are always successful in
imposing their will on the workforce. Beynon's (1973) study of Ford in the
1970s documents a struggle between workers and supervisors to gain control
of the shop-floor, a contest in which the workforce were able to set limits to
supervisory control through the use of official and unofficial collective action.
There are of course strategies other than adversarialism or 'human
relations' available to supervisors in their dealings with workers. In some
cases supervisors may indulge in cooperation or collusion with workers. This
can take a range of forms including the lenient, or non-application of
workplace rules (Burawoy 1979) and the education of workers in the
circumvention of formal procedures (Bensman and Gerver 1963; Ditton 1977).
Supervisors practice these forms of indulgency as a way of giving workers
some interest in the job, as a method of getting work done and as a means of
easing the difficulties of supervision (Edwards 1988).
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One final point concerning supervisory networks is that roles and
relationships within them are not static. Management may seek to amend the
duties of supervisors to mesh with business objectives (Nichols and Beynon
1977). The recent development of interest in HRM has seen moves to devolve
greater responsibility for personnel matters to supervisors. In other cases,
management may seek a change in the way supervisors 'control' the workers.
Danford cites one such example in the context of managerial attempts to
reduce the porosity of the working day; a foreman in the CarPress plant
comments:
My instructions are to push them to the limit. Just this morning my
manager marched up to me and said he'd seen one of my men talking
to a mate down the other end of the plant. And he wanted to know what
am I going to do about it, why aren't I disciplining him? That's the key
change in my job. It's gone from using the skill of talking and coaxing
people to the pure use of discipline all the time (1998a:176).
Personnel networks
'Personnel networks' indicate the manner in which personnel polices
impact on workers. This raises the question of whether personnel policies
should be cited as networks. This can be resolved by reference to the three
characteristics of networks (Hakansson 1987) discussed earlier in this
chapter. First, networks were seen to involve a range of actors. This is
certainly the case for personnel policies, which can be established at any
level from plant to corporate organisation. Similarly, the actual management of
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personnel policies can be conducted on a day-to-day basis by staff from
differing strata and from various functional departments in the company,
including personnel managers, production managers and supervisors. As
Mullins observes • it is clear then, that the personnel function is a shared
responsibility among top managers, line managers, supervisors and the HR
manager (1999:687). The second feature of networks was the concern with
the acts of transformation and transaction. Personnel policies provide the link
between transformation and transaction in that they establish the framework
of conditions under which labour power is purchased, such as wages and
working time (the transaction act), and they set down, in general terms, the
obligations expected from this purchased labour such as what the worker is
engaged to do and levels of effort4 (the transformation act). Third, networks
are concerned with the control of human resources and involve some degree
of mutual dependence. Personnel networks are directly concerned with
human resources. The interpretation of mutual dependence depends on the
political perspective applied. A positive perspective is attached to personnel
policies by managerial texts that stress mutuality of interest, as the following
quotation from Torrington and Hall illustrates:
Personnel management is a series of activities which: first enables
working people and their businesses which uses their skills to agree
about the objectives and nature of the working relationship and,
secondly, ensures that the agreement is fulfilled. Only by satisfying the
4 It is reoognised that the employment contract cannot specify ail aspects of the effort-bargain,
nonetheless it does provide a framework for the transformation of purchased labour power into actual
labour.
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needs of the individual contributor will the business obtain the
commitment to organisational objectives they need for organisational
success, and only by contributing to organisational success will
individuals be able to satisfy their personal employment needs
(1998:20).
Set against this, Richard Edwards (1979), writing from a Marxist
viewpoint, stresses the significance of bureaucratic control in maintaining
management hegemony in the modern organisation. This category of
bureaucratic control contains many elements of personnel policies, as it refers
to the way in which rules relating to promotion, to conditions of service and to
dispute resolution are codified and subject to joint regulation. This, according
to Edwards, allows disputes to be resolved away from the point of production,
and in a manner that dissipates conflict by reference to systems and
procedures which are dressed in a veneer of fairness. Although Edwards'
view offers a radically different standpoint from that of HRM advocates, both
perspectives share a similar view of personnel policies as providing a crucial
underpinning for the commercial survival of the organisation.
Arguably, the significance of personnel networks has increased over
the last two decades with the gradual replacement of the 'fire-fighting'
approach of personnel management by the more strategic vision of Human
Resource Management. The extent of this substitution, and the exact meaning
and nature of HRM have been the subject of wide debate. Despite this,
extensive claims have been made by advocates of HRM which suggest that it
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can contribute both to business success and to an enrichment of the working
life of employees (Gratton 2000)
What assessment can be made of these claims that HRM policies
produce a positive-sum outcome? There is recent survey evidence to suggest
that firms with a coherent package of HRM policies can improve their
performance (Guest and Hoque 1996; Hoque 1999; Wright et al. 1999). The
key factor in achieving business success seems to be ensuring that
supportive bundles of HRM policies are in place, rather than the faddish
application of isolated elements of them (Hoque 1999). Set against this is a
body of case study literature suggesting that the outcomes for employees are
much less positive. The variant of HRM most closely associated with positive
outcomes for employees is 'soft' HRM, which emphases employee
involvement and commitment, rather than the more business-driven rationally
calculative 'hard' HRM. In assessing the actual impact of policies, Turnbull
and Wass (1998) argue that it is important to distinguish between the rhetoric
of soft HRM and the reality of these policies for workers. Drawing on a case
study of a high street retailer which claims to have an extensive array of soft
HRM policies, the researchers found that job satisfaction was low, that staff
regarded communication with management as poor and that the internal
labour market was segmented and gendered. Similarly, research by Truss et
al (1996) of companies in the 'Leading Edge Forum' (a group of high-profile
national businesses with a strong commitment to HRM), concluded that 'even
if the rhetoric of HRM is soft, the reality is always hard, with the interests of
the organisation always prevailing over those of the individual' (1996:69). It
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would appear, therefore, that HRM has not necessarily led to a
reconfiguration of workplace relations even amongst firms with a seemingly
strong HRM commitment.
Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that HRM can lead to
increasing workplace antagonism rather than commitment, especially where
the promises of soft HRM are not delivered. For example, in a study of HRM
on greenfield sites, Leopold and Hallier (1995) found that initial recruitment
and selection exercises often raised employees' work and employment
expectations, but that these were not always fulfilled. Consequently, the
companies had high labour turnover and a disgruntled workforce. In addition,
the study also found that HRM policies contained contradictions which
provided management with problems. The recruitment of a young workforce
did not prove the malleable and committed employees that management
anticipated; rather, they proved to be the source of significant anti-social
behaviour on the shop-floor.
The above discussion is not presented in any way as a resolution of
the various HRM controversies. It does however illustrate that personnel
networks can exert an important influence on workplace relations. They
provide a point of contact between workers and managers and supervisors at
various levels of the organisational hierarchy. Significantly, the outcome of
personnel policies does not always accord with managerial aspirations.
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Commercial networks
'Commercial networks' as adduced here refer to the ways in which
relations between firms, their customers and their suppliers impact upon the
labour process. There are several themes which emerge from the literature.
One of these is the significance of product markets in determining workers'
attempts to manipulate the effort-bargain. At the broadest level increased
product market competition has been one factor responsible for reducing the
bargaining power of trade unions during the 1980s and 1990s allowing
management to push through initiatives aimed at reducing the porosity of the
working day (Darlington 1994).
Historically, product markets have also been linked to the ability of
workers to extend their influence over shop-floor effort-bargaining. For
example, Lupton (1963) found that the highly competitive product market that
was a feature of the Wye Garment factory militated against worker attempts to
engineer some control over the labour process as, in these circumstances,
management are more likely to attempt to control labour costs more closely
and to clamp down on any unofficial practices which might conflict with
'getting the work out'. By contrast, more oligopolistic markets are likely to
engender a more relaxed attitude by management to worker attempts to
manipulate the effort-bargain, as Burawoy's study of Allied Engineering
illustrated (Kelly 1985). This relationship between product markets and effort
bargain should be viewed as a general tendency and not an exact correlation,
as competitive product markets do not always negate worker attempts to gain
some control over the pace and intensity of their work (Ram 1993)
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A further link between product market and labour process concerns
managerial willingness to introduce various forms of employee involvement.
Marchington argues that strongly competitive markets are likely to operate
against the introduction of employee involvement initiatives 'because
managers become obsessed with satisfying market needs, to the detriment of
employee interests and issues' (1992:171). Even when employee involvement
schemes are in place they can be jettisoned under commercial pressures.
Marchington and Parker (1990) document an instance at a supermarket where
daily team briefings were abandoned in the context of pressure to meet
customer demands.
It is important however to resist the notion that product market
competition inevitably induces changes that disempower employees or work
solely against their interests. In Kelly's (1985) study of an electrical appliance
company, product market competition necessitated a move to small batch
production and a re-organisation of the labour process, away from the flow-
line established for mass production to fewer workstations each assembling a
larger proportion of the product. The result of this reorganisation was a rise in
productivity and greater worker motivation through increased interest in their
jobs.
Commercial networks also refer to the manner in which firms adjust
their HRM practices, as well as work organisation, as a consequence of
evolving buyer-supplier relations. Recent developments in buyer-supplier
relations away from 'spot' contracting towards greater communication and
longer-term commitment has meant that:
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Subcontracting has increasingly become a method by which social
relations such as defined by work discipline, quality and training
standards are transmitted between buyers and suppliers (Rutherford et
aI.1995:3)
This is particularly so in industries such as motor vehicles where the final
assemblers have undergone a transformation in their organisation of
production, and have the market power to expect their first-tier suppliers to
respond to these changes (Oeyo 1996). Consequently, some first-tier
suppliers in this sector have changed or developed their policies relating to
recruitment, training, internal labour markets and employee involvement (IRS
1995; Rutherford et al. 1995; Turnbull 1993). There is also some evidence to
suggest that first-tier suppliers in industries other than motor vehicles are
amending their HRM practices in response to market pressure of their
customers (Kinnie et al. 1998).
In summary, this section has identified, discussed and justified four
network structures which are applicable to an analysis of workplace relations.
Three broad conclusions can be drawn. First, although the term networks is
little used in studies of workplace relations, the concept is strongly
representative in the literature. Second, these networks have a powerful
influence on the labour process and third, the actual influence of networks is
not unidirectional, but is contingent upon factors both external to and within
specific organisations.
These networks should not necessarily be seen as operating in
isolation, rather they interact, either in a way which promotes mutually
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reinforcing effects or in a manner that involves contrary effects. One example
of this interaction is provided by Danford's (1998a) study of CarPress, where,
in order to respond to the Just-in-time demands of customers (commercial
networks), the company restructured team-working arrangements away from
autonomous work-teams (workgroup networks), bestowing greater power and
pressure on supervisors to reduce the porosity of the working day
(supervisory networks).
This raises the question of what factors determine the specific
influence of networks. Why, for example, do workgroups support managerial
objectives in some instances and yet actively seek to undermine them in
others. In order to address this the second element of embeddedness needs
to be introduced, that of social relations.
Social relations
As was discussed earlier, the concept of social relations as used here,
refers to purposeful action within an ongoing pattern of relationships between
network constituents. Social relations and networks can be viewed as having
a sustained and potentially interactive relationship, with each having the
capacity to shape and be shaped by the other. Social relations is not used
here in the specific sense of the distinction between the owners of production
and the proletariat within a capitalist mode of production, though it is
recognised that the interaction between social relations and networks is
developed within a context of capitalist relations of production.
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Social relations are important in a study of the workplace because they
help to address issues concerning individual and collective activities. They
complement networks because they allow a more intimate discussion of the
behaviours and motives of workplace actors. In this sense they allow both
disparate and similar actions within networks to be 'unpicked' and analysed in
more detail. Social relations provide an additional way of 'making sense' of
observable behaviour and of understanding why certain patterns of worker
action occur in particular situations.
Three categories of social relations can be identified within the
workplace. Clearly, all actors approach social interaction in the workplace with
some expectations (however ill-defined) and will evaluate exchanges and
develop or eschew relationships on the basis of the extent to which these
expectations are met. This can be termed 'reciprocity'. Also actors bring with
them certain information, relating to, for example, technical data, occupational
skill, facts or heresy on the partner in the interaction; this can be termed
'knowledge'. Finally, actors bring themselves, their values, self-image and
prejudices; this can be termed 'identity'. This section now moves on to discuss
and justify these three categories of social relations with reference to existing
workplace studies.
Know/edge
'Knowledge' is used here to indicate the ways in which information and
learning are used in shaping workplace relations. Knowledge of production
processes can be appropriated, guarded or shared. One long-standing line of
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approach stresses the actions and ability of management to appropriate
worker knowledge at the point of production in order to gain control over the
labour process. Taylor's 'Scientific Management' was formulated around the
codification and standardisation of work practices in order to combat the
'systematic soldiering' which was a consequence of the lack of knowledge
held by management of the details of the production process (Miller and Form
1980). For Taylor the result of Scientific Management would be industrial
harmony, with the ensuing increase of productivity raising both profits and
wages.
Braverman (1974) also saw the appropriation of worker knowledge as
a key objective of management, but his analysis is rooted in the exploitation of
labour by capital. He argues that the continuous search by capital for surplus
value, manufactured at the point of production, led management to deskill
workers through a combination of Scientific Management and technology.
These two related themes, the subdivision of tasks in minute detail and the
use of technology to appropriate the knowledge and skills formerly held by
workers, constitute an enduring thread in the industrial relations literature
across a range of industries (Gabriel 1988; Lupton 1963; O'Connell Davidson
1994). It does however need to be noted that their effieacy in promoting
managerial control is disputed (Edwards 1979; Wilkinson 1982).
An alternative perspective on knowledge is that it can guard as a
defence for workers against work intensification or unfair treatment. Collinson
(1994) identifies two different examples in contrasting work environments. In
one ease, an engineering works, workers kept the knowledge and skills they
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had gained over operating procedures to themselves and used this
knowledge to buy time, for example, by 'kidding' the rate fixer. In the second
case study, a female worker in an insurance company engages in what
Collinson describes as 'resistance through persistence', based on extracting
information from management. The case highlights the actions of a pregnant
female insurance worker who saw two colleagues promoted instead of her,
despite being the best qualified candidate and being told at a previous board
that she was next in line for promotion. The clerk fought this decision with the
help of the union officer, using knowledge of company procedures to force the
company to try and justify their decision
A third theme prevalent in current literature is that of sharing of
knowledge. It is argued that in order to survive in a competitive environment,
companies need to encourage and promote workers' ability to use their
knowledge and tacit skills. It is a perspective that views the enhancement of
worker skills as being of benefit to both employees and managers. Although
this has the same principle as those associated with Scientific Management,
that of mutual gain, it is usually based on enhancing the task discretion of
workers rather than rigidly constraining their actions. This approach is central
to a number of influential texts. Poire and Sable's (1984) flexible
specialisation thesis has as one of its central planks the renaissance of an
artisanal culture and the revival of craft working, allowing companies to
compete in niche markets. For Peters and Waterman (Peters and Waterman
1982) 'excellent' companies are ones that allow their employees considerable
degrees of autonomy. In Atkinson and Meager's model of the 'flexible firm'
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(1986), the core workforce is a key to an organisation's success, as they are
characterised as being multi-skilled and willing to update through continuous
training. This literature, amongst others, has led to the recent growth of
initiatives such as autonomous team working, noted earlier. However, it is
important to recognise that these strategies of 'empowerment' and
'responsible autonomy' have been viewed more critically as means of work
intensification (Nichols and Beynon1977) and increased managerial control
(Friedman 1977).
Finally, workplace relations are also linked to absence of knowledge as
well as its possession, in that perceptions of (in)competence can influence the
interaction within different networks. For example, managers' lack of
confidence in the competence of supervisors can reduce the degree of
authority that is delegated down the supervisory hierarchy (Lowe 1993).
Similarly, worker perceptions of the competence of managers and supervisors
may also constitute an important issue. Harris' (1987) study of a chemical
plant shows that if workers were given orders by superiors whom they felt to
be incompetent, then they were more likely to bend these instructions or act in
non-compliant ways. Additionally, workers were actively hostile to incompetent
managers and would try to get them removed.
Identity
'Identity' is used here to indicate ways in which personal and group
identities impact on shop-floor relations. For some commentators this issue of
identity has been accorded a pre-eminent position within workplace analysis
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to the exclusion of more traditional interpretations. Casey (1995), for example,
argues that identity, through its function in creating an image of 'self, is the
most important determinant in structuring workplace relations. One
consequence of the primacy of identity within the 'new' workplace is,
according to Casey, the greatly reduced relevance of labour process analysis.
She comments that:
Post-industrial interregnum, post-industrial technologies have brought
about the end of the labour process as it is traditionally understood ..the
old discourses of industrial production - typically understood as
ideologies that include traditional class locations and identifications,
traditional relations between capital and labour, management and
unions and occupational stratifications-are diminishing in importance in
post-industrial conditions (1995: 132)
However, Casey's approach seems unsatisfactory for two reasons. First,
because the traditional structured antagonism (Edwards 1986) which has
characterised workplace relations shows little sign of disappearing (Danford
1998a; Scott 1994). Second, because it appears based on a reading of the
labour process literature that has not moved on since the work of Braverman.
That is not to deny the Significance of identity. The reference-points
that people use, either as individuals or groups, can shape workplace
behaviour. One category in framing identity is gender. It is beyond the scope
of this study to survey the plethora of literature on the influence of gender on
the labour process. For the purpose of this section, two specific examples will
be outlined to establish the link between gender, identity and workplace
76
relations. Collinson (1992), in a study of Slav Engineering works, argues that
the way men view their employment and interact with each other and with
authority figures is underscored by their investment in the culture of
masculinity, Masculinity does not conform to a homogeneous category, but
has alternative meanings for different workers. For Harry, a character in
Collinson's study, masculinity embodies the supremacy of practical, manual,
craft work over other forms of employment. Collinson observes:
Embedded in Harry's elevation of 'the practical' is a deep-seated
emphasis on masculinity that contrasts with the 'effeminate' feminised
work of white collar employees and managers and the domestic labour
of wives (1992;91).
Alternatively, for Dave, masculinity is embedded in his role as breadwinner.
This leads him to reject promotion because he sees that it would both disrupt
his domestic stability and increase his job instability, as he would no longer
have access to trade union protection, therefore threatening his role as
'provider' for his family.
Additionally, identity and workplace relations can also be shaped by
women's attitudes towards 'femininity'. Gottfried's (1994) study of temporary
clerical workers describes a situation where female workers would impose
their identity by engaging in acts of 'everyday' resistance, such as rejecting
'feminine' behaviours expected of them, by, for example, challenging
'acceptable' dress codes. In a similar vein, Westwood (1984), in a study of
female workers in the clothing industry, argues that their identity, both as
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female workers and (potential) brideslwives, forms the basis of their
relationships with colleagues and with management.
Identity is important not only in influencing workplace behaviour and
attitudes, but also in the way that work activities bestow meaning on
individuals. Identity can both be derived from work activities and shape them.
To use Super's (1994) term work can form part of an individual's 'self-
concept'. An example of this occurred with the introduction of a computer
system into a privatised public utility (O'Connell Davidson 1994). One reason
why the clerical staff resisted (albeit unsuccessfully) the introduction of this
system was that their personal identity at work was constructed around their
view that they should provide a helpful service to customers, a function which
the new computerised system denied them. Similarly, Sosteric's (1996) study
of 'servers' in a night-club illustrates how their identity, both as individuals and
a group, was constructed through the development of personal styles in their
I
relationships with customers. Management attempts to force them to behave
differently towards clients led to resistance amongst the staff.
Not only is identity important in shaping the views and actions of
workers, it also applies to other groups of staff such as supervisors. For
example, supervisors' identity can be shaped by their perceptions as to
whether they are part of the managerial or shop-floor culture (Armstrong
1983). Similarly, as Nichols and Beynon (1977) illustrate, supervisors'
identities and behaviour can reflect their attachment to the traditional craft skill
of the foreman or, alternatively, to the planning and administrative world of
computers and data. Whatever identities are embraced by the supervisor,
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they can have significant consequences for the ways in which they interacted
with workers and managers.
Reciprocity
'Reciprocity' characterises relationships between and within
organisations. With reference to relationships between organisations,
Grabher comments that inter-firm networks 'entail indefinite, sequential
transactions within the context of a general pattern of reciprocity' (1993:8).
He argues that obligations under reciprocity are often implicit rather than
explicit, and reciprocity is not supposed to reach a balance in every exchange
'but rather over the entire exchange relation' (ibid: 8). It is this concept of
implicit, long-term reciprocity that is one of the underpinning features of
strategic alliances, which have been the subject of much recent academic and
business interest (Faulkner 1994).
Reciprocity is also a feature of intra-firm network relations. This intra-
firm reciprocity can act as a way of facllitatinq output and of averting overt
conflict. Consider, for example, the 'culture of politeness' which characterised
worker-management relations at the biscuit factory studied by Scott (1994).
Management would couch requests in the language of 'favours'; in return,
workers would receive perks, such as financial bonuses for operating an extra
machine. This was an informal accommodation which senior managers
supported because, on balance, they believed it could secure a high degree
of co-operation from workers. However, the informal nature of reciprocity
means that it was subject to 'abuse' and renegotiation. When, in the biscuit
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factory, workers started bidding up the price of favours, holding out for more
bonus time, the reaction of management was to attack slack practices (e.g.
clocking on for a friend) which they had previously ignored. This led to a
souring of management-worker relations and, consequently, management
rescinded some of its 'harsh' decisions. However, the very fact that
management had the capacity to act in this way was successful in sending a
message to workers not to push this reciprocal arrangement too far. The point
this illustrates concerning reciprocity is that it can be withheld and that it is an
arrangement that is usually underscored with relative degrees of power.
Reciprocity is also a key feature of many supervisory networks. It was
argued earlier that supervisors develop mutually beneficial arrangements with
workers to ease the processes of production. Supervisors can also enter into
reciprocal agreements with workers for pecuniary rewards, as the in the case
of the fiddles used by hotel staff (Mars 1973). Although these fiddles were
I
implemented by the waiting staff, access to them was controlled (or denied) by
their supervisor, the headwaiter, who received a share of the 'spoils'. It is also
interesting to note that reciprocal arrangements can involve supervisors in
collusion with other non-manual grades. For example, Lupton observed:
At Jay's, the inspector, the progress chaser, the storeman, as well as
the foreman and time clerk were all involved in a network of reciprocal
obligations' (1963:155).
This theme of reciprocity across several groups of employees has also been
illustrated by Roy (1954). In one of the few workplace studies to refer
extensively to networks, he details how workers, supervisors and service
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departments conspired in 'a network of intergroup relations' (1954:225) to
subvert official rules and procedures. In this instance reciprocal agreements
acted to frustrate new managerial initiatives, not least because the employees
involved saw them as unworkable.
Not all reciprocal agreements involve supervisors or managers. In
some cases reciprocity exists between groups of workers as they seek to
pursue their own interests. Pilferage again provides an example of this. Mars
contrasts the pilferage in hotels, which relied on the complicity of the
supervisor, with pilferage in the docks which was organised between groups
of workers:
In dock work-gangs, a regularly hired body of twenty-six men were
found organised together to unload cargo. Some work-tasks facilitated
access to cargo, but access alone was insufficient for safe pilferage
and had to be buttressed by the support of other workers in the gang.
I
Support was offered from within the gang by checkers, who would
falsify paperwork; by fork-lift truck drivers who would stack cargo into
barriers so that supervisors could not see illegitimate activity; and by
signallers who acted as look-out men whilst carrying on their normal
work. The gang foreman, though formally responsible for hiring and
firing and the discipline of his men, had no role in this pilferage
(1973:262).
This is not to argue that work group reciprocity is only driven by
pecuniary interests. Reciprocity within workgroups can be a means of defence
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against managerial control. In the case of Phoneco, a British-based, American
owned company (McKinlay and Taylor 1996), a cornerstone of management
philosophy was the establishment of a monthly peer review procedure where
team members rated each other on ten dimensions of individual behaviour
and attitude. These peer reviews were intended to increase the team
members' motivation to comply with expected behaviour and norms. For
Phoneco management, 'the success of peer review was the key to gauging
the embeddedness of the team culture' (1996:291). However, a deep mistrust
of the peer review system developed amongst workers with the consequence
that a reciprocal arrangement developed whereby workers collaborated in
tacitly trading scores. Worker reciprocity in this instance undermined
managerial objectives.
Finally, just as reciprocity can be used to sustain the interests of
workers within a group, it can also be used as a measure of discipline;
I
reciprocity can be withdrawn from individuals as a form of sanction by the
workgroup. In her study of women workers on a production line, Cavendish
(1982) notes that the help normally given to each other by members of the
work group was not extended to workers who were disliked and/or perceived
as lazy.
In summary, this section has devised, described and justified the three
categories of social relations in the embeddedness model. In practice, social
relations may work independently or in concert. One example illustrating the
interaction of the three categories of social relations is the instance of workers
in a privatised utility, mentioned earlier. In this case workers attempted to
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resist the introduction of a new computerised system by management
(O'Connell Davidson 1994). This resistance was grounded on the workers'
view that the new system did not allow them to fulfil the role they envisaged
for themselves (identity), neither did it recognise the customer expertise they
had developed (knowledge). Resistance to management took a number of
forms including unofficial collective decisions on 'walk-outs' and not to work
beyond contract (reciprocity). This resistance ultimately failed and one of the
factors militated against its success was the workers' lack of familiarity with
formal trade union procedures (knowledge).
Embeddedness and the labour process
This chapter has outlined the embeddedness framework which forms
the analytical basis of this thesis. Four types of network structures have been
identified which interact to influence workplace relations. To support this
network analysis three categories of social interaction have been formulated.
Together these two concepts of networks and social interaction can be used
to explore the ways in which workplace behaviour are embedded in both inter-
firm and firm-specific structures and also in the consequence of the actions
and choices of all constituents.
The embeddedness framework is presented diagrammatically in figure
one. The diagram illustrates the interactive nature of the embeddedness
analysis. Workplace relations will be influenced by the interplay within and
between networks and social relations. Each of the four network structures
may have an independent influence on the labour process, or as the
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overlapping circles suggest, there may be some supportive or conflictual
interaction between the structures which influence workplace relations. The
three categories of social relations may also operate in an individual or
combined manner, as is indicated by the dotted lines between them. Also,
these categories of social relations can, as the firm lines suggest, both
Figure 1
The Embeddedness Framework
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Categories of Social Relations
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influence and be influenced by the network structures. The nature of
workplace relations will, of course, vary between organisations depending on
the interplay of networks and social relations, but it is this interaction that will
shape the labour process.
Finally, having outlined the embeddedness framework which informs
this study, it is also important to recognise a factor which has been discussed
in the case study materials but has not been allocated a distinct category,
namely, technology. This has been omitted as a specific classification in order
to avoid an overdeteministic view of the impact of technology (Grint and
Woolgar 1997; Wilkinson 1982). In the case of the embeddedness model, the
influence of technology will be gauged both within the four network
classifications and the three dimensions of social relations.
The embeddedness framework and the Japanisation debate
The aim of this chapter was to develop an analytical framework through
which the labour process in Japanese transplants could be explored and
explained. It was argued in the summary of the previous chapter, that any
satisfactory analysis had to satisfy four requirements. In order both to
illustrate the link between the current and previous chapters and to establish
the applicability of the embeddedness framework, this section will consider
the ways in which this framework fulfils the four stated requirements
The first requirement is the avoidance of oversocialised or
undersocialised accounts of workplace behaviour. Granovetter's
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embeddedness model was developed specifically to offer an alternative to
these perspectives. The embeddedness framework identified above
recognises the social structures shaping action, both within and outside the
organisation, but also allows for the actions of individuals and groups in
shaping their own destiny. This framework allows for the significance of
individual actions within an overall structure of networks.
Second, it was argued that any analysis should include factors external
to the point of production and also those at the level of the factory floor. The
identification of intra-firm and inter-firm networks achieves this by presenting
an integrated analysis of external and internal structures which impact on the
labour process.
Thirdly, an inclusive analysis needs to embrace the motives and
actions of a range of actors. Again the use of a range of network structures is
significant here as it allows an analysis of workplace relations to include the
actions of operators, supervisors and managers. In addition, the categories of
social relations provide an insight into the meanings and motives of individual
actors at all levels of the organisation as they seek ways of pursuing their
interests within broader structural constraints.
The final requirement of a theoretical analysis is to identify the
contingent factors impacting on consent and resistance. The embeddedness
model provides a framework which allows workplace relations to be examined
both comprehensively and systematically. Whilst suggesting that the nature of
workplace relations can be explained by the interplay of network structures
and social relations, it does not pre-judge the outcome of research. Taking
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this approach allows an analysis of the impact of both individual action and
wider social and economic structures upon the labour process, without
predetermining their outcomes.
Summary
In summary, this chapter has sought to establish empirically and
conceptually the embeddedness model of workplace relations. Using
Granovetter's networks and social relations model of embeddedness, an
analytical framework of four network structures and three categories of social
relations has been devised. It has been argued that this satisfies the criteria
established in the previous chapter for an adequate framework with which to
analyse the factors shaping the labour process in Japanese manufacturing
transplants. The embeddedness framework will form the basis of the case
study discussion in subsequent chapters. Before this is attempted a
description of the research methodology and the case study company is
required; this is presented next.
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Chapter Three
Research Methods and Research Site
This thesis is based on an ethnographic study of a single company,
which I have called Telco. Telco (a pseudonym) is a Japanese company with
a manufacturing base in Britain. It is a first-tier supplier to the automotive
industry. The research method involved primarily, a nine week period of
participant observation on the factory floor. This was supplemented by:
structured interviews with key management informants both before and after
the participant observation, two days work-shadowing of supervisors, and
structured interviews with staff in two of Telco's suppliers and one of their
customers.
The aims of this chapter are to provide a description and justification of
the research methodology selected. In addition, methodological critiques of
previous studies of Japanese transplants are incorporated where appropriate.
The chapter begins with a justification of the research method used. A
rationale for case study approach is offered and the use of overt participant
observation as the primary research method is justified. After identifying the
reasons for selecting Telco as the case site, it discusses some of the
methodological issues arising from an ethnographic approach.
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Methodological Justification
Any researcher of workplace relations is faced with a considerable
array of choices. The purpose of this section is to identify why a single-site
study, based on overt participant and supported by interviews and work
shadowing was an appropriate choice for this research project. It does this
through a process of filtration where a range of alternative methods are
considered and either discarded or progressed until an academic justification
is produced. This filtration process begins with a discussion of case studies
and surveys.
Case study or survey
Research into Japanisation generally and shopfloor relations more
specifically has usually taken the form of a surveyor of case studies. Surveys,
as referred to here, involve gathering data from a large number of sites, often
through questionnaires and sometimes supplemented by other methods such
as structured interviews. By contrast, case study research uses a variety of
tools to produce an in-depth study of a smaller number of sites (Hammersley
1992). Whilst recognising that surveys have a number of benefits such as
allowing the researcher to gather large amounts of data quickly, identifying
trends, determining correlations and making generalisations, the approach
selected here was one of case study analysis. The reason for this is that the
case study has a number of advantages over the survey as an approach for
understanding and analysing workplace relations.
Case study analysts provides a greater level of detail and
accuracy than surveys (Hammersley 1992). With reference to detail, although
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the surveys can produce large amounts of data, they may not provide the
adequate detail to explore the relative significance of particular policies or
events. Peck and Stone make this point in a critique of surveys within the
Japanisation literature. They comment:
We contend that the presence or absence of a particular practice (as
indicated perhaps, by a tick in a postal questionnaire) is of less
significance than the way in which the practice is applied in the
establishment concerned ...This is an important point, given that
information concerning Japanisation is frequently derived from surveys
(for example, IRS Focus, 1988, 1989 Oliver and Wilkinson 1990) To
confirm the existence at a plant of a particular practice tells us little
about its significance in operational terms (1992: 60).
In-depth case studies provide a method of attaining detail which help the
researcher make informed judgments concerning the relative significance of
practices. In the context of workplace relations the researcher can explore
issues such as, whether policies are applied consistently across the workforce
and if they have the same degree of importance to all the constituents in an
organisation.
Even when questionnaires are supplemented with interviews, the
structured interview approach favoured by the survey method constrains the
amount of detail that can be gathered. Structured interviews give respondents
less chance to elaborate on questions and also deny the researcher the
opportunity to probe inconsistencies or areas of interest that emerge
spontaneously. As a consequence, surveys may produce a less nuanced
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view of workplace relations and workplace change than the case study (Morris
and Wood 1991).
Case studies also offer a potentially more accurate research tool than
surveys. Accuracy can refer to the ability to validate factual information. In
many instances survey information relies solely on one or two management
informants, who, for reasons of self-interest or lack of information, may not
provide complete or objective information. Accuracy also refers to the
opportunity to distinguish between the existence of a policy and its outcomes.
In this sense, case studies are able to explore the social and potentially
contested nature of workplace relations in a way which surveys cannot. This
point is particularly important in relation to the Japanisation debate because,
as indicated in chapter one, accounts which have posited the demise of
worker resistance can sometimes be premised on the failure to distinguish
between managerial intentions and policy outcomes.
In some instances the advantages of case studies over surveys have
been recognised by the researchers themselves. For example Abo et al. who
utilize surveys as a major research tool, comment that a case study where 'a
researcher conducts observations at a single plant over a period of time and
then individually, gathers checks and confirms all the data ... is recognised as
the ideal type of plant observation and ...has produced a number of seminal
studies' (1993:23).
In sum, the case study method has a number of advantages over the
survey which are related to detail and accuracy in analysing social relations.
Given that the aim of this dissertation is to report and analyse workplace
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relations, the use of the case study method does seem more appropriate than
the survey technique. This section now considers the issue of single or multi-
site case studies.
Single or multi-site case-studies
Multi-site studies refer here to the in-depth case study analysis of a few
sites. Multi-site site case study research has generated some valuable
contributions to the Japanisation debate (Delbridge 1998; Eiger and Smith
1998; Stephenson 1996)and to an understanding of workplace relations more
generally (Edwards and Scullion 1982; Lupton 1963). The advantage of multi-
site studies is their comparative focus. As Edwards observes 'having learnt
that things are done in a certain way, one wants to know how much the
process differs elsewhere and why' (1992:393).
Given the potential benefits of a multi-site approach, one of the original
options considered when contemplating the research strategy for this thesis
was a comparative two-site study. However, during my placement at Telco I
took the decision to limit the research to a single site and to investigate
aspects of that particular case in more detail. The reason for this was that two
issues arose during this period which had a significant impact upon shopfloor
relations, issues that I could not adequately research solely from the
perspective of a shopfloor worker. These issues were the significance of the
role of the supervisor and the importance of buyer-supplier relations. I elected
to forego the potential gains of a comparative period of participant observation
in order to pursue the outstanding issues arising from the initial intensive
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research. I chose the latter option for two reasons. Firstly, a central analytical
approach underpinning participant observation is inductive reasoning
(Hammersley 1992), with the concepts and ideas arising out of the data. It
would therefore seem inappropriate not to pursue key issues as fully as
possible, simply because they were not part of the original research design.
As May (1997) argues, flexibility is important in research. Secondly, and
relatedly, given the finite amount of time available for any research project
there is then a potential trade-off between depth of study and number of sites.
What single-site studies do allow is the opportunity to produce 'thick'
descriptions (Geertz 1973). In attempting to discover and explain what do
people do and why they do it, regular and sustained contact is very important.
Thick descriptions may be better at both capturing the range of behaviour and
allowing a more sophisticated and contextualised interpretation of the
significance of events. For example, something might occur infrequently (or
even once), yet be of considerable Significance. This in-depth perspective
may be lost in multi-site cases where there is no prolonged period of contact.
Is the use of a single-site rather than multiple-site study a Significant
disadvantage? There are a number of reasons to suggest not. Single-site
ethnographies are an accepted tradition both within Japanisation (Graham
1995) and within the study of workplace relations more broadly (Burawoy
1979). Also, a comparative focus need not rely on research by a single
author; there is a range of other case study material on Japanese transplants
which provides very valuable comparative data. The obvious disadvantage of
using studies authored by other researchers is that they may not ask the
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same questions and confront the same issues. This is a point taken up later in
this chapter when the issue of generalising from ethnographic studies is
considered; it is sufficient to say at this point that the breadth of other case
study material does make a comparative analysis possible.
Questionnaires, Interviews or Participant Observation.
Research based on case study analysis usually involves one or more
of three methodological approaches: questionnaires, interviews and
participant observation. The salience of these methods for this study is
considered next. The use of questionnaires in case study analysis replicates
many of the advantages and disadvantages of the survey method discussed
above. Questionnaires can produce a large amount of data both within and
across different sections of the workforce, thereby allowing generalisations
and comparisons to be made from a representative sample. They can also
address a number of purposes ranging from the gathering of factual
information to the evaluation of attitudes and opinions. Set against this,
questionnaires are able to say little about detailed social interaction and the
way in which the dynamics of working life are 'played out' on a day-to-day
basis. In the context of the Japanisation debate, the strengths and
weaknesses of questionnaires can be illustrated by reference to Grant's early
work (1994). Grant used questionnaires as the main research tool to report on
the impact of culture-change policies in two British-based Japanese
transplants. The data showed that workers held negative views concerning
the company and that the programmes had not achieved their objectives,
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allowing Grant to explore the reasons for this antagonistic relationship.
However, the research tells us little about the outcomes of worker
dissatisfaction. We do not know whether this adversarial relationship had any
consequences for the management or, indeed, if it was translated into any
form of action by the workers. In relation to my thesis, whilst acknowledging
the potential benefits of questionnaires, they do not seem to facilitate the aims
of this study.
Turing next to interviews, these have provided some valuable insights
into workplace relations in Japanese transplants. Smith and Eiger (1998) use
interviews to paint a vivid picture of the difficulties facing managers in
managing a 'green' workforce at Telford, in the context of the plentiful supply
of jobs. Similarly, Fucini and Fucini's (1990) study of the conflict at Mazda's
Flat Rock plant was based primarily on interviews. There are, however, pitfalls
in interviewing as a method of attempting to determine what goes on at the
level of the factory floor. There may be a difference between what the
interviewee says and what occurs in practice, resulting either from a
deliberate attempt to misinform or from lack of accurate detailed knowledge.
Delbridge illustrated the shortcomings of interviews as a research method
when he conducted interviews after a period of participant observation.
Delbridge comments:
In an interview, Desmond Sweeting (the production director), claimed
that improvements discovered at the plant would be fed back to Japan
in order that the standard times in the manuals would be updated and
improved. In practice, this information is held within the panel shop by
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the team leaders and middle managers in order that they may meet the
very demanding targets set. (1998:61)
Delbridge's observations are particularly interesting because Sewell and
Wilkinson (1992a) use the same case study company to support their claim of
work intensification, stating that shortcuts workers devise are automatically
appropriated by management. It would seem that Sewell and Wilkinson take
the word of management that surveillance and work-monitoring are carried out
in the prescribed fashion whereas, in reality, and unsurprisingly, this does not
always seem to the case. That is not to claim that all interviews are unreliable
and that observation is necessarily more objective. Observation brings its own
issues concerning objectivity (Hammersley 1992), and these will be dealt with
later. But, as Delbridge's example illustrates, an advantage of observation
over interviews is that observation provides accuracy and detail that
interviews cannot guarantee. This is particularly important as it helps to
distinguish between managerial intention and policy outcome.
The problem associated with inferring shop-floor behaviour from
interview data has been raised by Allen, with reference to Garrahan and
Stewart's study of Nissan. Having been denied official access by the company
the authors interviewed a number of volunteers, drawing conclusions that
Nissan employees were forced into accepting a regime of subordination. Allen
comments that:
Employee compliance/non-compliance is extraordinarily difficult to
assess unless systematic observation within the company has been
carried out and additionally partiCipation as an employee is undertaken.
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Until these methods are incorporated I am sceptical that Nissan has
cracked the old employer problem of turning human beings into robots
to the extent that the authors convey (1995:121).
One key advantage of observation is that it allows the actions of
workers (and other shopfloor constituents) to be viewed first-hand rather than
relaying on accounts of participants or of third-parties. In this way it can
provide a more accurate description of workplace relations. Participation can
also deepen understanding of the interaction within the workplace. It allows
the researcher to develop an awareness of actions in context and to perceive
the dynamics of the shopfloor from the view of those working within it. Also, it
enables the researcher to discuss and explore the actions and feelings of
workers through prolonged informal contact. To paraphrase Roy's (1954)
analogy, in order to explore the lower depths of the shopfloor the best way is
to put on a diving suit and go and see what it looks like on the bottom.
However, to rely solely on participant observation is an approach which
runs the risk of loosing the potential gains of interviews. Interviews are a
valuable means of gathering information and opinions from groups of staff that
it might not be possible to observe, such as senior managers. They can also
provide a valuable normative picture of the organisation. Finally, interviews
can be a way of gathering data in an attempt to explain some of the
occurrences and actions noted during observation. These points are
acknowledged by Graham in her study of Subaru. Commenting on her
methodology of observation and company documentation, she states:
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The analysis has many limitations, the greatest of which is that
evidence concerning the nature and effectiveness of managerial
control strategies are deduced from the position of the worker. There is
no way of knowing the management's intentions' (1993:150).
The issue of managerial intentions is a significant one. It would, for example,
be incorrect to assume that managers will always seek to quash incidents of
rule breaking; there may be times when managers, in the interests of
'effective' control, may elect not to enforce shop-floor regulations strictly
(Gouldner 1954), or even collude in bending rules (Burawoy 1979). Interviews
with management provide away, albeit imperfect, of exploring these issues.
Given the potential benefits of interviews it was decided to incorporate these
into the research methods of this thesis.
In sum, this study incorporated a range of research methods to gather
data from a single case site. The main research method used was a nine-
week period of participant observation. This allowed a detailed and accurate
'thick' description of the factory floor, provided the occasion to see policies in
action and gave the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the
behaviours and motives of workers. This period of observation was
supplemented by interviews. Three senior managers concerned with
personnel and production were interviewed prior to the period of observation
to acquire current and background information on the company. After the
observation period the same managers were re-interviewed and also the
senior British manager was interviewed for the first time. These interviews
allowed questions and issues that had arisen during the observation to be
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explored and provided a management perspective to help contextualise the
experience. In addition, subsequent to the placement, interviews were held
with three staff from Telco's quality unit: the senior manager responsible for
the unit, a customer liaison representative and a member responsible for
supplies requisition. The quality control staff offered a valuable insight, from
the company's perspective, regarding the issues faced by Telco when dealing
with customers and suppliers. To supplement these data interviews were also
undertaken with three staff in a company that was a customer of Telco, and
with a senior member of staff in two of Telco's suppliers. The interview
schedule also included discussions with two supervisors at Telco, followed by
two days spent 'work shadowing' one of them. Interviewing and tracking
supervisors allowed a perspective, other than that of a shopfloor worker, to be
integrated into the study.
The extended research involving quality control staff, buyers, suppliers
and supervisors was undertaken for three reasons. First, participant
observation suggested that both buyer-supplier relations and supervisors had
a key influence in shaping the shopfloor labour process at Telco. Second, the
identification of commercial and supervisory networks as part of the study's
analytical framework and the holistic analysiS underpinning this study
necessitated research on these topics. Third, interviewing key informants
allowed the motives and experience of these staff to be explored rather than
merely inferred.
The final data source used in this thesis is company documentation.
This was gathered in part from the material which I was given as an
99
'employee', in part from material I was given or allowed access to as an
interested scholar during my time on the shopfloor and also from documents
that I was offered during or as a consequence of the interviews I conducted.
In summary, the funnel shaped diagram in figure two provides a
synopsis of the selections made concerning research methods.
Figure 2
SELECTION OF RESEARCH METHOD
Case Study ---- Survey
Multi site Single site
Questionnaire Participant
Observation
Interview
Single site (overt)
participant observation
supported by interviews
and 'shadowing'
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The choice of participant observation (supported by interviews, company
documentation and 'shadowing') as a research technique can be seen as the
result of a filtration process. This started out with the broad options of case-
study or survey before moving through various choices, selecting those that
are most appropriate either on methodological or pragmatic grounds. No
apologies are made here for pragmatic decisions, most research is based to
some extent on what the researcher feels is achievable and within the
parameters presented by the possible (Buchanan et aI.1988). Having
discussed why the research methods chosen were appropriate this chapter
now moves on to consider the issues related to undertaking ethnography.
Doing Ethnography
The Case Site
One of the first issues to be faced in ethnographic research is the
selection of the case site. The organization chosen in this study is Telco, a
subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturing company supplying specialist parts to
motor manufacturers. Telco established their British base in 1988, on a green
field site in a 'new town' in the West Midlands of England. Telco were
attracted to Britain initially to service the needs of Rover which had recently
embarked on a joint venture with Honda. Honda were one of Telco's major
customers in Japan and, as a consequence of the joint venture, Telco were
invited to supply the jointly developed models. Telco's managers said that the
company had been invited to Britain because of the quality problems with
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Rover's existing British suppliers. This explanation mirrors evidence from
America which suggests that the influx of Japanese first-tier suppliers was
also linked to the failure of indigenous companies to meet the quality
standards of Japanese vehicle transplants (Kumon 1994).
Why was Telco chosen as a case site? There were a number of
practical reasons for this. It was in daily travelling distance of my home, thus
affording easy access. Also, I had some previous dealings with the company. I
had taken groups of students there as part of their undergraduate studies and
also had interviewed managers in the company as part of my MA dissertation
three years earlier. On these occasions the company had seemed open and
receptive to external scrutiny, and I had established a rapport with the
personnel officer who subsequently proved to be a 'gatekeeper' in sanctioning
my time on the line. The choice of company was taken therefore, at least in
part, on grounds of pragmatism and opportunism, grounds which are often the
'drivers' of many academic studies (Buchanan et aI.1988).
There were also reasons other than pragmatic ones for selecting Telco.
It is a Japanese transplant, and as has been discussed earlier there has been
extensive debate concerning the nature of the labour process in Japanese
transplants. The choice of a company within the motor manufacturing sector is
significant as the vehicle industry has been at the forefront of changes in work
organization and buyer-supplier relations (Oeyo 1996). As a case site, Telco
also offers a contrasting perspective to much of the Japanisation literature. It
is a medium sized plant which is in contrast to most studies of Japanese
transplants in the vehicle industry. Also, it is not located within a dense cluster
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of transplants, such as those found in several 'new towns' and in parts of
South Wales. This is significant because such clusters appear to involve
relations between managements and local labour market effects of a rather
particular kind, as shown in the Telford case. (Eiger and Smith 1998).
A further reason for selecting Telco is that it offers a chance to study a
company in a position in the supply chain which has been largely ignored by
studies of Japanese transplants, but which is of importance. Most transplant
studies have focused their attention on final assembly plants, with the first-tier
supplier attracting little research attention. A trawl of the literature found only
three case studies of Japanese-owned first-tier supplier companies in Britain
and America. One of these case studies, (Kerrin 1998) is a journal article
presenting a mainly descriptive report of workplace relations within a
production system that embraces an internal customer ethos. The remaining
two studies offer valuable accounts which detail how company relationships
with major customers can either facilitate work intensification (Danford 1998b)
or allow workers to extract concessions from management (Stephenson
1996). However, the detail in both these studies is limited as the accounts
comprise, at most, half chapters in an edited book. What both of these studies
do indicate is that a company's position as a first tier supplier can have an
important impact on the labour process. There is also recent research
evidence from non-Japanese first-tier supplier companies which suggests that
buyer-supplier relations have an significant influence on workplace relations.
The precise nature of this influence varies, leading to an intensification of
work effort in some cases (Danford 1998a) and the development of worker
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capacity to engage in fiddles in other instances (Delbridge 1998). In sum,
Telco provides the opportunity to investigate workplace relations in a
Japanese transplant operating within a key manufacturing sector and from a
position in the supply chain which is significant, but which is under-
researched.
Overt or covert participation
Overt participation was chosen for this thesis, although in some ways
the use of the word choice is misleading as the decision was made on
pragmatic grounds. Given the part-time mode of study, it would have proved
very difficult to organise the application for and undertaking of a 'real' job
which coincided with other work commitments. Also, given that I had already
developed contacts with the company, covert participation would not have
been possible. I could have looked for a period of covert parncipation in
another company, but did not want to lose the benefits of size, sector and
location in the supply chain that Telco offered.
The problems raised with overt participation are connected with the
potential behaviour modification of the group under observation (Punch 1993).
The group members may behave differently when the participant is around,
and the participant may be treated differently by the group but be unaware of
this occurring. The issue of differential treatment is one that arose on at least
one occasion during my placement. One afternoon my line attended a
scheduled training session. It was a very hot day, the training room had plate
glass windows, the session was held during the end of the day, and I kept
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'dozing off for a few seconds. The next day this was a source of great hilarity
and I was ribbed about not being able to stand the pace of a real 'working
day'. It was also pointed out to me that had I been a 'normal' member of staff I
would have been reprimanded for such behaviour. There were, therefore,
times when my artificial position was apparent and possibly affected peoples'
behaviour towards me. It does, however, seem unlikely that my workmates
could have modified their behaviour in my presence all of the time even had
they wanted to, as I was with them daily for nine weeks and throughout this
period they had the pressure of performing their everyday tasks.
A related issue concerning overt participation is whether an 'outsider'
fits in and becomes accepted (Punch 1993). It is difficult to assess this but my
own informal indications are that I was accepted as a member of the work
team. I performed similar tasks to other operators, joined in the banter and
was not spared any group admonishments. One example that suggests that I
was generally accepted was my 'leaving present'. This was a framed scroll
'celebrating' my time on the line and detailing some of my more memorable
experiences (and clangers). This was written by the women with whom I
shared my lunchtimes, calliographed by the husband of one of them, and
presented to me on my last day. A copy of the scroll and a 'decoding' of the
events it refers to is presented in appendix one. While this is not proof of my
acceptance by my co-workers it does suggest some strength of relationship
had developed.
As well as potential pitfalls, overt participation can also bring
advantages over covert involvement. In particular, it is easier to ask questions
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and request information. Supervisors and production staff, knowing that I was
there to find out about Japanisation became accustomed to me asking
questions, and would point out incidents that they thought might interested
me. They would also tell me their experiences at Telco and volunteer their
views of the company generally. I was also given access to data that an
operator would not normally gain. For example, after being on one line for a
couple of weeks I asked the supervisor about production data. He showed me
the data produced and allowed me to photocopy them. He also sent me to the
production office with a request that they copy data from the other lines, which
they duly did. Had I been a covert participant these sources may not have
been available to me.
Negotiating Access
My previous contact with the company made negotiating access fairly
unproblematic. After writing to request access I had several meetings with the
personnel officer to outline the project and to discuss any specific queries
from either side. In addition I undertook (and passed) a manual dexterity test,
to establish that I had the requisite 'trainability' skills. Prior to taking the test it
was stated that my placement did not depend upon my reaching an
acceptable level. It is however interesting to note that in a discussion after the
placement I was informed by the personnel officer that I had performed
competently as an operator (honest), and that if I had been no good "then the
production manager would have had you off the line straight away"
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Prior to starting the placement, I met the production manager when he
attended one of my meetings with the personnel officer. I was half an hour late
for that particular discussion, due to a misunderstanding as to the time of the
meeting. When I arrived the production manager told me, in no uncertain
terms, that punctuality was expected and that if I were to come and work for
him that no excuses and no exceptions would be made. This direct approach
was, as I found later, a key feature of the way in which that manager ran the
factory floor. This serves as an interesting example of the manner in which
negotiating access can be more than merely a methodological 'problem', but
can, as May (1997) argues, provide some initial clues to understanding social
relations.
Recording the data
With reference to recording data there are two areas of concern,
accuracy and scope. To consider accuracy first, in common with most
ethnographers I recorded data in the form of daily experiences which I noted
every evening on returning from work. This approach is not an ideal one, as
preferably 'where possible a record is made of observation on the spot, during
the event' (Robson 1993:203 original emphasis). I tried this on one occasion,
taking a pen and notebook into work. When I started to record the first
'incident' of the day, one of my workmates instantly asked me what I was
doing. Not wishing to admit that I was recording what they might do or say I
mumbled some comment and stopped writing. As a result of that experience, I
decided to abandon that strategy, and instead to try to keep a mental note of
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issues and record these after work. I felt the possible loss of certain verbatim
accuracy was an acceptable price to pay if it meant there was less chance of
generating suspicion amongst my workmates concerning my motives. An
alternative strategy I considered was to return to my car at lunchtimes and
record my observations there. I rejected that option because lunchtimes were
often a fund of stories and opinions, not just relating to what had happened on
'my' line, but across the factory. Also lunchtimes provided an opportunity to
get to know my fellow workers more closely and to integrate into their social
circle. With increasing 'intimacy' (Bruyn 1966) comes the opportunity to
understand the meanings of actions taken by group members
Turning to the second issue, that of scope of data, I felt it was important
to record information from as wide a range of sources as possible. To
facilitate this, I detailed what I had seen and heard, incidents that had
happened to me and to others where I was present and also examples
reported by others but not occurring during my presence. In recording
incidents which I had not observed I ran the obvious risk of gathering
inaccurate data. However, as most of these conversations occurred in the
presence of others, I felt sure that they had not been constructed merely for
my benefit, and also could see no plausible reason why operators would recall
to their workmates occurrences that were totally fictious. If 'tall tales' were
being told, my judgment was that this would be a matter of degree rather than
substance. In addition, in order to extend the scope of the data I asked to
work on a number of different lines during my time at Telco. This led to my
spending three, almost equal, periods of time on different lines, thus
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experiencing differing social circumstances (Bruyn 1966), which helped lead
to a greater understanding of the activities of the operators.
Reflexivity
The recording of data not only raises issues relating to the process of
gathering information, but also concerns over what the researcher decides to
record and the interpretation placed on events. Early ethnographic accounts
saw these issues as relatively unproblematic with researchers providing a
disinterested account of the social situation with which they were involved.
This view has been challenged by Hammersley who argues that while
ethnography allows researchers to observe actors in their 'natural'
environment, the process of research is a 'reflexive' one (Hammersley 1992;
Hammersley and Atkinson 1995), in that it is influenced by the values and
interests of the researchers. In this sense the data are viewed through a
particular lens that filters some events out, accepts others and continually
'tints' the vision of the observer. Thus, it is argued that there are is no single
objective description of anyone event, rather that:
There are multiple non-contradictory descriptions of any phenomenon.
How we describe an object depends not just on decisions about what
we believe to be true, but also on judgments about relevance
(Hammersley 1992:28).
Despite these difficulties concerning objectivity, this does not mean that
ethnography cannot accurately represent social phenomena. It is impossible
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to escape entirely from the social world in order to study it - pure objectivity in
this sense is simply not obtainable. The fact that researchers bring with them
their own 'histories' does not invalidate, per se, the descriptions which they
produce. Similarly, in the case of participant observation, the active role of the
researcher cannot be ignored or written out of accounts, rather their actions
and feelings can form an important element in the subsequent analysis.
So, what does reflexivity imply for the practicing ethnographer? One
implication is the requirement to keep accurate and extensive data. This I
attempted to do and have described in the preceding section. A further
implication is the need to consider how the intimate involvement the process
of research involves the interpretation of events. I chose, when writing up the
thesis, to include my own actions and feelings as well as those of my
workmates, recognizing that I was more than 'a fly on the wall' and that my
experiences would shape the outcome of the research. Finally, researchers
need to be 'open' in relation to any ideological perspectives. In the case of
this study, neither my particlpation nor my subsequent analysis was based
upon any specific epistemological standpoints.
Generalising from ethnography
The use of single case studies or a small number of cases raises the
issue of generalization. Although the use of ethnography rather than survey
research makes generalisation more difficult, generalisation from ethnography
is not impossible. The goal of ethnography is not to establish laws of universal
applicability that (seemingly) exist in the realm of the natural sciences, rather
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it is to establish the extent to which findings in one case (or a few cases) are
more broadly applicable.
One key approach is to consider the 'fittingness' (Guba and Lincoln,
cited in Schofield, 1993) of case sites. 'Fittingness' involves comparing one
case with others of similar detail and description in order to analyse the
similarities and differences that occur between the cases. Such an approach
relies on the provision of 'thick' descriptions, as is presented in this study.
Exactly how this technique of fittingness is applied will depend upon the
nature of the major case study site. One approach is to select a site that can
be viewed as 'typical'. This study however has rejected this 'typical' site
approach and focuses upon an untypical case; untypical, in that there are few
published studies of Japanese-owned first tier supplier companies operating
in either Britain or America.
How then can a comparative approach of fittingness be applied to an
untypical site? It can be achieved by comparing the detail from this study with
relevant aspects of a broader sample of cases. Thus, while Telco represents
an untypical case, there is an established body of case study literature on
Japanese transplants within which the findings of this study can be located.
As the discussion in chapter one indicated, data, in the form of other case
study material, exist that cite a range of factors as influencing the labour
process. These factors include the (mis)application of HRM policies, the
existence of intensive surveillance and monitoring systems and the
organisation's external commercial relationships, to name but a few. The
findings from Telco can be compared with this body of evidence to begin to
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generalise about the way in which specific factors affect the nature of the
labour process.
Summary
This chapter has detailed and justified the process of selecting a
research methodology and also considered the practical concerns around
implementing this methodology. Of prime concern has been the need to
evaluate competing methodologies in the context of the aims of the study. It
has been argued that participant observation supported by interviews and
work shadowing was the most appropriate approach to achieve the aims of
this study. The research process itself evolved in a way that reflected the
emerging significance of different factors. The results of these findings form
the basis of the next five chapters. These chapters are organised around the
four network structures of personnel, workgroup, supervisory and commercial.
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Chapter Four
The Personnel Network at Telco
This chapter focuses on the personnel network at Telco. As argued in chapter
two, the term 'personnel network' refers to the cluster of personnel policies
operated by an organization and the effects of these policies on workplace
relations. The debates concerning personnel policies in Japanese transplants
have been discussed in chapter one, and will not be replicated here. It
suffices to state that within the technical and social organisation of production
associated with Japanisation, personnel policies are often allocated a
particular significance as one of the key mechanisms for generating either a
committed (Wickens 1987) or compliant (Delbridge and Turnbull 1993)
workforce.
The chapter begins by outlining briefly the main characteristics of the
labour force at Telco. It then moves on to present and analyse the data on the
personnel network under four headings, each representing clusters of
policies. These are: single-status, recruitment and attendance control,
employee consultation and involvement and training. This does not represent
a comprehensive chronicle of all personnel procedures, rather it is a selective
account of what, from my discussions and observations, appeared to be those
aspects of personnel policies which engaged the interest of workers and
managers at Telco. This means that some aspects of personnel policy which
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are often a central feature of other workplace studies receive little or no
attention here. Payment levels and systems for example figure only briefly.
The data also focus on the policies which did exist, rather than
referring to practices which are often associated with Japanese companies,
but which were absent at Telco. For example, there is no discussion of
appraisals, as they were not a feature of personnel practice at Telco. While it
might be interesting and instructive to comment on the non-appearance of
policies, this approach does not cohere with the theme of this chapter which is
the evaluation and impact of actual practices.
After discussing the four policy clusters, these are then analysed
around the three categories of social relations: knowledge, reciprocity and
identity. The chapter finishes by discussing amendments made to personnel
policies at Telco and relates this process of adjustment to wider debates
concerning the transfer of policies by Japanese transplants.
The workforce
In a workforce of 410, the number of shopfloor operators was 225.
Approximately 35% of the operators were mature workers (over 30 years of
age). This figure represents a significant increase in the percentage of mature
workers since the start-up period. The reasons for and consequences of this
shift are discussed later in the chapter. Around 70% of operators were female.
The high percentage of female workers is consistent with other studies of light
assembly work both within Japanese transplants (Danford 1998b; Saso 1990)
and in British companies (Cavendish, 1982).
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Payment rates for operators were deliberately pitched in the upper
quartile in order to attract staff. In the 'new town' where Telco was located
there were a large number of factories offering light assembly work. According
to the personnel manager Telco had to pay premium rates because:
Work discipline is much tougher here than in many other local
factories. We are hot on attendance and timekeeping and we don't let
people eat on the lines. In order to get staff we have got to pay good
rates.
The payment of premium rates had not resolved the staffing issues, as labour
turnover averaged 25% between 1990-1995. Operators were all paid the
same wage (excluding any overtime bonus). They were all expected to be
functionally flexible and to undertake any operator-grade task, as directed by
management.
There were around 20 Japanese staff at Telco. Most of these were
employed in a technical or advisory capacity. Of the twelve senior managers
at the company, only two were Japanese. One of these Japanese managers
was the managing director, this was a position that had always been held by a
Japanese person. The proportion of Japanese staff had been reduced since
the start-up period.
Single-status
Single-status is perhaps the most visible and public indictor of both the
distinctiveness of 'Japanisation' and also the organisational culture of
reducing overt status differentials to enhance commitment to and identification
115
with common goals. Evidence from surveys suggests that single-status is a
practice which has been extensively transferred by transplant companies
(Peck and Stone 1993, Morris et al 1993), although, as Peck and Stone
argue:
In some cases, plants have adopted 'full' harmonisation, including pay
and grading, working-time, income security, and other conditions such
as canteens, uniforms and car parking. In others, single-status extends
only to the more superficial (and least expensive to implement)
elements (1993:61).
At Telco the harmonisation of terms and conditions of service for all staff
includes: common uniform, single canteen, no reserved car parking,
standardized working hours, identical sick-pay entitlements.
Within the 'Japanisation' debate the issue of single-status poticies has
rarely been problematised. The experience of Telco suggests however that
single-status can potentially be a source of dispute at all levels of the
organisation. One area of tension concerns the policy of no reserved car
parking. A company memorandum of November 1994, enigmatically entitled
'miscellaneous items requiring clarification' (see appendix two), states that 'it
should be noted that the car park at the front of the building is for use of
visitors and for cars to be used on company business only. All employees
should therefore park their vehicles in the employee car park situated at the
rear of the premises'. This practice was not always followed by senior
members of the company, as the personnel manager observed:
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when you come in the morning there shouldn't be any employee cars
on the front car park. And yet the MD always parks on the front and so
do some of the other managers and one or two of the engineers. We
have a single-status rule saying that you don't do that and yet they do
it; they're not following the rules.
The implications of this rule-breaking extended beyond the single issue of car
parking, as non-adherence to rules by managers supported a climate whereby
minor infringements of rules by workers were tolerated. One of the rules which
supposedly applied to all staff and which was ignored was the eating of
sweets by operators on the line. The 'miscellaneous items' memo also stated
that 'food or drink should only be consumed in the canteen.' However it was
common for sweets to be passed around the line. This was a practice which,
according to the personnel manager, was known and tolerated. He
commented:
We try to be fair and when you've got the MD parking on the front and
taking no action, is it fair to go out there and discipline operators
because they're having a sweet?
What is not claimed here is some causal link between the abuse of car
parking privileges and a specific instance of operator rule-breaking, rather
that the non-application of one aspect of single-status works to reinforce a
culture where some degree of rule-manipulation by all levels of staff becomes
accepted. This led to a situation which the personnel manager summed up as
follows:
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It's a bit of a shambles when you've got rules, people know you've got
rules and you don't enforce them. It makes a bit of a mockery of things
and as I say, we're not enforcing all of these rules.
Single-status also raised tensions concerning timekeeping. The head
of engineering argued that engineers should be allowed some leeway over
timekeeping because they were professional staff who often worked longer in
the evenings and thus should be allowed to come in later the following
morning. However the production manager argued that this approach
discriminated against shop-floor staff who had to be in on time each morning
even if they had worked late the previous evening. A situation had started to
emerge where staff were being managed in different ways, some being
allowed a limited degree of flexibility over timekeeping, whilst others, the
shop-floor workers, continued to be penalised for any breaches of
timekeeping. This inconsistency was a concern for the personnel department.
The personnel manager commented:
Either we've got single-status and what we do in the offices is exactly
the same as the shop-floor and, if the MD's five minutes late,
disciplinary action is taken and he accepts it, he has to accept that. Or,
we are going to say, we all have different terms and conditions in
different parts of the factory; flexi-time in the offices and rigidity on the
shop-floor and we'll manage people differently in accordance with that.
If it created divisions and them and us then we have to deal with that.
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In an attempt to develop a consistent approach the issue of
timekeeping was considered by the personnel strategy group, an ad-hoc body
formed to discuss personnel issues, comprising Ofsenior representatives
from various departments. However, the contentious nature of the issue and
the inter-departmental tension it generated, led, not to the discussion forum
providing a solution to the 'problem', but to the 'problem' precipitating the
dissolution of the group. The personnel manager again recounts the
background:
Richard, the senior production manager, took offence, personally or
professionally or whatever. He didn't want to be sitting in a room with a
lot of people who he thought were hypocrites because on the one hand
they were saying 'yes we need to cut down on shop-floor absenteeism
and make them come to work and deal with them', and on the other
hand say 'our guys are different - it doesn't matter if they are late'. He
thought that was hypocritical and he wanted nothing to do with it and so
he resigned from the personnel strategy group. Because Richard
resigned, the group ceased to be representative of all the views in the
company and there was no point carrying on - so it stopped.
This interdepartmental tension over timekeeping was, as we will see later, one
of a number of sectional conflicts and tensions, some of which had significant
implications for the workforce.
An additional single-status issue concerns company uniform. A
common uniform still exists, but this has been amended due to worker
pressure. Peaked caps were a feature of the original uniforms but these were
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apparently disliked by the workers and, under pressure from the company
council, the Japanese managers reluctantly agreed to dispense with them. A
further compromise 'concession' arose from the request from women workers
to wear skirts instead of trousers, an allowance which the Japanese managers
were not prepared to make. An agreement was reached by allowing the
workers to wear culottes. This diluting of requirements concerning uniform
and the reluctant flexibility of Japanese management is a feature of other
Japanese transplants (Gleave and Oliver 1990).
Recruitment procedures and attendance control.
The extensive application procedures traditionally associated with
Japanese companies (Abegglen and Stalk 1985), and with some transplants
(Graham 1995), are not a feature of operator selection at Telco. Aptitude tests
are used but these merely assess manual dexterity; there is no personality
profiling or attitudinal testing. All applicants are given an interview but this is a
brief fifteen minute fact-finding exercise, undertaken solely by a member of
the personnel department. The first three months of the contract for all staff
are a probationary period. At the end of the three month period a decision is
made as to whether to employ the individual on a permanent basis.
Why is such a rudimentary selection procedure used? There are a
number of answers to this question. First, the buoyancy in the local
employment market means that the available pool of labour is limited. Second,
the period of probation acts as a screening device (Morris et aI.1993). During
the probationary period a very strict line was taken about absence of any kind.
120
For example, during my period on the line one new starter was summarily
dismissed because he rang in sick one day, only to be seen in a local
'hostelry' that lunchtime by one of the managers. A third explanation of the
rudimentary selection procedure is that attempts to extend the process would
founder on practical problems. The personnel manager explained that he
would like a supervisor to take part in the interview, but that this was not
possible:
Really we should have somebody from production in the interview
because then they have ownership of that individual. Then, when we put
them on the line it's not a case of "what kind of crap have you sent me
today?" it's "oh well, this is my person. If they're not working out I better
do something about that. I better train them otherwise I'll look stupid
because I took them on". If they weren't involved it's so easy when
there's a problem to say "you failed - kick them out and get me another
one". It's harder to say, "right you've given me this person who isn't very
good and now I've got to train them and work with them".
GP: Have you floated this idea at ali ...?
Yes, yes, again it's time. When we've been recruiting en masse, we'd
have needed to have a supervisor or somebody with us all day for a
week and they can't spare them. And the counter-argument is, when we
recruit we don't know which line they're going onto so you wouldn't, you'd
never get complete ownership because you wouldn't have the supervisor
who would be supervising them involved in the selection decision. It's not
a particularly good argument against it because you would hope that
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every supervisor would pick a good person whether it was for them or for
their colleagues. Time is the main pressure.
This illustrates a tension between what personnel regarded as 'good' HRM
practice and the demands of production. This tension was, as we will see, a
theme which characterised the design and implementation of a range of
personnel policies at Telco.
Selection procedures at Telco have undergone two significant
transformations. First, in line with a significant number of other Japanese
transplants in Britain (Eiger and Smith 1998; Morris et al. 1993), Telco
changed from a policy of recruiting solely young workers for operator posts to
one of employing older workers also. One of the British managers responsible
for recruitment explained:
The production manager reporting to me was Japanese and he
certainly initially had this idea that he wanted schoolleavers and rather
than just dampen his enthusiasm and say it won't work I decided to go
along with this policy and see how it did work. Eventually it turned out
that schoolleavers were not the best people to employ. They didn't
have mortgages and at the time didn't need to work. If they didn't want
to work they didn't come in and absenteeism was high, there were
problems with attitudes. Eventually we moved to a higher age group. A
few months ago the average age was 30 years, in the early days it was
probably in the mid-twenties. Previously our Japanese management
were not keen on people over 30 for production, but now we have
people around 45 - 50 who we have taken on and been successful.
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This shift in recruitment practices at Telco took a particular direction; all of the
mature workers were female. I was the only male on the line over thirty years
of age. When I questioned the personnel manager about this gender
(in)balance, his response was that he would have been happy to recruit older
males onto the factory floor but that they did not apply for these jobs. To
justify Telco as an equal opportunities employer he argued that mature men
applied for jobs in the mould shop and were employed in that area by the
company. During my time on the line the recruitment of new starters followed
the established pattern. Younger workers of both sexes joined the lines, but
all the mature new starters were female.
While this cadre of older female staff may have been perceived as a
stabilising element by management, they certainly were not uncritical or
compliant. Indeed by bringing in workers with prior experience, Telco also
'imported' staff who had developed views and expectations of how people
should be treated at work, standards which were not always met at Telco.
Consequently, amongst my workmates the keenest critics of Telco's
management were 'mature' workers who often viewed the regime as unjust.
Several examples of these concerns will be discussed later; for now it is
interesting to record the comments of Iris, one of my co-workers, when I told
her I had school-aged children:
You tell them to work hard at school and get a good job, so they don't
end up in a dump like this and get treated like shit.
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A second change in recruitment practice, one which occurred
subsequent to my period on the line, was the strategic recruitment of
temporary workers. By November 1997 there were 210 permanent and 40
temporary operators employed. This change of policy, according to the
personnel department, was a response to commercial decisions. The
Japanese parent company had decided to consolidate Telco's business rather
than to continue to expand, and so there was no anticipated increase in
business to sustain more permanent recruitment. Temporary employees
allowed the company to meet fluctuations in demand from existing customers.
However, the personnel manager also argued that while the use of temporary
workers offered a short-term response to commercial decisions, it was
unsatisfactory from an HRM perspective. They were, he commented, 'difficult
to get, difficult to keep and not of the right quality'. The difficulties associated
with the recruitment and retention of temporary staff have been noted by other
studies of Japanese transplants (EIger and Smith 1998; Palmer 1996).
As the above discussion illustrates, recruitment and selection at Telco
presented a significant challenge for management. A related 'problem' was
that of control of attendance, which is widely identified as a key concern
amongst Japanese transplants, as lines often work on 'lean' staffing levels
with no 'floaters' to cover absenteeism (Danford 1998b; Sewell and Wilkinson
1992a). At Telco, the issue of attendance control was one that engaged the
personnel department to a significant degree, and they sought every
opportunity to emphasise the need for consistent attendance. For example, I
attended a meeting for my team, led by a member of the personnel
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department, to explain the forthcoming introduction of total preventative
maintenance (TPM). One issue raised by an operator was that time spent on
maintenance might mean that targets were not met. The response from the
personnel trainer was that targets may not be met for a range of reasons and
that one of the most significant of these was absenteeism. She went on to
comment that:
unless it is a genuine reason for illness, then you are letting the team
down. You have got to ask yourself 'could I really have come in?' and if
you don't what is the effect going to be.
My diary entry for that evening records my own feeling on the trainer's
comments:
Joanne (the trainer) seemed to go out of her way to get a 'dig' in about
attendance. I couldn't see how it was relevant to the topic of the
training session. It seemed to me that it was something she was
determined to raise at some time during the session to 'make the
point'. The tone of the meeting went downhill from that point. TPM
needs the support of operators, why introduce a 'telling off?
Attendance control at Telco was managed in a number of ways by the
personnel department. Each member of staff was graded A to C according to
the number of absences they had registered during the year. This grade was
then used to calculate the amount of company 'sick pay' allowable during
authorised sickness. An A-grade employee received 'company sick pay
during all sickness absence' but a grade C received 'standard sick pay only'
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(see company documentation appendix three). This grading system was an
adjustment to the rules as the original policy allowed company sick pay to all
absentees. The rules were changed as management felt that this original
policy was being abused, with some staff taking 'excessive' sick leave.
The issue of attendance was also a major factor in determining
satisfactory completion of the probationary period. For example, one of my
fellow operators, Mandy, had her probationary period extended for a further
three months because she had a brief period of illness (substantiated with a
doctor's note) during her initial probationary period. It was indicated to her
that any further absence, for whatever reason, would result in her not being
offered permanent employment. A consequence of this hard-line approach on
this occasion was that it created for Mandy a sense of grievance and injustice
that she was not being treated fairly. She commented to me:
They (the personnel department) said that I was a good worker but that I
would have to complete another three months probation because I had
a week off. It wasn't my fault, I had 'flu' and sent in a doctor's note - I
don't think it's fair, it's not my fault I was ill.
In contrast to this punitive approach to the control of attendance, one
recent innovation to encourage consistent attendance was the introduction of
the 'turkey club'. The personnel manager described this innovation:
we were so busy we said to operators "if you effectively contract
yourself to working throughout the whole of December and part of
November, six days a week, no time off at all, not even holidays, you'll
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get a bonus". They got that, what we called the 'turkey club'. There's a
bonus of about three hundred pounds paid on the last day worked
before Christmas.
Interestingly, as with other personnel policies, the 'turkey club' had unwanted
and unforeseen consequences. The personnel manager went on to comment
that as a result of the 'turkey club':
a lot of people worked through that and a lot of them got fed up and
tired because of the long hours. People were generally getting a bit
miserable and they were talking about leaving and we started to get a
trickle of leavers and absentees, so turnover has increased and morale
has gone down.
The final feature of attendance control concerns the disciplining of
operators by the personnel department. Operators who were considered to
have unsatisfactory attendance records were 'sent upstairs', that is,
summoned to the personnel department to be formally rebuked by a member
of the personnel staff. The significance of place associated with discipline is
also noted in Delbridge's (1998) study of Nippon where workers were taken to
the canteen to be disciplined, and also by studies of British companies using
mainly female workers on the assembly line (Cavendish 1982; Edwards and
Whitston1993). At Telco, this practice of 'sending operators upstairs' was a
major issue for some workers who felt it was applied in an inconsistent
fashion, with occasional block purges which caught operators who happened
to be absent recently, not necessarily the persistent offenders. This view was
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echoed by a number of operators, but perhaps vocalised most stridently by a
worker in her 50s who had a range of previous work experience. My diary
notes her comments:
Pat told me that she was 'taken upstairs' recently and told off about her
attendance. She was the last of quite a lot of people as personnel had
been going through recent records. She said it was the first time in over
30 years at work that she had been told off and that it was unfair
because people with a much worse record than her had got away with
it. She claimed that she had been ill for one and a half days and also
had taken two days off for a bereavement. What's more she had come
to work on Good Friday although she was not completely better
because she had a week's holiday booked over Easter and she did not
want management to think she was skiving. In the five years she had
been at Telco, Pat said every previous attendance grading had been a
grade A.
While it is impossible to comment on the correctness or otherwise of the
action of the personnel department, the key issue is that Pat genuinely felt a
sense of grievance and unfairness. It was a story she told every new starter
and also if her mates said they felt unwell Pat would always chip in that they
better not take time off or they would be 'sent upstairs'. Pat's account became
a motif to her and her friends of the unfair and arbitrary treatment meted out
by the personnel department.
The issue here is not a challenge to the legitimacy of the personnel
staff to discipline errant workers (many operators felt that persistent non-
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attendees should be rebuked) but that the process of identifying miscreants
was inconsistent, ad hoc and consequently unjust. My diary entry comments:
Pat and Maureen were having a moan at lunchtime concerning
Michelle's absence. They claimed that Michelle often took occasional
days off but she had never been 'sent upstairs'. They felt that
personnel were slack at following up persistent offenders but just have
occasional clampdowns which has the effect of catching anyone who
has had time off within the recent time span, hence Pat being sent
upstairs. They complained about the unfairness of the system.
Interestingly, support for this interpretation came from Jo, one of the team
leaders. She was unhappy with the current situation where team leaders could
tell operators off over attendance and punctuality, but had no formal authority
to discipline them - a function which was the sole preserve of the personnel
department. She commented that:
Even if you do report things to personnel they take a long time to get
round to doing things and then they have block 'purges'. That's no
good because they don't always get the worst offenders.
Another feature of attendance control which caused resentment and friction
was the issue of 'pass-outs'. 'Pass-outs' were permits given to operators by
the personnel department to leave the factory for a short time for personal
reasons such as doctor's appointments. This time away from the factory floor
was not counted as an absence against the operator's attendance record. The
refusal to grant 'pass-outs' again generated a sense of unfairness amongst
operators:
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Lorraine told me that she applied to become a bone marrow donor
recently. She received a letter to go to the hospital for tests because a
potential recipient had been identified. She took the letter to Joanne in
personnel who said that she was not interested in Lorraine's reason for
wanting a 'pass-out' and that if she went for tests and also became a
donor then it would be counted as an absence against her or it would
have to be in her own holiday time.
As with the example of Pat being 'taken upstairs', the case of Lorraine and the
marrow donation became an emblem of company unfairness. Lorraine
recounted this instance to all new starters and also took every opportunity to
remind her workmates of the injustice she felt as the following illustrates:
Talking about dentists at lunchtime today and how most people
dreaded dental appointments. Lorraine said that you better not try and
ask for a 'pass out', even if you were in pain - they wouldn't give you
one - they're not interested in anything but production.
In sum, issues related to recruitment and attendance control proved
significant concerns for both managers and workers. For the personnel
department a tension arose between 'good' HRM practice and the demands of
production. Also, a feature of the personnel policies has been that of
adjustment, where initial policies have been reviewed in the light of either
'inappropriate' worker responses, or broader commercial decisions. For
employees the main issue has been the consistency of application of policies
which has raised concerns about fairness.
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Employee consultation and involvement.
The issue of employee involvement has been recognised by Telco's
management as a significant area and one which the company needed to
develop. During my first series of discussions at Telco a member of the board
commented:
I'm a great believer in team work, in employee involvement. We are
discussing with the production manager and supervisors how we can
get greater employee involvement. One thing we have done is
introduce kaizen, but we need to get quality circles which we don't have
at present. We need to get more team and employee involvement in
the next year or two.
It is somewhat ironic in the context of the above comments that, by the time I
joined the company, the original kaizen scheme had collapsed and was in the
process of being relaunched.
At Telco, kaizen was a form of suggestion scheme that was open to
individuals and groups of workers. Successful suggestions were rewarded
either through small monetary gains or trips to HQ in Japan. While the
scheme was aimed at promoting employee involvement, the view from the
factory floor was that the way it was managed alienated rather than motivated
workers. The following diary extracts report some of the views of the operators
concerning the original kaizen scheme:
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Anne: one reason the scheme failed was that if you were filling in a
kaizen form during work time and this held up the line you were told off.
So, you thought 'bugger that' and gave up.
Darren: we broke into a kaizen box last year (the boxes to receive
kaizen suggestion forms were placed throughout the factory) and found
suggestions in there that were more than a year old - the box hadn't
been opened for more than a year. What's the point if they're not even
going to look at them?
Iris: I only ever put in one suggestion. I spent a lot of time making a
suggestion and drawing a diagram, but I heard nothing. Later on I
found out that the idea had been implemented - I got nothing for it.
Jo (team leader): Management interest in kaizen stopped when Mr.
Iwasaki (the instigator of the kaizen) went back to Japan. Since then
suggestions have not been collected or acted on so people don't
bother now.
One common thread running through all of these comments is that, from the
operator's point of view, management were not committed to the scheme.
However, while Jo observed that the demise of the scheme could be linked to
transfer of its champion, suggesting a lack of broader institutional support for
kaizen, the scheme was re-launched at the initiative of the personnel
department.
The re-launch occurred during my period on the line; kaizen was 'born
again' under the legend ESP - employee suggestion programme (a
competition was held to find a new name for the scheme, with ESP the
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winner). The 'new' scheme was introduced to each line as part of a training
meeting (see appendix four for associated paperwork). My diary notes record
the cynicism with which some of the line responded to the trainer's invitations
to discuss ESP at the re-launch meeting:
Darren: does this mean you are going to open some of the boxes?
Pat: I'm still waiting to get feedback on an idea from kaizen.
Iris: I put in a suggestion, never heard anything, and it was taken up
later - I never got anything for it.
Damien, the trainer, acknowledged that difficulties existed with the previous
scheme, but argued that ESP represented a new initiative which had the
complete backing of management. Speaking to my colleagues afterwards, it
was evident that their cynicism had not been dispelled by Damien's
assurances:
Darren: Anyway it won't come to anything - like all the schemes. When
there is a panic on to get stuff out of the door they say we'll do that
later - but they never do.
Darren's view of the longevity of ESP proved prophetic. Within twelve months
it had collapsed.
This process of introduction, cancellation and reinstatement which
characterised kaizen also applied to the company council at Telco. The
company council, which was introduced when Telco was initially established,
had, by 1995, been disbanded. When I asked during my induction period why
the council had been disbanded, I was told that it was the decision of the
senior personnel manager who thought that it was a waste of time in its
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current form because the worker representatives just used to moan about the
state of the toilets or other minor issues. It was stressed that the council had
not necessarily been abandoned permanently, and that it might be reinstated
in a different format, becoming more focused on issues of significance to the
company (it was subsequently reinstated and then finally abandoned)
The senior personnel manager's evaluation of the value of the
company council was not shared however by all my co-workers on the factory
floor, some of who had a much more positive reflective account. It was felt by
a number of operators that the company council had achieved some benefits
for the workers, with the change in uniform being the most cited, but not sole,
example. There were also contrary opinions, with a few workers claiming not
to have heard of the councilor stating that it did not represent their opinions,
a view consistent with Broad's (1994a) study of the company council at
Deniko. But, on balance, amongst my workmates at Telco, these negative
responses were in the minority. A much more frequent observation was that
the workforce now lacked a forum for discussing genuine grievances.
Interestingly, following a discussion with a workmate about the company
council, she subsequently produced a cutting from the local press celebrating
the opening of the factory. With no little irony, she guided me to a paragraph
which cited the establishment of the company council as a feature of Telco's
commitment to heeding the voice of its workers.
Employees' opinions on the reasons for the dissolution of the company
council were also at odds with those of the head of personnel. One view was
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that it was the pressures of production which led to its demise. A former
council member commented:
When we first started they used to let you have the meetings in work
time, but they stopped that because they didn't want to take the
operators off the line. They started to hold meetings after work - you
were paid overtime. After that no more meetings were called. I don't
know if people didn't want to stay over or whether the management
didn't want to pay the overtime.
An alternative explanation for the demise of the council was offered by three
operators on separate occasions. Each expressed the view that it was a
request for union recognition which was raised by the council representatives,
and rejected by management, that resulted in the termination of the company
council. Telco remains a non-unionised company.
This section began with reference to a comment from one of Telco's
board members on the need to increase communication with the workforce
and the possibility of introducing quality circles. Not only has the latter not
been achieved, but also systems for employee involvement and
communication had been allowed to atrophy. Although there was no
consistent view concerning the value of these institutions, there was a sense
amongst the shop-floor workers that management had little commitment to
employee involvement. Management were viewed as being more concerned
with other issues, in particular the day-to-day demands of production, and as
having scant interest in the opinions and concerns of the workforce.
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Training
Training at Telco was a mixture of on-the-job training supervised by the
team leader or chargehand, and off-the-job training led by the personnel
department. There were also plans to introduce work-based NVQ training for
operators. At the first of two in-house training sessions I attended, I was
presented with a personal development plan detailing the training I would
receive over the forthcoming twelve months (see appendix five). It was a
cause of some hilarity amongst my co-workers that, when comparing personal
development plans after the session, we discovered that they were exactly the
same, the sole 'personal' element being that each operator had their name
typed at the top of their particular sheet.
Every shop-floor operator was officially designated a trainee until they
had successfully completed their probationary period. As a trainee you were
supposed to wear a trainee badge, appropriately positioned, on your company
workwear at all times (see appendix six for company statement regarding
positioning and purpose of badge). New starters generally wore the badge for
the first week or two and then discarded it. The emblem or status of 'trainee'
seemed to be accorded little significance either by workers or management.
As a new starter, my on-the-job training consisted primarily of a mixture
of being shown how to do the task by the chargehand and 'sitting with Nellie'.
Once I had indicated that I had grasped the principles of the particular task
then it was a case of 'get on with it' and 'you will pick up speed as you gain
experience'. Sylvia, a chargehand, described the training in the following way:
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You put them at a machine and you show them the job, watch them a
couple of times and that's it.
If I got into difficulty with an operation, I would call the supervisor or
chargehand over, or ask my co-worker at the next work-station for assistance.
The limitation of this method of training was recognised by workers:
Cath (an operator): Basically they stick you on a job and leave you to
get on with it. You just learn the best you can.
When the team leader considered an operator was competent at a particular
task they would enter a tick on the line-training matrix. It came as something
of a surprise to me the first time I discovered a tick against my name on the
training matrix, as I had not been informed that I had been 'passed' as
'competent' .
The issue of operator involvement in the training of new staff was one
which generated some lateral conflict between operators, as my diary records:
Talking to Sue and Iris today about training new starters. They said
some operators don't like to train new operators because it means they
have to go more slowly and so they can't keep up with production. This
can cause aggravation sometimes. The problem, according to Sue and
Iris, is that targets are not reduced when you are training someone, you
still have to keep up.
I had some personal experience of the tension that this could cause, as the
following diary extract indicates:
Sent to work with Mandy at the beginning of the day. Her task is one of
the most complex on the line, involving assembling a number of
137
components manually then placing them on a jig and compressing
them to fix them into position. She is incredibly quick and dexterous at
this. When she was told by Jo (the team leader) that she would be
training me she complained that it was a demanding job that didn't
have any spare time for training. Jo's response was to give it a go and
see how I got on. Mandy suggested that she should continue the more
complex manual assembly while I worked the compressor. She did
warn me of the need to set the unit in the jig accurately and that failure
to do so would mean holes were drilled in the fascia rendering the unit
unusable. After half an hour of trying to match Mandy's pace I was
responsible for six ruined units. Mandy went to Jo and had me taken off
the job.
The above accounts illustrate the tensions between training and the
demands of production. These tensions are further exemplified with reference
to the in-house training programme provided by personnel. An annual training
plan was submitted by the personnel department to the board of directors,
accompanied with a bid for training time to meet this. Once the bid was
accepted, each line would have specific half-days allocated to them when
they were taken off production to attend the training sessions. It is interesting
to note that the two training sessions which I attended had been scheduled on
three previous occasions, but had been cancelled because of urgent
production demands. The personal development plan I was given also
indicates how far training had fallen behind schedule. Of the six 'development
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needs' with specifically allocated training times, four had been extended
beyond their original dates. A member of the personnel staff discussed the
difficulties in planning and delivering training at Telco:
Training came to a standstill in the end because we couldn't release
people off the lines which is a great shame..... Sometimes when I talk to
people like Richard (the senior production manager) he convinces me
that he really understands why training's important. There are many,
many occasions when we're talking about all the problems in the
company, when they make it obvious that they know that the fact that
the operators aren't fully trained is a problem and is holding them back.
So on those occasions they know it's a problem and they know training
is important and has to be done but there is this conflict because at the
end of the day what they're measured on is output and it's today's
output. And if today's figures are down, they get taken to the M.D.'s
office and they get a bollocking .....When we do training we know we will
get a payback but it might be in six months, might be in a year, it's a
gradual process. If that means they've got to suffer now for a payback in
six months or a year they're not going to be interested. So yeah, they
understand the importance of it, but the pressures that they're under
mean that they have to put their targets first. ... so there is a conflict.
Taking them off the lines is just too disruptive. In the future we may get
the situation where it's possible but at the moment it's not.
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The priority allocated to output over training raised grievances for
operators as well as for the personnel department. It acted as another piece
of evidence to operators that Telco's commitment to its employees was
secondary to production objectives. In addition, when the training sessions
were eventually held, the tensions between training and production developed
a further sense of injustice amongst operators, as supervisors would demand
extra effort to catch up on 'lost' production time:
Sandra: Allan (the team leader) said because we've got a training
session this afternoon, we've got to make extra units tomorrow to make
up for lost time.
Michelle: Allan's been pushing us really hard today. He said we had to
make up for time lost yesterday due to training.
The most recent plan of the personnel department was to introduce work-
based training through NVQs. However, mindful of the past difficulties he was
not totally optimistic about the success of this initiative commenting:
The problem with NVQ is that it may involve training operators in things
that they don't need to know or do. Richard (the senior production
manager) won't wear any non value-added activity.
In summary, training exhibited many of the conflicts apparent in other
personnel clusters at Telco. It illustrated the internal tensions between good
HRM practice and the day-to-day demands of production. It also acted as
another indicator to workers of the low priority they were allocated by
management, and the provision of training conflicted with the demands of
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daily output targets. Having described and discussed key personnel policies,
this chapter now moves on to analyse these. This analysis is developed using
the three categories of social relations identified previously: knowledge,
reciprocity and identity.
Knowledge
The issue of knowledge has been accorded considerable significance
within the Japanisation debate, either as heralding a way by which workers
can unleash their cognitive and creative potential (Adler 1993; Kenney and
Florida 1993; Womack et at.1990), or as a pernicious method of appropriating
what rightly belongs to workers and utilizing this as a means to work
intensification (Garrahan and Stewart 1992). Underpinning both perspectives
is the assumption that Japanese transplants will have in place a sophisticated
mechanism for eliciting workers' knowledge. Neither of these perspectives is
applicable in the case of Telco. There had been some rudimentary
procedures to 'tap into' workers' knowledge through the kaizen scheme and
the company council but both of these had atrophied. Similarly, there was little
sign of actual commitment to extend and develop the skills and knowledge of
workers through training. Practical training was limited to learning from
workmates, while training which might have extended the skills and
responsibilities of operators suffered due to the pre-eminent demands of
production. Indeed, when training did occur it was to the disadvantage of the
operators, as supervisors demanded extra effort levels to recover 'lost' time.
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This apparent lack of managerial effort to harness the knowledge of the
workforce is consistent with Delbridge's account of Nippon. There is however
one interesting difference between the two companies. In the case of Nippon
there were no formal systems to involve operators. At Telco, by contrast, there
were some rudimentary systems, but these had broken down. The
consequence of this was to send an unambiguous message to the workforce,
namely, that there was a distinction between rhetoric and reality in relation to
personnel policies. The withdrawal of the company council and the problems
associated with kaizen acted as evidence to the workforce that management
had no interest in the views and opinions of the workforce. Similarly, the
continuous cancellation of training sessions sent a clear message that the
achievement of production targets over-rode any concerns for training. There
is therefore little surprise that the relaunching of the ESP system was greeted
with cynicism. In the experience of the workforce, there was little indication
that management were genuinely interested in the views of the workforce or
that management had any real commitment to their own initiatives
Reciprocity
At Telco, both the formal and the psychological contract operated, in
the main, to create a view among employees that they had few reciprocal
obligations to the company. With reference to the formal written contract, one
example which influenced my own early perceptions of the company was the
reduction of the sickness allowance. My diary entry records my thoughts on
the sick pay amendment, as a 'new starter':
142
At induction today I was given an employee handbook. In it, the original
sick pay policy was crossed out using a black felt pen and a new policy
stapled in. This new policy effectively reduces the sick pay entitlement
of employees. The downgrading of the scheme and the crude
'doctoring' of the handbook do not create a very positive first
impression of the company's commitment to its employees.
It can also be argued that the adjustment of the payment system, in the form
of the introduction of the 'turkey club' bonus, acted to diminish rather than
sustain worker reciprocity, as its overall impact was to demotivate staff and
increase turnover.
However, it was the unwritten psychological contract which
demonstrated most clearly to the workers the limits of the company's
obligations to them and consequently shaped their views of Telco. This
contract has been defined as 'individual beliefs, shaped by the organisation,
regarding terms of the exchange agreement between individuals and the
organisation' ( Rousseau 1995:9). It was the belief of many operators at Telco
that the company did not treat its workforce appropriately. The psychological
contract can be (at least partially) shaped during the recruitment and induction
process, where employees may pick up and internalise 'Signals' before they
start their designated task (McFarlane and Tetrick 1995). Worker perceptions
of the limits of Telco's commitment to its employees were drawn to my
attention during my induction 'tour' of the production area. Here I was
introduced to Lorraine, who recounted her bone marrow 'experience' and told
me not to expect any sympathetic treatment from the personnel department.
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This was a story she told to every new employee, with the message that Telco
did not meet the expected norms of a 'reasonable' employer. More generally,
the psychological contract was shaped by the 'broken promises' over the
company council, kaizen scheme and training, discussed above, all of which
generated cynicism and mistrust. Management were viewed as having no
commitment to initiatives they had instituted, initiatives which were
supposedly aimed at developing employee involvement. Finally, the
psychological contact was influenced by a perceived absence of 'procedural
justice' (McFarlane and Tetrick 1995), exemplified by the widespread
perception of unfairness. Worker claims of unfairness were not necessarily
related to the policies per se, rather they were often directed at what
employees saw as the inconsistent implementation of policies, as illustrated
by the disciplining of absentees and 'pass-outs'.
Concerns relating to unfairness were expressed across all sections of
the workforce. However, they did seem to be most keenly felt and verbalised
by mature workers. These workers often drew unfavourable comparisons
between their perceived injustices at Telco and their experience in previous
workplaces. These past employment experiences are central to employees
evaluation of their current psychological contract. As Rousseau observes 'the
saying "what is past is prologue" applies in individual-level psychological
contracting.' (1995:219). Thus while the recruitment of an older age group
was viewed by management as adding a degree of stability and maturity to
the shop-floor, it helped to create a climate that was critical of management.
Workers have 'histories', in the form of experience and expectations from
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previous workplaces, that they bring with them. These 'histories', in the case
of Telco, contributed to a feeling of antagonism from many of the mature
workers towards management.
It is not being argued here that all employees were critical of all
policies. Employee views were much more diverse than that. Some employees
expressed a positive view of working for Telco, as my diary records:
Working on the machine next to Wendy today. She has been here ten
months, her first job since leaving school. She thought it was OK, better
than she expected. Her friends had all told her not come because it
wasn't a good place to work - you were treated badly. That had not
been her experience - she felt they treat you all right.
Talking to Heather and Chris at break. They both said Telco was 0 K,
you weren't treated too badly - it was clean , you all had your own
locker and uniform and it was secure employment.
Other workers, whilst articulating negative views concerning fairness or lack
of organisational commitment, also expressed positive views about particular
policies. For example, although some mature workers were the company's
keenest critics, they voiced appreciation of the company's de facto non-
redundancy policy, which meant that when production demands were slack,
workers had been used for general cleaning and housekeeping tasks, rather
than being 'laid off.
Notwithstanding these positive views, what did emerge on balance was
the climate of disaffection felt by the workforce, and this was generated, at
least in part, by their experience of the formal and psychological contracts.
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Significant elements in both these contracts indicated to many of my
workmates that Telco had failed to deliver its reciprocal obligations.
Identity
The main point concerning identity to emerge from the study of the
personnel network was the existence of a strong anti-company ethos.
Workers, in the main, developed an identity that was antagonistic towards and
in opposition to management. The controversy over pass-outs, the seemingly
arbitrary nature of attendance control, the cancellation of training and the
demise of the company council and kaizen scheme all acted to create an
environment where workers felt that management had no respect for or
interest in them. My diary was punctuated by comments that echoed this
disaffection. Observations such as "they (the management) treat you like
rubbish", "all they care about is getting stuff out of the door" and they're not
interested in the operators", were commonplace. The extensive occurrence of
such comments suggests that they cannot simply be 'written off' as a few
individual 'whinges', but rather represent both the individual experience of
many workers and also a shared collective view which was a barometer of the
overall climate of workplace relations at Telco. The impact upon worker
identity was to create a situation where operators felt little sense of
commitment to company; their main sense of loyalty, as will be shown in the
next chapters, was to their workmates on the line and this often involved them
in actions which circumvented managerial instructions.
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Personnel Policies and Japanese transplants
Having explored the relationship between the personnel network and
the formation of worker attitudes at Telco, this section moves on to make
some, broad observations which relate the company's personnel policies to
the wider Japanisation debate. First, Telco's personnel policies re-affirm the
need to recognise the diversity of practice amongst Japanese manufacturing
transplants (Eiger and Smith 1998; Milkman 1991). While some transplants,
such as Mazda, Subaru and Nissan, might be characterized as having a high
degree of application (Abo 1994) of Japanese practices, this is certainly not
universally true, as illustrated by the rudimentary selection procedures and
the lack of opportunity for employee involvement in problem-solving activities
at Telco.
Second, the actual (mal)functioning of personnel policies presents an
alternative to that academic literature which has emphasised a coherence of
both purpose and practice in the policies of Japanese manufacturing
transplants. As was argued in earlier the chapter, both the HRM and the
critical perspectives are founded on a functionalist view that production and
personnel practices worked as they were intended and provided a system of
coherence and mutual support.
The data from Telco add to the empirical material that challenges this
view of a coherent integration of personnel and manufacturing policies (Eiger
and Smith 1998; Grant, 1996). The relationship between personnel and
production at Telco can be characterised as one involving contradiction,
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conflict and compliance. Contradiction represents instances where personnel
policies did not operate in the manner expected, thus causing production
tensions. An example is the recruitment of school leavers who did not prove
the keen and malleable workforce that Japanese managers had expected.
Conflict denotes cases where the objectives of the personnel and those of the
production were seen to be in competition. For example, training was forgone
so as not to incur the opportunity cost of lost production. Compliance signifies
the introduction of policies to meet production needs which were viewed by
personnel as counter to their interests. This occurred with the instigation of
the policy to recruit temporary workers. This lack of coherence between
personnel policies and the demands of production was, in the main, the
consequence of tensions within and between managerial policies and not the
result of conflicts between management and labour.
A final key feature of personnel practices at Telco was that they were
subject to review and adjustment, with policies becoming amended over time.
This draws an important distinction between the transfer and the evolution of
policy. While the question of transfer is one which has generated significant
academic research (Abo 1994; Dedoussis 1995; Kenney and Florida 1993;
Kenney and Florida 1995; Milsome 1993; White and Trevor 1983), the issue
of evolution has not always been addressed. Consider, for example, the
study conducted by Abo and colleagues into Japanese manufacturing
transplants in America (Abo 1994). Their analysis is based on an application -
adaptation scale. Application represents the transfer of Japanese practice 'to
the maximum extent possible' (Abo 1994: 19), whilst adaptation denotes a
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'significant modification to the management and production system, by
adopting many of the local operating procedures' (Kamiyama 1994:29). Abo
and colleagues add some finesse to this model by adding levels of adaptation
and accommodation, but this dyadic structure lacks the analytical
sophistication to capture the social nature of workplace relations and the
consequent evolution of policy. Their model allocates to management the role
of sole strategic actor in determining policy; management decide which
policies can be applied and which have to be adapted to local operating
procedures. The picture presented is one of managers selecting, from a range
of Japanese and local practices, those policies which are the best 'fit' for their
particular transplant company. The potentially contested nature of policies is
not recognised, nor is the fact that they might not achieve the objectives
allocated to them. Apart from general references to inter-country differences
of culture and institutions, workers seem strangely absent from this model.
Consequently, Abo's model presents a static picture of policies, with no
consideration of the possibility of ongoing policy change.
The evidence from Telco indicates that for a comprehensive analysis of
personnel policies any model needs to include adjustment in addition to
application and adaptation. This refinement is supported by other studies
which suggest that the issue of policy amendment is a significant one, as
Japanese transplant companies jettison some policies and procedures,
amend others and embrace new ideas (Broad1994; Eiger and Smith 1998;
Leopold and Hallier 1997; Wilkinson and Ackers 1995).
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Table three presents an analysis of adjustment at Telco along two
dimensions: the nature of the changes and the cause of these changes. Using
this analysis a number of key points emerge, some of which are at variance
with other studies of Japanese manufacturing transplants. The first concerns
the extent of change; policy amendments at Telco occurred across whole
clusters of personnel concerns, suggesting that Abo's neglect of the dynamic
of accommodation is a major omission.
Table 3
Adjustments in personnel policies at Telco
Nature of Adiustments Causes of Adiustments
Cancellation of company council Lack of value attached by the company
Re-launch of kaizen scheme Lack of value attached by the company
Recruitment of temporary operators Commercial considerations
Problems with planning internal training Commercial considerations
and possible introduction of NVQ's
Recruitment of 'mature' workers Employees not responding
'appropriately' to Japanese personnel
practice.
Turkey club Commercial considerations
Change to 'sick pay' scheme Employees not responding
'appropriately' to Japanese personnel
practice.
Change to uniforms Response to employee request
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Differential application of 'clocking on' Managerial (mal)practice
procedures
Reserved car parking unofficial practice Managerial (mal)practice
for managers
The extent of change also represents a significant difference from other
studies which have reported amendments to single policies, such as company
councils (Broad 1994a), or to particular strategiC clusters, such as recruitment
and retention (Eiger and Smith 1998), but not across the spectrum of
personnel policies, as was the case at Telco
A further significant issue is the differing causes of adjustment.
Accounts of Japanese transplants in Britain have highlighted the way in which
amendments to personnel policies are the consequence of direct challenges
from the workforce, or relatedly, of unforeseen and unwanted worker
responses to particular policies (Broad 1994a; Wilkinson and Ackers 1995).
At Telco, while employee action did have an impact on adjustments to
personnel policies, it was just one of a number of causal influences, as the
personnel department struggled to meet the sometimes competing demands
of workers, management and production targets. Other significant forces
bearing on accommodation were: pressures to achieve production, the
seeming lack of value attached by personnel to the original employee
involvement schemes and managerial (mal)practice in the form of managers
manipulating or ignoring workplace regulations.
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Summary
Employee attitudes at Telco were clearly embedded in the personnel
network, represented by personnel policies. A discussion of knowledge has
illustrated that there was scant evidence at Telco of workers contributing to
'problem-solving' activities. Moreover the distinction between reality and
rhetoric in relation to the actual operation of company policies worked to
develop a culture of cynicism and mistrust of management. From the workers'
viewpoint, management was disinclined to listen to any suggestions made,
and operators' needs were always secondary to production targets.
This culture of mistrust was illustrated further through the discussion of
reciprocity. Here it was argued that Telco had failed to deliver its reciprocal
obligations and that the (mal)functioning of both the formal and the
psychological contracts generated a situation where the company was
perceived as an uncaring employer and a bad place to work. The overall
consequence of the personnel policies was to develop an anti-company
identity for many of the workers. The picture presented is very different from
that of the high commitment organization portrayed by advocates of
Japanisation. It has more in common with Grant's (1994; 1996; 1999) study of
Renco, where workers' perceptions of management actions as low-trust
created an atmosphere of suspicion and confrontation.
More broadly, the actual functioning of personnel policies also differs
from the coherent, supportive and functionally unproblematic accounts of
some transplant companies. The operation of personnel policies at Telco
presents a volatile picture characterized by tensions and adjustments. This
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does not mean, of course, that personnel policies in all Japanese transplants
do not work, rather, that the potentially problematic nature of their operation
needs to be recognised and that it is both theoretically and empirically
unsound to simply infer the outcomes of these policies merely from their
existence.
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Chapter Five
Workgroup Networks: Managerial Control SYstems
Having discussed the personnel network at Telco in the previous
chapter, this study now moves on to explore the workgroup network. This
chapter concerns the managerial control systems experienced by the
workgroup at the point of production. It begins by outlining the organisation of
production and then discusses the composition and functions of the
workgroup. A flve-fold classification of managerial control is then presented
and detailed. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of the main
features of the control systems.
This is one of two linked chapters that have the workgroup as their
focus. The subsequent chapter goes on to discuss and analyse employee
responses to the managerial control systems outlined below. Dividing the
chapters in this way stresses the important distinction between design of
managerial control systems and their operation in practice, reflecting the view
that these systems do not always function in the manner intended (Allen 1994;
Thompson and Ackroyd 1995).
The Organisation of production
The organisation of production at Telco replicates that of their parent
company in Japan. The plant was designed in Japan, was equipped solely
with Japanese machinery and was installed by Japanese engineers. This type
of transfer, using predominantly Japanese technology and production layout,
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is typical of Japanese transplants operating as first-tier suppliers in the motor
vehicle industry (Kumon 1994).
One feature of production often associated with Japanese
manufacturing methods is just-in-time (JIT) (Schonberger 1982). There is
however some difficulty in determining whether companies are using JIT as it
is a disputed concept. With reference to internal JIT systems, one working
definition of JIT proffered by Graham is that it is 'a method of inventory
control in which the company keeps parts stocked on the line for only a few
hours of work' (1994:140). Under this definition the production system at
Telco can be classified as JIT. The particular components required for each
batch were selected and brought together in the warehouse according to the
demands of that specific model. These were then moved onto the factory floor
to coincide with model changeovers. As lines manufactured several models a
day, the parts were only on the lines for a few hours at most.
A further feature of internal JIT is the minimisation of buffer-stocks
between work stations (Roper et aI.1997). At Telco work in progress varied
from a few seconds to a maximum of ten minutes worth of stock. In many
cases, the capacity to build up buffer-stocks was constrained by the layout of
the line which often limited the number of units between work stations to
single figures. The instances of ten minute buffer-stocks occurred in a number
of sub-assemblies producing fragile electronic movements. In order to protect
these movements they were packed in a special crates holding 24 units
(approximately ten minutes worth of production) and each crate was
transferred between work-stations. It was the expectation of management that
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there should be no more than one crate waiting to be worked upon between
each station. To police this expectation the Japanese Managing Director
would patrol the factory floor insisting on 'one-to-one' operations and
reprimanding supervisors who had allowed any build up of excess stock
between work-stations.
A further feature of Japanese manufacturing practice is total quality
manufacturing (TaM). The TOM approach to ensuring quality is to make it the
responsibility of all employees within the organisation, rather than merely the
function of the quality control department (Dawson 1994). Under TOM,
operators have greater accountability both for the quality of their own work
and that of their fellow workers. At Telco a wide range of systems were in
place to make workers responsible and accountable for product quality. These
included: work standards above each work-station which detailed exactly how
to perform tasks, the use of statistical process techniques at some work-
stations and visual and electronic quality monitoring systems at various
stages on the line. These processes will be discussed in greater detail later in
the chapter; it is sufficient to note at this point that operators were allocated a
significant role in the achievement of product quality.
There are three production zones at Telco: a printed circuit board area,
a plastics moulding shop, both of which supply the third area, the product
assembly lines. This chapter will focus on the product assembly lines, as this
is the area in which I worked. The product assembly line is also the one which
has the largest number of employees, and which manufactures the company's
sole externally sold product. The product assembly area consists of seven
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product lines, with each line dedicated to a particular car company or
companies. It is the line that constitutes the basis for the workgroup, or in
Telco's parlance 'the team'. This study will also refer to the workgroup at
Telco as the 'team'.
The team at Telco
Each line team is staffed by a number of workers (usually between 15
and 25) and is managed by a supervisor with the assistance of a chargehand.
Workers tend to stay within one particular team although they can be
transferred permanently to another line (by managerial decision) or 'loaned' if
another line is having staffing difficulties. In common with many Japanese
transplants there are no 'floaters' to cover for absence (Sewell and Wilkinson
1992a), although the chargehand usually deputises for any operators who
might have left the line temporarily.
Each line has a daily target which is based on the models produced
and on the number of operators. Batch size is quite small, usually between 50
- 300 units, with different models varying slightly in production complexity and
speed of construction. A summary of the production data of a typical line is
provided in figure three on the following page.
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Figure 3
A4 Line
10 model variants
14 major parts variants
Line target: around 900 completed units per day
Batch size: maximum 300, minimum 63. (During my time on the A4 line, the
batch size was usually between 100-200 units. On a few occasions,
changeovers were as many as ten per day).
25 Operators
Highest job cycle time 25 seconds
Notwithstanding slight differences between lines, the production
process generally conforms to the pattern outlined in figure four. At the head
of the line are sub-assembly cells which 'build up' the components that
constitute the product. Typically there are four sub-assembly stations, each
staffed by one operator. These sub-assemblies are fed through to an operator
(or operators) who assembles the component elements. The part-assembled
units are then fed onto a robotic line, which performs a series of drilling and
screwing operations. The robotic line is staffed by an operator who ensures
that the machines have the correct screws and that it is performing its task
consistently. The unit is then cleaned with an air jet to remove any dust
particles prior to receiving its casing and visors. This completes the building
process. Once constructed, the unit then goes through a series of manual and
osub-assembly
o sub-assembly
o visor assembly
o
Back case
assembly
o = operator(s)
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Figure 4
Typical Line Layout
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electronic testing stations. Each unit then moves to 'final assembly' for an
overall visual check. Finally, the approved unit is packed ready for dispatch.
Operator tasks are typically short-cycle assembly or checking tasks. On
sub-assembly, for example, one of my tasks involved the following operations:
Locate the base sub-assembly onto a jig. Add plastic guard to base
sub-assembly, making sure that it fits correctly by locating the lugs on
the small pins of the jig. Press button to activate the machine to screw
the sub-assembly together. Add fascia piece onto sub-assembly.
Locate it in position manually with two small pins using a hand tool.
Time for operation, 24 seconds.
The above description of the production process has similarities with
other Japanese transplants. The organisation of machines around 'family
groups' rather than functional areas, small batch production and in-process
checks are all features found in other research (Milsome 1993; Oliver and
Wilkinson 1992; Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b). Similarly, the
unskilled/semi-skilled nature of the production tasks means that Telco can be
characterised as a 'screwdriver operation' which is typical of many Japanese
transplants (Morris et aI.1993).
It is also interesting to note that the organisation of production at Telco
was configured around a 'traditional' linear organisation. It has been
suggested that Japanese companies have a preference for cellular or U-
shaped organisation in order to facilitate teamwork and communication (Oliver
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and Wilkinson 1992). Telco had experimented with U-shaped lines but,
according to one manager, this led to a situation where:
operators were talking to one another not about the quality of work, but
about what she was going to cook for tea or whatever ....when we re-
laid the line we straightened it out.
During my time with the company, the straight production line was in evidence
throughout the factory floor. This meant that while management designated
the line as a team, the physical configuration of the workstations did not
facilitate teamworking. This raises the issue of what did management at Telco
understand by teamwork?
In conceptualizing Japanese work teams generally, it has been argued
that a distinction needs to be drawn between the Japanese version of teams
and the autonomous work groups of Anglo-Scandinavian oriqin' ( Buchanan
1994). Autonomous work groups imply self-managed groups with
responsibility for production decisions, characteristics that are largely absent
in Japanese teamworking. This was certainly the case at Telco where
decisions on work scheduling and the organisation of product were made
solely by management. Moreover, as the previous chapter illustrated, the only
attempt to involve employees in continuous improvement activities was the
abortive suggestion scheme which, when in operation, focused on the
individual and not the team. Thus the team at Telco does not satisfy even the
limited definition of Japanese-style teamwork where 'teams examine how their
5 Buchanan argues that autonomous work teams 'were first formulated in Britain and have been most
extensively applied in Scandinavia' (1994:220). There are also many British examples of teams
operating with no autonomy.
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otherwise traditionally run manufacturing facility can be continuously
improved' (Buchanan 1994:220).
What, then, was the purpose of teams at Telco? From a managerial
perspective the teams appeared to perform two major functions. First, they
represented an organisational unit within which information could be
disseminated, jobs could be rotated and a training matrix could be applied.
Second, and more importantly in the context of this discussion, the team
represented a unit of accountability, being held responsible for the delivery
and achievement of targets.
One physical manifestation of the significance of targets was the large
whiteboard that stood at the top of each line. This whiteboard displayed the
current day's target, the previous day's target and actual output, the number
defective units recorded on the line and the major sources of operator error
for the previous day. It was a public pronouncement of the 'effectiveness' of
each work team's performance. To facilitate this level of accountability a
number of managerial control systems were in operation. This chapter now
goes on to categorise the control systems experienced by the team.
Controlling the line
This section develops a classification of managerial control systems on
the line at Telco. A number of typologies of control have been advanced to
explain both capitalist workplace relations generally (Edwards and Heery
1989; Edwards 1986; Friedman 1977) and managerial control within
Japanese transplants more specifically (Graham 1994). None of these
162
standard typologies is completely appropriate here, because they do not focus
solely upon the issue that concerns this chapter, namely, control at the point
of production.
Participation and observation suggest that Telco's managerial control
strategies at the point of production can be grouped into five categories:
reduction of dependence upon the operator, monitoring and surveillance,
pacing, time control and personal control. Each of these categories has
specific mechanisms of control associated with it. These strategies and
mechanism of control are presented in table four and discussed in the
sections that follow.
Table 4
Typology of Control Systems at Telco
Control Strategy Mechanism of Control
Reducing dependency Poka-Yoke
upon the operator Machine checking
Monitoring and Recording procedures
surveillance Quality control department
Traceability
Pacing 'Efficiency quotient'
Standard operating procedures
Time control Morning briefings
Bell-to-bell working
'Cleaning up' time
Toilet breaks
Personal control Management information
systems
Autocratic authority
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There is no claim that these five strategies are essentially new. For example,
personal control is a characteristic of Edwards' (1979) 'simple control',
Friedman's (1977) 'direct control' and Rose's (1998) 'supervision structure'.
Thus while complete typologies of managerial control provided in the literature
have been rejected as inappropriate, selected categories within these
typologies which concern control at the point of production are of value.
Reducing dependence upon the operator
Reducing management dependence upon the operator is one of the
two key components in Edwards and Heery's (1989) model for managerial
control. One of the strategies identified by Edwards and Heery under the
banner of reducing dependency is management replacing workers with
machines. This is relevant to the control strategy at Telco. Although the
machines did not replace workers as such, they did take over the detailed
operating functions at some work-stations and also acted as 'fool-proofing'
devices at others. The aim of introducing machinery in these ways was to
reduce the company's dependency upon operators by circumscribing their
input into tasks. Reducing dependency at Telco was the process of creating
operating procedures that, as far as possible, marginalised any reliance on
workers in order to minimise manufacturing errors.
One way of reducing reliance on operators was the development of a
poka-yoke system, which a production engineer at the company described:
It's where you design a fixture on a component so it is idiot-proof. It will
not go in upside down or sideways - it will only go in one way. That
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then takes all the onus off the operator because she picks it up and it
only goes in the correct way. You make it foolproof so they can't get it
wrong'.
Poka-yoke was not an isolated example of reducing reliance on operators,
but, rather, formed part of a wider programme to minimise Telco's dependency
upon its employees. The production engineer explained:
Where possible you try and take the onus off the operator to look for
quality and put it in a machine that is more reliable. We are now
introducing more vision systems into the company where the computer
and the camera are viewing for things rather than getting the operator
to view for them. Where possible we are putting robots and vision
systems in to take the responsibility off the operator.
This reduction of dependency at Telco was not driven primarily by an
economic rational of replacing people with technology, as operators were still
required to load and supervise the machinery, but as a mechanism to try to
ensure higher levels of product quality by reducing the capacity for human
error.
Monitoring and Surveillance
Significant recent academic interest has been generated concerning
monitoring and surveillance of operators, both in the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b,1993; Taylor and
Bain 1999). At Telco there was an extensive system of monitoring and
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surveillance which stemmed from three mechanisms of control: recording
systems, the quality control department and the traceability system.
A key function of the recording systems is the daily identification and
tallying of defective units. It is a procedure which permeates every stage of
the line. During the build process, operators on sub-assembly are expected to
spot and note any errors, either from their own work, that of their colleagues
or resulting from faulty parts. The various 'testing stations' that are located on
every line exist solely for the purpose of detecting malfunctioning units. At
these 'testing stations' operators mark the casing with a coloured crayon
(different colours indicate different work stations) to signify that it has been
checked and is of an appropriate standard. The penultimate station on each
line, the illumination booth, performs an electronic test of key functions. At the
end of the test, the computer screen flashes either 'OK' or 'ER' (error). The
test machine also emits a buzz if a unit fails. The cause of failure can either
be defective parts or faulty insertions by operators upstream in the production
process. At the last station on each line the 'final inspector' has the
responsibility for checking the visible quality of the unit and identifying any
burrs, blemishes or other visible defects which have not been 'spotted' earlier
on the line.
It is company policy that each defective unit is logged and the cause of
defect is recorded, either as 'self i.e. operator error, or 'other' i.e. faults
resulting from defective parts or machine error. At the end of each shift the
various recording sheets are collated by the supervisor onto one record. This
recording procedure serves as a constant reminder to operators that their
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performance is under scrutiny. At morning team assembly the number and
type of defects is read out to the team. If the defect rate due to operator error
has been high the previous day, the supervisor would inject a note of warning,
as the following diary extract indicates:
Paul, the supervisor, chastised the line at morning meeting today over
the number of defects. He said "we had a lot of problems with dust in
the units yesterday - this level of defects to 'self is not good enough.
Jeff, it's your job to blow the dust out, you need to take extra care.
Everybody else, make sure you check for dust before you pass the
units on, and make sure your materials and work-stations are dust-free.
The recording process also applied to output figures as well as defect rates,
with each line allocated a daily production target by management. At every
morning meeting the previous day's actual and designated output levels were
announced. Failure to meet the target could result in a reprimand for the
team, whilst exceeding the allocated figure would bring words of praise.
This monitoring procedure provides a way of allocating responsibility
and blame both to individual members and to the team as a whole. This
blame-culture was exacerbated by the public display of performance. As
discussed above, the whiteboard located at the head of each line was
updated every morning to give the actual and target output figures and the
number and type of defects for the previous day. Whilst this display of
performance was not as Draconian as the measures reported by Nippon CTV,
where individual operators had cards over their stations indicating the number
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of faults they had perpetrated (Delbridge 1998), it was a constant signifier of a
regime of surveillance at Telco.
A second mechanism of monitoring and surveillance involves the
quality control (QC) department. Although the responsibility for product quality
is devolved to the work team, a separate QC department is still retained to
'police' quality and quality procedures. At the start of every day and at the
beginning of each batch, a number of units are set aside for QC to inspect. If
these fail, QC can order the whole batch to be inspected by the line. QC staff
also occasionally 'patrol' the line to check that operators are following the
correct procedures and that they have the appropriate work standard
displayed. This function of the QC department indicates that although the
responsibility for quality is devolved to operators, a practice commonly
associated with Japanese manufacturing techniques (Oliver and Wilkinson
1992), at Telco management were unwilling to rely solely on operators and
used the traditional inspection role of QC to reinforce line-monitoring
procedures.
A further mechanism of monitoring and surveillance at Telco was
traceability. Traceability represents the process which allows surveillance
procedures to be extended beyond daily accountability, as it provides
management with a way of tracking faulty work even when the product has left
the company. Traceability is organised around a batch data identification
procedure called 'lot numbers'. Each batch of units is allocated a lot number.
This number is printed on a computer-generated label on the casing of each
single unit. When the first unit of each new batch travels down the line, it is
168
accompanied by a lot data sheet. Each operator signs their name on the lot
data sheet against the appropriate function, signifying that they are
responsible for that operation and that they are using the appropriate parts.
This combination of lot numbers and data sheets allows errors to be tracked
back to specific operators during the guaranteed life-cycle of the product, as
the lot data sheets are photostatted and kept in the company archives for ten
years. This function of traceability, to hold operators responsible for the
quality of their work even when it has left the factory, was explained clearly to
me during my first day induction by the personnel department. Neither is
traceability a hollow threat, as the engineering director explained to me:
We keep the lot data sheets and we do use them. If a unit comes back
and there is an obvious fault that should have been picked up we go
back to the archives and see who was responsible. We will talk to that
person about their mistake. We have done that, checked back on any
obvious errors - it's an essential part of our quality systems.
Pacing
'Pacing' denotes the intensity of work experienced by operators. One
determinant of pacing is management's judgment about how much actual work
can be expectedl extracted from operators. For each operator on the line at
Telco an 85% 'efficiency quotient' is assumed. This presupposed that
operators will be engaged on direct production duties for 85% of their
allocated working time, excluding official breaks. The remaining 15% is
earmarked for changeovers (averaging at four minutes per new batch),
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housekeeping, toilet breaks, operator fatigue and miscellaneous delays. This
figure of 85% efficiency was allocated by the Japanese parent company when
Telco was first established.
The pace at which operators worked was linked not only to the 85%
efficiency quotient but also to standard operating procedures. Each operation
had a time allocated to it. This was determined by measuring the number of
seconds taken to perform that task following operating procedures to the letter
of the work standard. Line speed was set by the task with the longest cycle-
time, which was generally between twenty four and twenty six seconds. The
engineers and supervisor would try to balance the line so that each operator
was working at a similar pace, irrespective of the job cycle-time of their work-
station. However, an exact match across all tasks is not always achieved. The
difficulty in reaching a 'balanced' line was not only a consequence of slight
time differences between work stations, but also a result of variations within
work stations as the time to complete a particular task might vary across
models. This meant that standard times at individual work stations could
fluctuate during the day as different batches were produced. Supervisors
would move staff up and down the line during the day when bottlenecks
occurred.
Time Control
The ability of capital to appropriate the concept of time in order to
impose discipline on workers is a feature of the emergence of industrial
capitalism (Thompson 1968). This control of time by capital is no less
170
important in the 'new' workplace. Production levels and work tasks, at Telco
as in other Japanese transplants (Delbridge 1998; Graham 1995) are
calculated on seconds worked. Andy, a supervisor at Telco commented:
Each operator, working at 85% efficiency, is available for 450 working
minutes in a day - that is 2,700 seconds. It's my job to make sure that I
get that amount of work out of them.
Whilst accepting that this concern with the extraction of maximum labour from
purchased labour power is not new (consider Scientific Management for
example), heightened product market competition has led capital to squeeze
the porosity of the working day. For Telco the ability to control time in detail is
an important objective. This is achieved in a number of ways: bell-to-bell
working, morning briefings, 'cleaning up' time and toilet breaks.
Bell-to-bell working is a common feature of Japanese transplants,
although as Danford (1998b) observes, its significance is rarely
acknowledged. Bell-to-bell working was in operation at Telco. Five minutes
before the start of work a 'warning' bell would sound. The start-of-work bell
signified attendance at the team-briefing rather than merely arrival on the
premises. Five minutes before the end of the working day the 'cleaning-up'
bell would sound, followed, exactly five minutes later, by the final bell of the
day. Breaks during the working day (two ten-minute tea breaks and one half
hour lunch break) were also delineated by bells. This use of bell-to-bell
working allowed supervisors and chargehands to monitor any infringements of
timekeeping.
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The daily morning briefings also acted as a form of time control.
Company documentation states that 'there is no time allowance for clocking
in/out as there is in some companies (e.g. 3 minutes change of clothing
allowance after official start time/before official finish time etc)'. The morning
briefing provided a way of monitoring this rule. Every morning briefing started
exactly on the eight o'clock bell. The first action of the supervisor was to
check who was present. If any operators were slightly late, they were easily
identified and a comment from the supervisor such as "here by the bell please
not one minute after" or "eight o'clock's the official start time" would greet their
arrival.
The end of working time was signified by a bell at 4.25 pm, leaving five
minutes for 'cleaning up' time or preventative maintenance before the final
bell. Telco's management was anxious that even this last five minutes of the
working day should be used 'productively', as the following extract from an
internal memorandum, circulated by the senior production manager, indicates:
The company allocates a specific time each day for TPM and cleaning
up the assembly area. This time is from 4.25 pm until 4.300m ... if you
have completed your TPM and your immediate work area is clean and
tidy you are expected to help clean the rest of line.
The final aspect of time control concerned toilet breaks. Although time
was formally allowed within the 15% 'non-productive' time for toilet breaks, the
attempts by management to control these were a source of conflict in the
initial start-up period of the company. The production manager commented:
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One of my girls (sic) was walking across the shop-floor about 9.45 am
to go to the toilet and the break was 10 am. One of the (Japanese)
directors was walking across and asked her where she was gOing. She
said "to the toiler' and he said "go back and go in your own time". She
came to me all upset and within a minute everyone on the shop-floor
had heard about it. I got hold of the (British) production director and
said "you can't do this, you can't turn round to someone and say you
can't go to the toilet. They are not robots". I had to go and ask the
(Japanese) director to apologise to the operator ... If you try and
impose only going to the toilet in your own break time you wouldn't
have a workforce.
The official policy during my period on the line was that toilet breaks could be
taken, but that these were at the discretion of the supervisor and chargehand.
Personal Control
Personal control? as adduced here, denotes the shopfloor influence
exerted by one manager through both role and force of personality. The
individual concerned is Ian Hollins, the production assembly manager, who
ruled the factory floor in the manner of an autocrat. Hollins' interpretation of
management seemed to be firmly based on McGregor's (1960) Theory X of
leadership which is grounded in a belief that:
6 Personal control is used by Richard Edwards as a sub-category of simple control and in his
framework the team specifically alludes to direct control by the owner/capitalist. In the thesis presented
here personal control is used to denote control by the representatives of capital, rather than the owners.
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People are lazy, prefer to be directed, want to avoid responsibility and
are relatively unambitious. They have to be coerced, controlled,
directed to make them work towards organisational goals (Hannagan
1998: 39).
My first encounter with Hollins has been documented in chapter four; this was
the occasion on which I arrived late for a pre-placement discussion and was
told by Hollins that punctuality would be expected of me if I were to come and
work at Telco. Hollins' abrasive and autocratic style characterised his
interaction with operators, as the following diary entries testify:
Mandy from A1 line told me that they had received a "bollocking" from
Hollins at the morning meeting. The line target was 1,100 and they had
only made 800 the previous day. One of the workers argued that there
had been a problem with parts. Hollins said that he knew this, but that
this was just an excuse, the line should have reached its targets.
Dave was 'sent upstairs' today for a telling off about timekeeping.
Apparently Hollins spent the time shouting at him.
Rachel said she was having difficulty keeping up with line speed as she
had been moved on to a new job. She said that Hollins said he would
be 'on her back' to make sure she kept up.
Hollins' approach to management and his domination of the shopfloor
corresponds to Edwards' category of simple control. Simple control exists
where owners or supervisors in small and medium-sized businesses wield
power in authoritarian manner. Edwards comments:
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These bosses exercised power personally, intervening in the labour
process often to exhort workers, bully and threaten them, reward good
performances and generally act as despots, benevolent or otherwise
(Edwards 1979:19).
Although this form of control was a feature of early capitalism, it has continued
to exist. This is supported by recent survey data that suggests technical,
skilled and non-skilled workers have experienced an increase in simple
control during the 1990s, as evidenced by tightness of supervision (Gallie et
aI.1998). Telco not only provides case study support for these survey findings,
it illustrates how the organisation of production associated with Japanisation
can facilitate personal or simple control by enhancing the range of data
directly and promptly available to management. Under Fordism, the collection
of performance data for management has been characterised as a slow and
costly procedure relying on bureaucratic 'relays' of intermediaries (Sewell and
Wilkinson 1992a). By contrast, the advent of the technical and social
organisation of production associated with Japanisation has increased the
amount of data available to management and the speed of access to this
information. This has been achieved by eliminating some of these
intermediate posts and devolving their functions to the team, whilst
simultaneously intenSifying the monitoring and control systems at the point of
production. At Telco, significant amounts of production information were
available to Hollins on a daily basis (and sometimes more frequently), making
it possible for him to exert personal control over the shopfloor.
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It is not being suggested here that employees in all Japanese
transplants will be subjected to the same domineering approach as those at
Telco. What is being argued is that while some studies of Japanese
transplants have reported the demise of personal control (Delbridge 1998)
personal control is not necessarily inconsistent with strategies of heightened
monitoring and surveillance. Quite the opposite in fact; the data emanating
from high surveillance regimes can act to sustain and stimulate personal
control.
Summary
At Telco, management control incorporated a range of strategies,
supporting the view that it is generally inappropriate to reduce control
strategies to a particular type within one organisation (Edwards 1986). There
are a number of general features of these control systems. The first is that
they are based on a 'low trust' managerial view of the workers, as illustrated
by the reduction of operator dependence and the plethora of monitoring and
surveillance mechanisms. Second, the control systems have two objectives,
the attainment of output levels and the generation of product quality. It has
already been suggested in the previous chapter that the demands of output
override other considerations, such as training. This raises the question of
whether both quality and quantity are attainable at Telco, or if, as other
studies of Japanese transplants have noted, they are contradictory objectives
(Grant 1996). Thirdly, while innovative forms of control have been identified,
for example the use of electronic monitoring, these exist side-by-side with
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more traditional control methods, such as personal control. Indeed, it can be
argued that the development of 'new' forms of control has increased the
potential of the traditional forms, rather than supplanting them. Finally, the
control systems at Telco exhibit many of the features associated with the
'emasculation' of the workforce and the demise of employee resistance
(Delbridge et al.1992 ; Delbridge 1995; Garrahan and Stewart 1992; Sewell
and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b, 1993). This contested issue of employee
responses is the basis of the next chapter.
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Chapter Six
On the line: Employee Responses to Control Systems
This chapter deals with the responses of the workgroup to the control
systems at the point of production outlined in the previous chapter. It is widely
recognised that there is often a distinction between the objectives attributed to
control systems and the actual outcome of them (Allen 1994). As the
characterisation of the factory floor as a frontier of control suggests, workers
challenge certain control mechanisms, accept some and even 'police' others.
This diversity of response characterised the reactions of employees to
management control systems at Telco.
This chapter begins by considering worker responses to the various
types of control at Telco, namely, reducing dependency, monitoring and
surveillance, pacing, time control and personal control. It then analyses these
responses in two ways. First they are categorised and discussed with
reference to resistance and compliance. Second, they are analysed in relation
to the categories of social relations identified earlier, knowledge, reciprocity
and identity. Finally, in order to discus issues of continuity and change, the
labour process at Telco is compared with that of UMAC, a first-tier supplier to
the motor industry researched some two decades earlier (Cavendish 1982).
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Responses to the reduction of dependency
The essence of dependency reduction strategies was to lessen
manufacturing errors by using machinery to control or replace the actions of
operators. This strategy was based on the assumption that technology was
more reliable than the human operator and that dependence could be
engineered out of the production system. An example from the line illustrates
the use of technology in this way. One station at which I worked involved
checking that two of the unit's functions were working within prescribed limits.
My job was to locate the unit onto a jig and then press a button which slid the
unit into an electronic testing device. The machine performed the appropriate
tests and indicated to the operator whether the unit was satisfactory. This
automatic calibration machine was a recent introduction. The machine it had
replaced relied on the operator's judgment to determine whether the unit was
functioning within prescribed limits.
While this type of initiative was eulogised by the production engineer
as resolving a problem for Telco, the actual performance of this particular new
device caused a range of production difficulties. First, it was rather
temperamental. So much so, that Ray, the usual operator at this station,
constructed a number of signs which he hung over the machine. The first, said
'machine out of order', the second, 'machine still out of order', and the final
one 'for sale, one new Japanese machine. Can be repaired or used for scrap'.
When the new machine did break down, the original machine, which remained
on the factory floor, was brought back in to commission. Ray's signs above
the machine were visual emblems of the sense of frustration with the
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malfunctioning of the technology. It was management who were held
responsible for introducing what was viewed as unreliable and inappropriate
technology, leading Ray and the workgroup to question the competence of
Telco's management.
A second difficulty was that the new automatic machine was extremely
sensitive to any slight variations outside the prescribed tolerances. This
brought an interesting reaction from the supervisor, as my following diary note
indicates:
The automatic testing machine I was on today alarmed, indicating that
the unit was outside the tolerance limits. I called Paul (the supervisor)
over and he said that the machine was over-sensitive and that the unit
was probably OK. He then checked it manually using the original
equipment and said that it was on the borderline and so we can pass it.
The acceptance of 'borderline' units and the reversion to the original
manual process both acted as examples of the supervisor manipulating official
procedures and, as such, were used by operators to legitimise their own
circumvention of formal systems. They also underscored two related key
messages to operators. The first was that quality and quantity were not
always mutually achievable and that the demands to meet output targets
could be in tension with quality standards. Second, despite the plethora of
quality-checking systems, and when friction occurred between output levels
and quality standards, it was quality that was sacrificed, usually through the
revision downwards of official standards.
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Responses to Monitoring and Surveillance
Monitoring and surveillance permeated all aspects of life on the line.
Although, as some of the following examples will illustrate, operators were
acutely aware of the omnipresence of surveillance, the monitoring procedures
drew little adverse comment from the operators. There were some exceptions
to this, one being where the monitoring procedures were felt to be applied
unjustly. My diary details one example:
At the meeting this morning, Paul (the supervisor) went over
yesterday's defects, but singled out a particular problem that had
occurred with loose screws. He said to Janet that she needed to be
particularly careful and to make sure that none got through to the end
of the line. Janet was furious afterwards at being singled out and for
the faults being counted against her. She said that all she had done
was report the faults and that the problem could have happened
anywhere up the line.
The focus of Janet's discontent was not the systems themselves, but the way
they were applied by the supervisor and chargehand, which she felt to be
unfair.
A further adverse comment by operators concerned the way in which
monitoring systems were manipulated by management. During one particular
day on the line there had been a significant problem with one of the processes
which led to the unit 'alarming' when it went through an electronic testing
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station, indicating that it was outside the tolerance bands. The response of
management was instructive:
Working on the line today when Pat said "hey - look at this, I know
whafs going to happen now, they're going to fiddle the tolerances". I
saw a couple of engineers and some members of the quality control
department conferring by the machine. Production was stopped while
they made some adjustments. Pat said "they always do that, if they're
having trouble getting things through they always fiddle the tolerances -
we won't have any alarms now". Pat's prophecy proved correct - the
day passed with no more units rejected by that monitoring process.
During a subsequent interview with the QC manager, I asked about this
changing of tolerances. His response was that the machine was initially set to
Telco's own tolerances which were more stringent than those applied by the
manufacturer, so the tolerances could be relaxed while still meeting
manufacturer's requirements. This does, of course, beg the question of why
have an internal standard if it is going to be ignored at the whim of
management. Also, the reason for this revision of tolerances only became
apparent as a result of my interview with the QC manager. No attempt was
made to inform the operators what the justification for the change was, either
at the time or at the following morning's team meeting. Consequently,
operators just viewed this as management 'cheating' the system when it suited
themselves.
The circumvention of monitoring and surveillance procedures was not
merely the preserve of management. Operators also developed a number of
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strategies to evade monitoring and surveillance in order to escape blame for
errors or substandard work. Part of the function of every operator was to
check for visible quality of the units they received from their colleagues
downstream on the line and reject those units they viewed as unsatisfactory,
passing them on to the supervisor. Quality, in this context, does not refer to
functional quality, but to visible cosmetic quality, which included scratches,
blemishes, shading, light levels etc. Thus operators were charged with
'policing' the work of their workmates as well as maintaining the required
standard on their own work. A key role in the circumvention of these aspects
of monitoring and surveillance was that of the 'final inspector', the end-of-line
operator who conducted a visual check on the unit and was supposed to
record any defects. However, rather than write down all defects, it was
common practice to send units back up to the line to be 'doctored' and then
pass them through as right first time. This did not mean that no 'end-of-line'
defects were recorded, as a complete nil return would have alerted
management suspicions. The 'final inspector' would submit a daily tally which,
in their view, was sufficient to allay any management suspicion, but which
underrepresented the actual level of defects. This practice was common
across all the lines and was carried out with the express intention of
protecting members of the team from censure. As Dave, a final inspector on
one line, told me: "you don't write everything down - you don't want to get
people into trouble".
There is some similarity here between the actions of operators at Telco
in looking after the interests of their workmates and Delbridge's experience at
183
Nippon where operators would pass warnings back up the line if errors were
being made. There is also a key difference between the two cases. At Telco
defective units were physically passed up and down the line, while at Nippon
assistance was limited to verbal support between operators. One explanation
of the difference between the two cases is the size and portability of the
product. Nippon's product, TVs could not be moved up and down the line; by
contrast Telco's units were sufficiently small and light to be taken off the line
at any point and so could be sent back for unofficial rectification. This
distinction has been raised because the issues of size and portability of
products as explanatory factors in influencing the nature of resistance are
largely absent in accounts of workplace relations.
A further example of the manipulation of official operating procedures
at Telco by the 'final' inspector concerned the 'doctoring' of the QC sample.
The first four units of each batch were supposed to be set aside for QC to
inspect. My experience of packing on the end of the line gave me an insiqht
into how this procedure operated in practice:
As I started to pack the units Sharon instructed me to put some of the
units in the QC box but to allocate others for normal dispatch - it was
not until twelve units had come down the line that we finally had four for
QC. When I asked what was wrong with the eight consiqned direct to
the customer, Sharon replied "They're fucking shit". I later learned that
what Sharon meant was that they had some minor cosmetic defect
which might not have escaped the 'eagle-eyed' QC representative but
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which were not likely to be spotted by Telco's customer or the final
consumer.
Experience also soon taught me that collective support to look after
each other's interests was not limited to the 'final' inspector; it was a general
feature of the line. If cosmetic defects were spotted before they reached the
'end-of-line' inspection point, they were usually sent back up the line for
rectification without the supervisor being notified. Operators would also
support each other by passing warnings up the line if there was a particular
need for caution. My diary indicate one such instance:
Pat came up to me this morning and told me to make sure that I had the
right work standard' on display, as QC was stalking the line. Sure
enough a member of the QC department appeared later and checked
that the work standard I was displaying tallied with the model currently
being produced, and that I was following the correct operating
procedure.
In addition to working as a group to protect each other's interests,
operators also developed individual methods of evading monitoring and
surveillance. Two examples from the sub-assembly areas illustrate this. Sub-
assembly usually involves placing a number of components on a jig and then
operating the machine to clamp the components into a complete sub-
7 A work standard is a detailed description of how to undertake a particular job, for each of the models
on the line. It includes a diagram, operator's instructions and key quality points to consider. The
operator is supposed to have the appropriate work standard above their work station at all times.
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assembly. Although not a difficult task, it was one that demanded dexterity, an
operation at which I was not always successful. If the components were
wrongly positioned on the jig, then the sub-assembly would emerge as
unusable and some of the components would have to be declared as scrap.
On one line Stuart, my neighbouring operator, saw me going to record one
component as scrap after I had mislocated a component on the jig. He
advised me not to declare it as scrap, as this would mean a fault recorded
against myself, but to mark it as a defective incoming part; in that way the
supplier would be held responsible and not me. It was, he said, a trick he
used whenever he thought he could get away with it. A further covert way of
avoiding having to record faulty work against myself was explained by Anne,
an operator on a different line. She told me to "put any mistakes you make in
your pocket, don't tell anyone about it and take them home with you". This
apparently was a method that she pursued particularly in the early days when
she was learning the job.
What quickly became apparent was that many of the operators'
strategies to evade monitoring and surveillance were often performed with at
least the tacit approval of the supervisor. When I asked Sharon, an end-of-
line inspector, about the possibility of being reprimanded by the supervisor for
not recording all defects, her response was that this would not be a problem
as the supervisors were well aware of this practice. This view was confirmed
by one supervisor who told me that she turned a 'blind eye' to units being sent
back up the line to be rectified, rather than being recorded as defective. She
argued "if you make them correct their own mistakes they don't make as
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many". This practice also had advantages for the supervisors. As they were
responsible for official rectification work, it relieved them of this task. Also, as
supervisors were held accountable for line performance by management, the
under-recording of the number of defects meant they were less likely to
experience managerial censure.
While operators and supervisors would sometimes collaborate to
circumvent monitoring procedures, operators were also aware that the
traceability process meant that any unit leaving the factory with an obvious
defect might bring a reprimand in the future. This knowledge sometimes
brought the operators into conflict with the supervisor. On some occasions
when operators alerted the supervisor to a quality problem they would be
instructed by the supervisor to 'pass' the unit, even though they, the operator,
felt it was sub-standard. In these cases, to protect themselves from any future
comeback should the unit be rejected at a later date by the customer, the
operator would insist that the supervisor sign the unit, thus indicating that
responsibility for passing it lay with the supervisor. When faced with this
demand for a signature, supervisors would often reconsider their initial
judgment and consign the unit for rectification.
What also emerged from the actions of both workers and supervisors
was that while support could be offered to some operators, it could quite
easily be denied to others. In the case of Dave, a line worker, this lack of
support was very obvious. Dave was not liked either by his co-workers or by
the supervisory team. He was viewed as lewd and foul mouthed (a difficult
achievement given the industrial language and general banter that
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characterised the lines), lazy and unreliable (taking time off for no good
reason). This led to the traditional 'protection' being withdrawn from him. My
diary entry notes a particular example:
Sharon (the end of line inspector) complained to the chargehand today
about the number of units that had been coming down with dust in the
visors. This was a clear dig at Dave who had been on the air-blowing
machine today. Darren, the chargehand said that he wanted all the
defects recorded on the sheet. As usual, Sharon had not been
recording the defects, so she made up a high number for 'dust in
visors' and entered it on the sheet. At morning assembly the next day
Darren said that the number of defects to 'self had been too high,
especially with dust problems and told Dave to be more careful. Darren
commented that "it's no good trying to hide faults by not recording them
because the rework required is reflected in the number of units
produced, so if targets have not been met then, unless there has been
a line breakdown, management know it must be due to defects." This
was clearly meant for Dave's ears as a signal that he was not going to
get support from the line or the supervisors.
The above discussion has illustrated that operators' daily actions at the
point of production were shaped, at least in part, by the presence of
monitoring and surveillance procedures. These actions took a range of
concrete forms and had a number of purposes including evading surveillance,
monitoring standards and 'policing' colleagues. It also involved operators in
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relationships with peers and supervisors that were both supportive and
confrontational.
Responses to Pacing
The pace of the line was dictated by the 85% 'efficiency quotient' and
the balancing of the line around standard operating procedures. The 85%
'efficiency quotient' is significantly less than work pace expected at Mazda's
American plant. Fucini and Fucini comment of Mazda:
Workers at Flat Rock were actively engaged in their work for 57
seconds every minute compared to the 45 second-a-minute average
pace of the Big Three worker (Fucini and Fucini 1990:148).
That is not to argue that the pace of work was pedestrian; the 85% 'efficiency
quotient' yields a 51 second-a-minute pace, greater than the American vehicle
manufacturers cited by Fucini and Fucini. It does however illustrate that Telco
did not expect the extremes of effort associated with some Japanese
transplants.
Among Telco's operators there were mixed feelings concerning the
pace of the line. While no one ventured the opinion that the pace of work was
slack, views did vary from "reasonable and manageable", to "difficult to keep
up". One explanation of the different views is that, despite attempts to balance
the line, the time taken to complete tasks varied between work stations and
also within work stations due to the particular requirements of different
models. The impact of a change of model on levels of effort can be illustrated
by my experience on the 'visor' work- station. This involved inspecting a
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plastic visor for scratches and then inserting it into the main body of the unit.
My diary records my progress:
On visors today. Initially I coped quite well: inspect the visor, add the
plastic 'housing', locate the plastic clips into the main body of the unit
and press them together until they click into place. By first bell I had it
sorted, working at a steady pace and chatting with people around me.
Then disaster struck in the form of a model change. For the new model
the visor edges and lugs had to be glued before they were located onto
the main body of the unit, adding several new movements and seconds
to the task. Despite my frantic best efforts, I failed to cope and was
replaced by Mandy, an experienced operator (I was sent packing -
literally). Talking to Mandy later she said that she had to work at full
speed to keep up with some models but that others were much easier.
What emerges at Telco is not the unremittingly harsh pace reported in some
Japanese transplants (Graham 1995; Fucini 1990), but a slightly inconsistent
pace depending on task and model.
What was quickly apparent at Telco was that the intensity of work was,
to some extent, controllable by the operators themselves. This was often
achieved by shortcutting the formal operating procedures laid down in the
work standard. For example, my task on one line was to undertake three tests
on the product, a procedure which I followed religiously until my predecessor
at the station told me I had no need to bother with the third test, as this was
replicated further down the line. Interestingly, when I asked about the
190
potential consequences of dOing this, he assured me that "there shouldn't be
any problems; Mark (the supervisor) knows that we do it."
On some work-stations, workers used the ability to 'shave' a few
seconds off standard job times to build up buffer stock, as the following diary
entry indicates:
Mandy, a worker on sub-assembly, said that she could cope with line
speed comfortably - she does not have to go too fast because she
misses out one of the test operations. She usually manages to build a
'kitty' to get ahead of the line, but she is careful not to get too far ahead
or the supervisor will find her other work to do.
As outlined earlier, in sub-assembly units were transferred between work-
stations in special protective pallets consisting of 24 units. Officially there was
supposed to be no more than a Single pallet of stock between work-stations,
but Mandy would work ahead to make up an extra pallet and kept this
underneath her workbench. Mandy's ability to translate any extra units into a
kitty in order to give her some control over her work effort is particularly
interesting as it is a feature of production which has traditionally been
associated with assembly work, but which, it has been claimed has been
eliminated by just-in time production (Delbridge et aI.1992). At Telco, although
the 'banking' of work was officially frowned upon, it was a regular feature of
the sub-assembly stations.
While in the example cited above Mandy was careful not to get too far
ahead for fear of being allocated additional duties by the supervisor, the
manufacturing of a 'kitty' was both recognised and encouraged by the
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supervisor. Supervisors knew about the banking of stock through their
physical supervision of the line. They encouraged this because it facilitated
the daily achievement of production targets. 'Banked' units were items that
had been produced and counted towards the daily production tally; they
represented a valuable resource in a production process which, as we will see
in the next chapter, was beset by problematic technology and variable quality
of supplies.
The ability of operators to gain some measure of control over their work
effort through circumventing official operating standards was not limited to
sub-assembly. This is illustrated by a description of the way the checking and
final inspection operations were organised on one line. The area was staffed
by Kate, Lorraine and Paula, with myself making up the fourth member of the
group for a three-week period. Our task was to perform a series of checks on
the finished units as they came to the end of the line. First, they would be put
on a machine for a specified time which simulated hot conditions, to ensure
they responded appropriately. Then they went to the 'Iumo' (illumination)
booth, where an electronic functional test was performed. Finally, they went to
inspection and packing. The women had worked together on this section for
several years and familiarity with the operations meant that they had found a
number of shortcuts which they exploited. For example, with the heating
process, rather than leave the units on the machines for the specified length
of time demanded by the work standard, when the unit had indicated that it
had responded appropriately to the temperature, it was removed and replaced
with another, irrespective of whether the full time cycle had been completed.
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The strategies detailed above were used to shave seconds off formal
procedures. The use of the 'Iumo' booth allowed workers to take clandestine
advantage of their ability to manufacture unofficial rest pauses. The 'Iumo'
booth is completely enclosed with a full-length black curtain, thus preventing
anyone from seeing in. Only one operator was supposed to work in the 'Iumo'
booth but it provided an ideal meeting place for the workers in this group to
chat, knowing that even if the work became backed up they could clear the
backlog quickly by shortcutting official operating procedures. The 'Iumo' booth
also provided a refuge for workers from other workstations and lines to have a
chat and take a pause if they managed to make time during their operations.
In addition, with company rules forbidding eating on the shop floor, the 'Iumo'
offered a haven for storing and consuming food. For example, Paula, one of
the three regulars who worked the 'end-of-line' section, had difficulty in getting
up in the morning and consequently did not have time for breakfast without
being late for work. Her solution was to bring her breakfast (two slices of toast
and a drink), daily onto to the shopfloor in her bag, and spend time in the
'Iumo' eating it. Her work was either covered by her colleagues or backed up
and then cleared later.
This discussion of operator responses to pacing has argued that there
was no one single uniform workpace at Telco. It has also illustrated that
operators devised a series of methods, usually related to the circumvention of
official operating procedures, to gain some control over the intensity of work.
Finally, it has identified the supervisor as a conspiritor in at least some of
these unofficial practices.
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Responses to Time control
Operator action to manipulate workplace regulations also applied to
time control. One example of this is illustrated through the issue of toilet
breaks. Toilet breaks acted often as a rest and a break from the line rather
than a physical need. As Collinson observes in his study of Components
Division:
The toilets constituted a free space in which time could be appropriated
and surveillance could be escaped. (1994:35).
At Telco toilet breaks officially had to be sanctioned by the supervisor.
However, rather than seek permission operators would simply leave the line,
merely informing their fellow workers. Occasionally, the supervisor would try
to control this absence from the line, an action that could be firmly rebutted by
the operator. For example, one lunch-time Anne described an altercation with
a supervisor which had taken place earlier that day:
I was going to the loo for a break and I could see Mark (the supervisor)
looking at me. He shouted to me 'where are you off to', so I turned
round to him and said 'I'm going to change my tampon - have you got a
problem with that?". He went bright red - he won't ask me that again in
a hurry - what I told him wasn't true, but it's taught him a lesson.
A contest also developed over 'cleaning-up' time. Officially, the last five
minutes of the shift was to be devoted to general housekeeping and TPM, but
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this was widely ignored, with operators using the time to chat or find reasons
to go and visit their workmates who happened to be stationed nearer the exits.
This was subject however to periodic attempts at clamp down. Supervisors
would sometimes reprimand workers for 'hanging around' during 'cleaning-up'
time and order them back to their workstations to "go and do some tidying".
The 'misuse' of 'cleaning-up' time also provoked a reaction from senior
management. At one team meeting, a memo from the MD was circulated
rebuking workers for their misuse of 'cleaning-up' time. The memo stated:
It is not acceptable to stand around waiting for the bell, you must work
up to 4.30 pm.....1have asked my supervisors to ensure that the above
is adhered to, and to bring to my attention any specific areas or
individual not complying with the company's policy.
That evening the MD 'patrolled' the floor during cleaning-up time and the
operators all found various aspects of housekeeping to occupy themselves.
However, when, over time, the MD's patrols became less frequent, the
operators returned to their previous practice. The use of 'cleaning-up' time
drifted into its original pattern of relaxed chatting, punctuated by occasional
reprimands from the supervisor.
A further issue related to 'cleaning-up' time concerned total
preventative maintenance (TPM). At one of the training meetings I attended,
TPM was introduced to the operators. The trainer explained that in the near
future operators' duties would be extended to include TPM, involving them in
the routine maintenance of their machinery. A question raised by operators
was when they were to undertake TPM, as it was an additional duty which
195
meant that line targets might not be met. One answer from the trainer was that
'cleaning-up' time could be used. This 'solution' seemed to be adopted by
management, as a subsequent memorandum from the senior production
manager concerning 'cleaning -up' time, cited TPM as one of the operators'
duties during this last five minutes of the working day.
Despite the initial misgivings of the operators that TPM would put them
under pressure and involve them in work during 'cleaning-up' time, these
fears did not materialise. Several days after the line meeting, maintenance
staff came round to each machine showing the operators the TPM
requirements. The reaction of the operators was generally positive, with
comments such as "it's only what I do now, plus a little bit of oiling. I can do
that when I get a spare minute". It became general practice amongst
operators to fit TPM into pauses during the working day; TPM duties were
rarely performed during the allocated 'cleaning-up' time. This remained five
minutes for the operators to relax prior to going home.
The actions of workers in challenging management regulations over
toilet breaks and 'cleaning-up' time stand in contrast to operator compliance
with the controls designed to monitor timekeeping. I noted only three
occasions when operators arrived late for morning assembly, and on each of
these occasions the individual concerned was reprimanded by the team
leader for poor timekeeping. The time structures imposed on breaks and
lunchtimes by bell-to-bell working were also broadly observed. Workers who
were in the canteen when the bell sounded would return to the work-station
promptly, and not try to 'pinch' a few minutes extra free time. This may be due
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in part to supervisors taking their breaks with the workgroup, which acted as a
physical reminder of timekeeping.
In summary, while operators had some success in manipulating
working time to their advantage, they were not able to exert any influence over
controls which structured their hours of attendance on the factory floor. Also, it
needs to be noted that attempts to manipulate working time brought operators
into conflict with supervisors; this is in contrast with many of the practices
involved in circumventing operating procedures discussed earlier, where
supervisors were active accomplices in rule breaking. The reasons why
supervisors should support operator rule-breaking in some instances yet try to
enforce the application of rules on other occasions will be discussed in the
following chapter on supervisory networks.
Responses to Personal Control
It was argued in chapter four that the operation of personnel policies
led to operators voicing concern over the way they were treated at Telco. The
personal control embodied in the adversarial management style of Hollins
served as another indicator to operators of the lack of respect and demeaning
treatment that they received. For example, the occasion that Hollins
reprimanded a work team for not achieving daily targets brought a variety of
negative reactions, as my diary record indicates:
Anne "it's just not fair - blaming us for something we have no control
over"
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Mandy "it's just like being back at bloody school, being told off like that
- in fact its worse than bloody school"
Iris "I had to try hard not to laugh but he made me think of a rottweiler. I
thought he was going to start slavering at the jaws at any moment"
The operators were powerless to combat Hollins' autocratic style. Any avenue
of complaint which they may have used had been blocked off by the
atrophying of the company council. The operators' feelings merely simmered
away, creating an atmosphere of offence and resentment.
Some of the workers drew a clear link between the way they were
treated, both generally and by Hollins specifically, and the gender
composition of the shopfloor. One lunchtime conversation illustrates this:
At lunchtime today Iris said to me "do you know why you're the only
man here our age (over 30)." I asked her what the reason was. Her
view was that mature men wouldn't stand the way they were treated at
Telco. She said "men who have been to work in other places would
come here and they would just tell management to piss off if they
treated them the way they treat us. Hollins would have been decked by
now, no problem - someone would have put their fist in his face". Iris's
comments brought general agreement from the other women workers at
the table.
While it is not possible to judge the accuracy of Iris's prediction, it does show
that some operators felt a double grievance against management in that they
were being poorly treated both as workers and also as women. This was the
only time during my placement that I heard the female workers make direct
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comments concerning the way they felt that their gender influenced the
conduct of shopfloor relations.
What is also interesting about the style of Hollins is that it was known
and disapproved of by the personnel department. During an interview after my
placement, I raised the issue of adversarial management with the personnel
manager:
GP I was surprised, on the line, not so much with the supervisors but
higher up, how adversarial some of the attitudes seemed to be.
One line got an immense bollocking ...
DP Was that off Ian Hollins?
GP Yeah, yeah, it seemed to be like an account of working for Ford
in the 1960's - it almost belonged to that era.
DP Do you know lan's gone?
GP No, where's he gone?
DP He's gone to Ford. Ian was a pretty good manager but one of the
things that caused us endless frustration was his attitude in his
dealings with operators. He didn't treat them well and he was
adversarial; he was adversarial in his dealings with everybody,
not just operators. He'd come up into our department and act
bolshi and make demands and be uncooperative and
aggressive, and that was Ian. I suppose he could shout at
operators even more that he COuldshout to other people
because they can't shout back at all. Other people can. But I
wouldn't be surprised if you said that you experienced similar
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behaviour from other people. Perhaps not so extreme; people
getting shouted at. I know some supervisors talk to people in an
adversarial manner. Sometimes they have to tell people off,
there's no escaping it, that's part of their job - they have to
control people. What we're trying to do as part of the
supervisors' development programme is teach them how to do it
constructively. Don't swear, don't get personal, don't do it in
public, don't shout. A lot of them do that because that's their
natural style and if somebody does something wrong, they get
angry and they lose their temper. They get frustrated and they
handle it whilst they're angry and they're frustrated instead of
calming down and dOing it later.
GP It's just an observation really ...
DP I know from sessions from when we do the training that a lot of
operators feel like they're not treated with respect and that's a
bad thing.
In addition to adding support to workers' claims concerning the way they were
treated, the conversation also illustrates the lack of power of the personnel
department over managers. Whilst supervisors' attitudes and behaviours
could be challenged through internal training, seemingly the personnel
department could do nothing to resolve the problems posed by an
'unreconstructed' manager such as Hollins, apart from wait for him to leave.
Also, what is somewhat ironic about the personnel manager's views is
that he associated inappropriate treatment of operators solely with production
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supervisors and managers. However, as has been discussed in chapter four,
the (mis)application of personnel policies by the personnel department was in
itself a source of significant grievance among operators. For many operators
the autocratic attitude stemming from personal control was merely
confirmation of the lack of respect and fairness with which they were treated
by the company in general.
Having detailed and discussed employee responses to control systems
this chapter now moves on to analyse these responses more fully. It begins by
examining employee actions in terms of resistance and compliance. These
two themes have been selected as they represent patterns of employee
behaviour which occur in response to managerial control systems outlined
above.
Analysing Operator Responses: Resistance and Compliance
Workplace resistance takes a range of forms and is given a variety of
meanings (Hodson 1996). This point is significant as it recognises that
resistance is much wider than organised conflict and includes:
covert and subtle forms like the restriction of output and rule violations,
or more illicit subterranean forms like sabotage and theft (Gottfried
1994:107).
This type of worker action has been a feature of a number of studies, with
various terms having been coined such as, 'making out' (Burawoy 1979),
'everyday' resistance (Gottfried 1994) and 'sabotage' (Taylor and Walton
1971), to indicate specific forms of worker exploits. The most appropriate term
201
for analysing the informal employee resistance at Telco is 'fiddles'. 'Fiddles' is
appropriate as the term denotes those shopfloor practices which involve
workers using their accumulated experience and tacit knowledge of the
production process to adjust or circumvent workplace rules and operating
procedures (Edwards 1988; Lupton 1963). It is this description of fiddles that
is used here. A categorisation of fiddles at Telco is provided in figure five.
Figure five classifies the various fiddles employed by operators in
response to managerial control systems, analysing them along two
dimensions.
Figure 5
pimensions of Worker Fiddles
Collective
Evading surveillance
'Doctoring' quality control sample.
Passing work back up the line for
rectification.
Not recording all rejects.
Quality Control warning
Individual
Hiding reject work.
Allocating faults to incoming
stock.
Source: Based on Webb and Palmer (1998:616).
Making time
Circumventing operating
procedures.
Ignoring 'cleaning-up' time.
Circumventing operating
procedures.
Hiding buffer stocks.
Leaving the line.
First, they can be grouped according to whether they were pursued by
individual action or by employees acting collectively. 'Collective action'
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denotes that the beneficiary of the fiddle was dependent upon the active
complicity of another operator. Second, they can be classified according to
one of two purposes: evading surveillance and making time. 'Evading
surveillance' involved workers in action which was essentially defensive, the
aim being to avoid detection and blame for any sub-standard work. 'Making
time' represented action to gain pockets of space away from the drudgery and
physical demands that were a consequence of the routine and continuous
nature of work at Telco.
The traceability system, the daily tallying and public display of faults,
the checks during and at the end of the production process, and the
'independent' gaze of quality control, all serve as constant reminders to
operators of Telco's ability to reprimand errant performers. Despite these
widespread controls, operators remained active agents in opposing control
strategies and retained an ability to engage in actions to exert some measure
of control over their life on the shopfloor. What emerges clearly from the data
is that neither the high-commitment nor compliant-worker models, discussed
in chapter one, are appropriate portrayals of employee responses described
above; resistance remained a feature of the factory floor at Telco.
It is, however, important not to view worker responses solely in terms of
resistance, as their actions also involved an element of compliance.
'Compliance' indicates the ways in which managerial control was accepted by
operators. Compliance took two main forms. First, it was apparent in what
workers did not do, thereby allowing managerial decisions to go
unchallenged. There was, for example, no concerted effort to resist the bell-
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to-bell working or the daily recording of faults on the white boards. Similarly,
management 'initiatives' that involved an extension of tasks, such as the
imposition of TPM, were not directly challenged. The introduction of TPM is
particularly interesting as it clearly illustrates the weakness of workers'
position once they are deprived of any independent representation through a
trade union. TPM was not subject to any discussion, but was unilaterally
imposed by management; operators were restricted to actions aimed at
ameliorating its impact. That is not to argue that workers are powerless, but
that the lack of a trade union tends to reduce opportunities for an organised
collective voice.
Compliance also took a more active form, with workers 'policing' the
line to ensure acquiescence with organisational rules. Compliance occurred
when workers refused to engage in fiddles, thereby preventing other members
of the team from manipulating standard operating procedures. The non-
support of Dave because of his slipshod work, and the insistence that
supervisors initial 'dubious' units, both illustrate the boundaries imposed on
fiddles by the workforce. Although in these two examples the 'policing' of
fiddles was prompted by different motives, in both cases the outcome was the
same, that workers ensured operating procedures were correctly applied.
More generally, this selective application of fiddles provides an illustration of
the manner in which control and resistance can be linked in one action
(Collinson 1994).
In summary, the response of operators to the control systems at Telco
was not unidimensional. Some actions represented an attempt to manipulate
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and subvert these control systems. On other occasions not only were control
measures accepted, but were also 'policed' by operators. This supports
accounts of workplace behaviour that suggest resistance at work is usually
interwoven with compliance (Collinson 1994; Gottfried 1994).
Having discussed employee behaviour in terms of resistance and
compliance, the chapter now moves on to a second stage of analysis, to
consider employee action in terms of the study's three social dimensions,
knowledge, reciprocity and identity.
Knowledge
Workers used their intimate knowledge of the production process both
to make time and evade surveillance. Individual and collective methods of
making time were often achieved by 'cutting corners' and not follOwing
standard operating procedures. They were able to achieve this, in part,
because they had accumulated a reservoir of knowledge as to which standard
operations could be safely circumvented. For example, in the situation where
the units were removed from the heating process before the full time-cycle
had been completed, accumulated knowledge told the operators that once a
unit had reached a particular 'reading' then it was of an appropriate standard.
Knowledge was not merely accumulated, it was also shared within the
workgroup. This sharing of knowledge allowed newcomers such as myself to
be initiated into the techniques of making time, by being informed which
operating procedures could be circumvented, and also into ways of evading
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surveillance through the recording of errors to 'others' and not 'self' and the
advice to 'take your mistakes home'.
Workers' actions were also shaped by their knowledge of managerial
(mal-)practice. Experience taught the workers that managers would
manipulate quality procedures when it suited themselves, as in the case of
altering tolerances in order to ensure that units were not rejected and output
was achieved. This knowledge provided workers with a legitimation for their
own fiddles, arguing that if management could break the rules, so could they.
The nature of the rules broken by management was also significant, because,
in the case of altering tolerances, they indicated that management's priority
was quantity rather than quality. This acted as a justification for workers to
'pass' units of marginal quality.
A further connection between worker knowledge and managerial action
existed through the process of introducing technology and technical
innovation to reduce operator dependency. This should have prevented
workers from using some of the detailed knowledge they had acquired over
operating procedures. However, in practice, this was not necessarily the
outcome. Innovative technology caused problems through its unreliability and,
consequently, management was forced to resort to the original technology
which relied more extensively upon operator input and knowledge. It is not
being argued here that all technical innovation was subject to malfunction, but
neither was it problem-free, which meant that managerial initiatives to reduce
dependency upon worker knowledge were not always successful.
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Reciprocity
Reciprocity was a key feature of interaction between operators within
the workgroup. As discussed above, workers shared knowledge in order to
make time. They also co-operated in a number of ways to evade surveillance,
ranging from warning colleagues of 'spot' inspections by quality control to the
systematic non-recording of defects. This philosophy of looking after the
interests of your co-worker was a central feature of all the lines on which I
worked. However, this mutual support was not extended to all members of the
workgroup. In the case of Dave, his slapdash attitude to his work, unreliability
and unacceptable social behaviour led to a situation where his co-workers
deliberately identified his mistakes to the supervisor so that he would be
censured. Some accounts of Japanese transplants have emphasised peer
surveillance and monitoring as the outcome of teamworking (Garrahan and
Stewart 1992; Sewell and Wilkinson 1992a, 1992b). The data from Telco
suggest that although peer surveillance does exist in some instances, this is
an exceptional, rather than a defining feature of workgroup relations. A much
more common occurrence was reciprocal support to evade managerial control
systems. Peer 'policing' is not, therefore, the automatic outcome of high-
surveillance regimes, rather, these regimes ean generate collective worker
action to deny management the 'benefits' of their surveillance systems.
A further key reciprocal relationship existed between workers and
supervisors. Operators' circumvention of operating procedures was often
conducted with the tacit approval, or in some eases, under the instruction of
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the supervisor. Operators participated in these reciprocal agreements
because they served their own interests; they were a significant factor in
facilitating the operator's capacity to evade surveillance and make time. g
Where operators thought that such co-operation was disadvantageous, for
example if they were requested to 'pass' units which they did not feel met
required quality standards, then they would withdraw co-operation by taking
steps to ensure that the source of the 'malpractice' was attributed to the
supervisor.
On other occasions reciprocity was challenged as workers' pursuit of
fiddles brought them into conflict with the supervisor. This was particularly
apparent in workers' attempts to make time by leaving the line and by 'skiving'
during 'cleaning up time'. Supervisors' attempts to enforce corporate
regulations were resisted by workers both individually and collectively. What
appears to have occurred in these cases is that over time informal workplace
procedure had replaced official regulation and this unofficial custom and
practice had ossified to represent, at least in the workers' view, a practice that
was non-negotiable. While this might seem a very small 'victory' it does
indicate that workers can still exert some informal influence over their
conditions of employment even in a situation where they are denied
independent representation and within a regime of surveillance.
g Why supervisors should conspire with operators in this way will be discussed in the next
chapter, supervisory networks.
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Identity
Chapter four argued that the operation of personnel policies had
generated an anti-company ethos amongst many of the workers. The
operation of managerial control strategies served to underpin this ethos. In
some instances worker discontent was aimed at the operation of monitoring
and surveillance systems which, they argued, apportioned responsibility to the
wrong person. More generally, workers resented the autocratic manner in
which personal control was exercised by the production manager; the effect of
personal control was to re-affirm to many operators the feeling that they were
not treated appropriately by the company.
More broadly, the issue of identity is significant not only as a
classification of worker responses, but also in making sense of these
responses theoretically. At issue here is whether worker actions at Telco
should be classified as representing resistance, or whether it would be more
accurate to characterise these responses as consent.
It has been suggested that consent occurs when employee actions
benefit both workers and management (Noon and Blyton 1997). Consider, for
example, Burawoy's (1979) analysis of the generation of consent, which he
develops through an ethnographic study of the shopfloor in an engineering
company. Burawoy found workers engaged in a range of fiddles and shortcuts
to 'make out' Le. achieve production targets. He argues that this process of
'making out' locks workers into the production of consent on the shopfloor. Not
only were management often the co-beneficiaries of the shortcuts and angles
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that workers used, with fiddles only being tolerated if they facilitated the
achievement of output, more significantly for Burawoy, once employees
engage in 'making out' they become incorporated into accepting the
conditions of their own exploitation. He comments that 'the very activity of
playing a game generates consent with respect to its rules' (1979:81).
If this interpretation of consent is accepted then there is a prima facia
case for viewing worker fiddles at Telco as consent rather than resistance.
Employee action in engaging in fiddles served not only the operators'
interests, but also those of management by ensuring the achievement of
production targets. This is illustrated for example, through the actions of the
end-or-nne inspector in 'passing' marginal units which, in her experience,
would meet the customer's requirements but not the standards of the internal
QC department. Moreover, the circumvention of workplace rules and
operating procedures was often based on workers' tacit acceptance of
managerial prerogative, rather than any direct challenge to managerial
authority. For example, through manipulating the way TPM operated on the
shopfloor, operators accepted the right of management to intensify the
working day.
However, in the case of fiddles at Telco this interpretation of worker
action as consent is not appropriate for a number of reasons. Firstly, for
Burawoy, consent is characterised by the replacement of vertical conflict with
lateral conflict. While lateral conflict was not absent at Telco, peer relations
were mainly characterised by co-operation aimed at protecting each other's
interests against the surveillance and monitoring systems devised by
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management. Secondly, classifications of worker action depend upon the
definition used. It has been argued that worker rule-breaking can be defined
as resistance when it allows workers some measure of control over their own
conditions of employment, irrespective of whether it offers a challenge to
capital (Jermier et al. 1992). The fiddles at Telco certainly correspond to this
definition as their purpose and outcome was specifically to increase worker
control over the effort they expended and the extent of surveillance to which
they were subjected.
A final reason for suggesting that fiddles represent resistance rather
than consent is through consideration of the meanings that workers
themselves attached to their actions. With reference to consent and
resistance, this draws an important distinction between actions and their
consequences on the one hand, and the intended meaning given to the
actions by the people performing them on the other hand (Knights and
Collinson 1985; Stephenson 1996). This issue of meanings attached to
actions brings the debate back to identity and to the resentment which
punctuated operators' accounts of shopfloor life at Telco. It has been argued
that this resentment represented the feeling of many workers towards the
treatment they received on the shopfloor. This level of perceived injustice sits
uneasily with a characterisation of consent, as it suggests that the workers'
view of the labour process is one that is rooted firmly in a basic conflict of
interest, where capital is represented as unjust and exploitative. Workers' own
views of fiddles certainly alluded to this conflict of interest, as they saw them
as a way of pursuing their own interests by resisting official working
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procedures. As the 'end-of-line' operator observed with reference to the non-
recording of faults "you don't write everything down - you don't want to get
people into trouble". A similar sentiment was expressed by a group of workers
whom I met during a visit to the factory that I made sometime after my work
placement. They asked me what I thought I had learned during my time on the
line. In response I mumbled something fairly inconsequential and then asked
them what they thought they had taught me; their answer was "we taught you
how to cheaf'. The meaning that workers themselves attached to their action
seems consistent with the classification of fiddles as resistance rather than
consent.
Something old. something new
One interesting feature of the above account of workplace relations at
Telco is the degree of similarity with workplace studies that were undertaken
before the impact of Japanisation. This can be illustrated with reference to
one particular piece of research, Cavendish's study of UMEC (1982). UMEC
provides a valuable point of reference because like Telco it was a first-tier
supplier to the motor manufacturing industry, and also the research data were
gathered through participant observation, generating a rich source of
comparative material.
Table five lists the features of the labour process at UMEC that have a
strong similarity with the experiences outlined at Telco. In both cases workers
engaged in collective resistance to make time and evade surveillance,
workgroup support was withdrawn from perceived 'skivers', the shopfloor was
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characterised by an uneven pace of work and inconsistent quality of parts and
management made little attempt to use the tacit skills of the operators.
Table 5
Features of the labour process at UMEC
Workers taught each other shortcuts.
Workers would correct the defects of other operators rather than having
units marked as rejects at the end of the line.
Workers generally supported each other although this support was not
extended to operators who were disliked or perceived as lazy.
Some jobs were much harder than others to complete in the standard
times.
There were problems with poor quality parts and with temperamental
machinery.
Managers and supervisors tried to ensure operators worked right up to
'clocking off time - a policy that was resisted by the operators.
Workers' views were not taken into account when lines were 'balanced'
or jobs were designed
This raises the question what is new in the 'new' workplace. Two major
differences can be identified between UMEC and Telco, namely, the extent of
supervision and JIT supply. Turning first to differences in supervision, while
both factories were subject to personal control workers at Telco experienced
more intensive and extensive supervision. Thus, morning team briefings to
determine attendance, bell-to-bell working, electronic surveillance systems,
daily public records of defect rates and the extensive array of production data,
that were all features of the labour process at Telco were absent from UMEC.
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This suggests that one important feature of Japanese transplants is a
potential for increased managerial hegemony. With reference to JIT supply, in
the case of Telco the need to respond to customer's JIT requirements, both in
terms of delivery and quality, in the context of technical and supply problems,
exerted a pressure on the shopfloor that was absent at UMEC. Whilst
accepting that the influence of product markets on the labour process has
long been recognised, the advent of JIT seems to create more extensive
pressure on capital and bring to bear new influences upon the point of
production. This point will be developed in the following chapters which
discuss the significance of JIT on workplace relations at Telco.
There are of course shortcomings in using two companies as proxies
for different epochs or paradigms, and no claims can be made concerning
representiveness. But, despite the limits to this analysis, it does provide a
potentially valuable method of identifying the extent of new developments.
The comparison of Telco and UMEC suggests that notwithstanding some key
differences, the labour process in the two companies can be characterised as
much by continuity as by change. The advent of Japanese transplants has not
necessarily changed the basic contours of workplace relations; management
still face many of the traditional 'problems' associated with securing
production, problems which have arguably been exacerbated by JIT. Similarly,
although new 'solutions' have evolved in an attempt to increase managerial
hegemony, employees have continued to challenge management attempts to
extend their control at the point of production. What Telco seems to represent
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is a continuation of traditional shopfloor industrial relations issues and
conflicts within new conditions both at and beyond the point of production.
Summary
This chapter has sought to identify and explain the shopfloor behaviour
of the workgroup at Telco. It portrays a picture which is very different from
accounts that suggest that Japanese transplants are characterised either by a
mutuality of interests or by the demise of worker resistance. The data
presented here suggest that worker action represents a mixture of compliance
and resistance. These responses were embedded in and arose out of the
workers' experience of managerial control systems, as it was these control
systems that shaped worker action.
The workgroup network at Telco formed the basis for resistance
through the manner in which knowledge was acquired and shared. Operators
used their intimate knowledge of the production system to devise fiddles, and
passed this knowledge on to their workmates. Worker knowledge of
managerial (mal)practice was one justification for the pursuit of fiddles.
Reciprocal agreements, within the workgroup and between the workgroup and
the supervisor, also played a significant factor in facilitating worker fiddles.
Workers entered into reciprocal arrangements when they coincided with their
interests. They also eschewed or withdrew reciprocity in instances where it
could disadvantage them. In this way reciprocal agreements drew boundaries
around fiddles, delineating the extent to which workers were willing to
circumvent procedures and offer support.
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The actions and motives of the workgroup were influenced by
supervisory and personnel networks. Reciprocal understandings with
supervisors were a key factor in helping workers to effect fiddles. The failure
of the personnel department to ensure that workers were treated in an
appropriate manner, especially by the production manager, compounded the
construction of an identity that was characterised by an anti-company ethos.
This hostility towards management is one reason that worker action can be
more correctly categorised as resistance rather than consent.
More generally, there are a number of issues that have arisen in this
chapter which either seem at variance with or are absent from other accounts
of transplants. One of these concerns the intensification of work. While the
data from Telco support the conclusion that Japanese transplants squeeze
more minutes out of the working day through strict attention to timekeeping
(Danford 1998b), it does not corroborate accounts which suggest an
incessantly frenzied pace of work. The pace of work was not slack but neither
was it unremittingly harsh for all workers, rather it varied between work
stations and models. This is a very different view of life on the line from the
accounts which suggest a continuously fast pace, sometimes with workers
chasing down the line to keep up with their allocated tasks (Fucini and Fucini
1990). A further issue relates to the significance of personal control. At Telco,
while control was embodied in the technology, in workplace rules and in the
operating procedures, personal control remained a powerful force in
workplace discipline and in underpinning worker attitudes. Indeed, it was
argued that the data emanating from the mechanisms of surveillance
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supported personal control. Nothwistanding occasional references to the role
of production managers and supervisors in maintaining workplace discipline
(Delbridge 1998; Graham 1995), accounts of personal control are largely
absent from studies of Japanese transplants where the emphasis is on control
emanating solely from the social and technical organisation of production.
This lacuna may be a significant omission.
The continued existence of personal control is just one of a number of
factors that point to a need to analyse the labour process in terms of
continuity as well as change. Management have certainly not resolved the
'problem' of worker resistance in all cases; the factory floor in Japanese
transplants ean still represent a 'contested terrain'. Moreover, it is a terrain
with very familiar features as the concerns and actions described in this
chapter have been long-standing issues in the literature on workplace
relations.
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Chapter Seven
The Supervisory Network at Telco
This chapter retains the shopfloor as its focus but extends the analysis
by concentrating on the role of the supervisor at Telco. There has been a
recent growth of academic interest in the role of the supervisor, both within
Japanese transplants (Delbridge and Lowe 1997; Morris et al.1998; Morris et
a1.1999; Sewell and Wilkinson 1993) and in the 'new' workplace more
generally (Bonnazi 1998; Delbridge and Lowe 1997; Lowe 1993; Perry and
Tranfield 1998). Nothwistanding some accounts that have signalled a
declining role for the supervisor as a consequence of the growth of self
managed teams and autonomous work groups (Wright and Edwards 1998),
the overall tenor of the research suggests that the supervisor is gaining
increasing significance. This is a consequence of firstly, the growth of HRM
which advocates the devolution of responsibilities to line managers and,
secondly, the Japanese model of teamwork which delegates responsibility for
quality and productivity down to the level of the work group and makes the
team leader accountable for group performance (Buchanan 1994; Morris et
aI.1999). This enhanced responsibility of the supervisor can be accompanied
by an increased monitoring of their performance (Sewell and Wilkinson 1993)
and greater pressures upon them to resolve problems stemming from a fragile
production process (Roper et a1.1997; Taylor et aI.1994).
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The identification of additional responsibility and accountability raises
some key questions, such as how do supervisors cope and what are their
relationships with managers and workers? It is these questions which form the
basis of this chapter. The chapter begins with a brief outline of the
characteristics of the supervisor at Telco, followed by two sections that
discuss their key function and the nature of the problems they face. Five
coping strategies of the supervisor are then identified, which leads into
sections discussing knowledge, reciprocity and identity, in relation to
supervisors.
Supervisors: characteristics
At Telco, each of the seven production lines was headed by a
supervisor who was assisted by a chargehand. Unless indicated otherwise, all
references to the supervisor will relate only to an individual so designated and
not to a chargehand. The title of 'supervisor' is used rather than that of 'team
leader' as this is the designation applied by the company.
Supervisors at Telco generally shared a number of characteristics.
They were all relatively young, with an estimated age range of 25-35. All but
one were male, and similarly, only one had been recruited externally, the
remaining six having started with the company as operators. This represented
a fairly rapid promotion as the company had only been established eight years
at the time of the research.
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The role of supervisors: Meeting output.
Supervisors at Telco had a wide range of designated responsibilities.
Appendix seven shows a list of supervisors' responsibilities produced by
Telco's management. In pole position on the list is 'ensuring output targets are
met'. It is this role of meeting output that concerns this chapter. There are a
number of reasons for concentrating on this particular aspect of the
supervisor's role. First, the placing of the requirement to meet output at the
top of the list of responsibilities was not some administrative coincidence or
accident, rather it represented the priority for the supervisor as determined by
management and as experienced by the supervisors themselves. Second, in
meeting output, supervisors had to make decisions concerning many of their
other designated functions. For example, in meeting output supervisors were
often involved in making decisions concerning quality levels. Third, it was the
need to meet output that structured much of the supervisors interaction with
the workforce.
The significance placed on meeting output is linked to Telco's position
in the supply chain. For management, the paramount objective at Telco was
ensuring that daily production targets were achieved and that customer orders
were met. A company director commented:
We never miss a delivery - that is the worst thing you can do - miss a
delivery. In terms of the way companies operate, first-tier suppliers
operate on a different plane because their customers have absolute
control. You're not going to be in business if you miss a delivery and
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you stop the track; stop the line and you won't be in business. All our
focus is on making sure the customer never stops.
A consequence of this philosophy was that the supervisors, as leaders of the
team, were under constant pressure to 'meet output'. Figures were generated
daily for each line across a range of production indicators such as operator
errors and rejected units, and these were used by management to judge and
monitor the performance of supervisors in achieving targets. As one of the
supervisors commented:
They (management) look at the daily reject figures and if there are too
many they blame the supervisor, they say it's your (the supervisor's)
fault, you're not training them properly.
The accountability of the workgroup therefore extended not only to operators
but also to the supervisor.
An indicator of the pressure upon supervisors to meet output targets
and of the relationship between operator and supervisor accountability can be
seen in the nature of team briefings. Targets formed the critical feature of the
supervisor's input to the daily team briefing; the first, and often only, issue
discussed at every meeting I attended was whether the line had met its target
for the previous day's output. If quotas had not been met the supervisor would
then identify what steps were to be taken to ensure the problem was not
repeated that day. Monitoring and surveillance systems were in place to make
the team accountable for meeting output; the same systems ensured that
supervisors were held responsible for ensuring that the team did, in fact,
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achieve the targets set. However, as the next section discusses, there were
major obstacles confronting the accomplishment of targets.
Meeting output and contingent conditions
Any discussion of the functions of the supervisor needs to take into
account not only the priority allocated to particular responsibilities, but
significantly, the ease with which these responsibilities can be achieved.
Thus, a primary responsibility may involve the supervisor in little use of their
time if the conditions contingent for meeting that target are in place and
controllable. The significance of contingent conditions in determining
supervisory functions is emphasised by Thurley, who comments:
Certain types of organisation and environment provide numerous
contingency problems which demand action by those within the
supervisory system. Contingencies might include variations in the
production process, shortages of raw materials or component,
unpredictable variations in performance by operatives, faults or
breakdowns in plant, and so on. The actions taken by supervisors to
deal with contingencies appear to be the most critical parts of their role
Although adequate planning may make it possible to avoid certain
types of problem, in reality it is beyond the influence and power of
supervisors to affect the causes of many contingencies. Reactions to
problems arising out of the production system are thus crucial (1973:
183 original emphasis).
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Although this relationship between the responsibilities of the supervisor
and production contingencies is nothing new (Beynon 1973), it assumes
particular significant in the context of the technical and social organisation
associated with Japanisation, given the fragility of the high-dependency
production system (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992). JIT and TQM production
regimes are especially vulnerable both to external dislocations, such as poor
quality supplies, and also to internal disruptions, such as problems with
materials resource planning systems or operator 'misbehaviour'. It has been
argued that one consequence of JIT production regimes is to increase the
pressure upon and accountability of supervisors (Sewell and Wilkinson 1993)
At Telco, external and internal contingencies arising out of this high
dependency system, posed significant problems for supervisors' efforts to
'meet output'. The major external contingency facing supervisors in the daily
task of meeting output was the quality of incoming parts from local suppliers.
A distinction needs to be drawn here between function and cosmetic quality.
Functional defects were rare in incoming supplies. However, cosmetic defects
such as scratches and blemishes were much more frequent, leading to a
position which led one supervisor to comment that "we're still building with the
same old crap".
The extent of this supply problem is illustrated by the data in table six.
This presents percentage defect figures arising from defective supplies for the
period November 1994 - June 1995.
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Table 6
Defect rates arising from defective supplies
Date Defective sUj2j2lies
(percentage)
November 1994 2.25
December 1994 2.35
January 1995 2.08
February 1995 2.43
March 1995 3.09
April 1995 2.35
May 1995 2.90
June 1995 2.87
Mean 2.54
Source: derived from Telco production records.
These data need to be treated with a degree of caution, because, as was
discussed in the previous chapter, shop floor data is subject to fiddles by
operators and supervisors. Nonetheless, the level of reject supplies was
consistently higher than the target of 1% set by Telco's management. Given
that supplies are moved onto the factory floor with no pre-inspection, this
variable quality presented the supervisor with a significant dilemma; whether
to reject incoming parts which might have slight cosmetic defects and thus
jeopardise the day's production or whether to let them through and hope that
they would meet customer requirements.
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A further external contingency was changes in the daily running order.
Supervisors and suppliers were issued with a daily running order detailing the
models and numbers to be built. This could change however as Telco tried to
respond to urgent requests from customers who may have run out of
particular models. In accordance with Telco's policy of always keeping the car
track running, the company would try to meet these demands, although it did
put pressure on the materials-ordering system.
In addition to external contingencies, supervisors faced uncertainties
arising from internal contingencies. One such internal contingency concerns
parts shortages. Parts shortages occurred as a consequence of the inability of
the company's materials-ordering systems to keep track of parts, resulting in
some supplies getting 'lost' in the system. One example was explained to me
by a QC manager:
What we've found is that the actual number of parts used on the line
doesn't tally with the number of parts being sent by the supplier. We're
losing parts; we don't know how, we don't know where, we're just losing
parts. The other day we had eighty four thousand screws simply
disappear. They were on the computer, but when we went to the
location to find them, they weren't there. When we went to find out if
they had been issued, we couldn't find them - things just disappear!
There is no question of theft being suggested here; in the case of the screws,
for example they were too bulky to steal in quantity and had no general
purpose outside Telco's product. The 'mystery of the missing screws' was not
untypical of the logistical difficulties emanating from Telco's materials and
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distribution system. The following extract from my diary details a further
example:
Packing on the X line today. We should be using special containers to
pack the units in for air-freight, but I had to pack them in brown boxes
because we have run out of containers. They are going to have to be
repacked when we get some more containers back from X.
A further source of internal uncertainty faced by supervisors was the
unreliable nature of the technology. The issue of unreliable machinery has
been noted in the previous chapter when discussing the difficulties
experienced with recently introduced technology. However, the problem was
not just one which affected new machinery, nor was it limited to one line. All
the lines experienced some stoppages due to malfunctioning technology, and
although the recently introduced technology seemed the most susceptible to
breakdown, some more established machines also broke down on a regular
basis. The following diary notes record instances of problematic technology:
Very few units produced this afternoon as the free-flow line was playing
up again - wouldn't locate the screws properly. This problem seems to
be happening fairly frequently.
Anne came over to chat from her line today. She said she was bored as
the machinery has been down for most of the morning and they had
been put on cleaning - but that really there was little for them to do.
Cath on sub-assembly said that she worked overtime on Saturday
morning and came in an hour early today (Monday) to get sub-
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assemblies ready for a rush job. Then she was told that it had been
discovered that the calibration on her machine was faulty and the stock
could not be used. She spent the morning on cleaning, waiting for the
machine to be repaired. She had apparently been paid overtime for no
reason.
An indication of the extent of machine problems is provided by figure six. This
provides data on machine efficiency for the A 1 line from April 1997 to March
1998. The efficiency target (percentage of time the machinery is functioning
correctly) for A1 is set at 98.5% (this is signaled by the line across the
histogram). The company benchmark was only met or exceeded in two of the
twelve months recorded. The worst month, May, was almost five percent
below target, and the year as a whole recorded 1.1% under target.
Figure 6.
Final Assembly Machine Efficiency Report 1997/98
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Month Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Available Time 7720 9875 8620 8620 9520 8265 10775 8620 7365 8975 8620 8265
(Mins)
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M/cDowntime 163.7 637.5 399.3 334.5 105.3 131.4 146.2 216.1 124 162 173.7 208.3
(Mins)
MIc Efficiency 97.88 93.54 95.37 96.12 98.89 98.41 98.64 97.49 98.32 98.2 97.98 97.48
First Time Yield 93.87 94.96 97.5 95.11 92.31 96.99 97.4 96.06 95.81 96.75 96.18 95.36
In sum, a number of external and internal contingencies militated
against the supervisors' ascribed task of meeting output targets. A significant
question becomes, how did they minimise the impact of these uncertainties?
This question is addressed in the next section.
The actions of supervisors in meeting output
Experience of working for, observing and shadowing supervisors
suggests that their coping strategies fell into five broad types: buying time,
reducing re-work, accumulating buffer stock, developing alliances and holding
the line.
Buying time
Buying time was important to supervisors, as the greater the amount of
operating time they could wrest from a working day, the larger the buffer they
would have against rework, machine breakdown etc. One way of buying time
was at morning team briefings. The official time allocation for the briefing was
five minutes, but, as previously discussed, most briefings were very short
affairs involving checking on who was present, outlining the previous day's
production figures and raising any problems. This normal briefing rarely lasted
more than two minute, after which it was straight to work.
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A further way of buying time was to reduce job-cycle times. In the
previous chapter it was stated that operators' shortcutting of official working
procedures was tacitly acknowledged by supervisors. On some occasions
supervisors also took a more proactive role, actually instructing operators to
deviate from work standards. For example, one station on which I worked
involved producing sub-assemblies and then calibrating these before passing
them down the line. Soon after starting I was instructed by the supervisor to
cut out the calibration stage, which he justified by saying "they are always
within tolerance anyway". This was not an isolated instance, or one that was
confined to that particular line, as a diary entry records:
Lorraine was moved today from the line I was on to another line to
cover for absence. She said that the supervisor on that line had told
her not to bother with all the checks on the work standard but just to do
some of them. Official procedures were replaced by quicker, less
detailed ones.
Reducing re-work
Reducing're-work' was achieved by passing rather than rejecting units
which had borderline cosmetic defects. This was a strategy used in order to
counter supply problems which arose from the poor quality of components, the
policy of limited stock-holding and the shortcomings of the materials planning
system. The difficulties faced by supervisors in having to meet targets in the
context of limited stock holding, and the on-going decisions they made
concerning re-work, is illustrated by the following diary extract:
229
Talking to Jo, the supervisor, today about the problems she has to deal
with. She showed me a unit which had a slight light leak (when
illuminated, the light 'escaped' from around the edge of the unit). She
had put it to one side and would decide whether to pass it later. If it
was a one-off she would send it back down the line for rectification, but
if there were a lot of similar ones she would pass them to meet targets.
I asked why the problem with the leaks had arisen. Jo said it was
because the cases were not the correct ones for the model. She went
on to say that the problem with JIT stockholding was that if an order
was increased unexpectedly then there were not always enough
dedicated components to meet it. In these circumstances they would try
and adapt possible alternatives.
It was, however, the issue of cosmetic defects in the parts received
from local suppliers which especially plagued supervisors' attempts to meet
output. Given the ongoing cosmetic problems with some supplies, supervisors
would use the knowledge they had accumulated of their particular customers
to make decisions concerning what specific companies would accept. For
example, whilst working on sub-assembly, I queried a possible cosmetic
defect with the supervisor. Her response was that it would be OK and that I
should 'go easy' on faults with this kit, because they were only going to X
(naming a fairly down-market car marque), who were not as fussy as some of
the more prestigious manufacturers.
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Reducing re-work, as with buying time, involved the supervisors, on
occasions, moving beyond mere compliance with operators and issuing a
direct command to manipulate operating procedures, as the following example
illustrates:
Packing on the line with Sharon today when Jo the supervisor emerged
from the 'Iumo' saying that a new batch was coming. She said to
Sharon "I want four for QC to pass". Sharon said "I'll make sure they're
good ones", to which Jo laughingly replied "aren't they all good ones?".
"Of course" said Sharon "but some are better good ones than others".
Jo responded "don't worry I'll mark them for you". Jo then went back
into the 'Iumo' and subsequently four units with 'QC' marked on them in
crayon arrived at 'final' inspection.
Manipulating the QC sample in this way ensured that the batch would not be
consigned to re-work by QC.
It became part of the shopfloor folklore amongst operators that if a
'marginal' unit was presented to a supervisor for an opinion, every effort would
be made by the supervisor to justifying passing it. The following diary extract
gives one such example:
In the 'Iumo' today when Lol rejected a unit because of a light leak from
the lens. Sylvia (the chargehand) came back with the unit and said
"how bad is it". She put the unit back on the illumination jig and said
she thought it unsatisfactory for what was a high specification model
and Sylvia agreed. Alan, the supervisor, arrived at that point and after
looking at the unit said that it was OK to pass it.
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A final way of reducing rework involved the supervisor's 'magic paste'.
On one occasion when I presented the supervisor with a completed unit which
had been rejected at 'final inspection' with a scratch on the lens, he doctored
the unit with what he called his 'magic paste'. Rubbing the paste gently into
the surface of the lens removed all traces of the scratch. It was, he said, a
procedure that was strictly forbidden, moreover, supervisors vvere not even
supposed to bring the paste into work. However, he claimed that all
supervisors had their own supplies of paste which they hid in their desk
drawers.
Accumulating buffer-stock
Accumulating 'buffer-stock' refers to the accumulation of illicit supplies
on the line. As was outlined in the previous chapter, supervisors would often
encourage operators in sub-assembly to keep a limited amount of 'unofficial'
completed buffer-stock. This had two purposes. Accumulated sub-assemblies
could be used to start production immediately at the start of work, rather than
having to wait for the sub-assemblies to be constructed. In addition, these
buffer-stocks provided a guard against the vagaries of incoming supplies and
temperamental technology; usable stock was a valuable asset in the climate
of production uncertainty.
This accumulation of buffer-stock could bring supervisors into conflict
with senior management. During one of my days spent 'work shadowing' a
supervisor, the MD appeared on one of his patrols of the shopfloor. The MD
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saw a box of units not being worked on and called the supervisor over, with a
heated discussion ensuing. When the supervisor returned he said that he had
been 'told off for allowing too much work-in-progress to accumulate.
As well as colluding with operators in the accumulation of buffer-stock,
supervisors also had their own stashes of unofficial supplies which they
cannibalised for defective units. My diary records one experience of this:
I was on the re-work bench today (repairing defective units ready to be
passed back down the line). While I was waiting for some defective
units to come through, Alan (the supervisor) told me to re-work some
old units which had been declared as scrap and recorded as such. My
job was to disassemble them and save any parts that had not been
broken or scratched. These were banked by Alan and Sylvia (the
chargehand); they did not officially exist but could be used in
emergencies in the future. When he asked me to do his Alan tapped
his nose, saying "we're not supposed to do this, but they come in
useful as spares"
Developing alliances
Supervisors developed a range of alliances to help them manage the
difficulties they faced. As discussed in the previous chapter, supervisors
developed alliances with operators to interpret quality requirements leniently
and to circumvent formal operating procedures. Operators were usually willing
conspirators in. this as it allowed them to escape some of the rigours of the
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surveillance systems and also to gain a greater measure of control over their
pace of work.
Alliances were also developed between supervisors. This could involve
'lending' staff to lines under pressure, and even occasionally working on each
others' lines. An additional ally was the QC inspector, who dealt closely with
customers and was the customers' 'de facto' representative on Telco's factory
floor. If a supervisor was experiencing difficulties in meeting quality levels for
a customer, the QC inspector would be called in to discuss whether the
customer was likely to accept the standard of output currently being produced.
One example of this negotiation occurred when a batch of components arrived
with slight burrs on the exterior casing. Several of the operators were set to
work filing off the burrs while the supervisor and QC inspector conferred.
Eventually a decision was reached to use the components in their
'undoctored' state. It was argued that, although the components did not meet
Telco's quality standards, the parts would be used, as the casing would not be
visible to the final customer, the driver. Supervisors therefore, actively sought
and often received endorsement from QC in passing units which fell below the
company's own very strict quality standards.
The discussion of supervisor's coping strategies so far has concerned
ways in which they deal with contingencies by manipulating company rules
and operating procedures in response to the difficulties which they faced. This
action is aptly encapsulated by one supervisor's statement that "we all cut
corners, it's knowing what corners to cur. But, on some occasions
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supervisors attempted to manage contingencies through enforcing
regulations. This fifth coping strategy can be termed 'holding the line'.
Holding the line
'Holding the line' characterised some of the supervisor's interactions
with operators. Some of these instances have been discussed in the previous
chapter, such as the (not always successful) attempts by supervisors to
control the extent that operators left the line and to ensure that 'cleaning up'
time was used 'effectively'. Holding the line also involved supervisors in
reprimanding operators whom they felt were being lax or not pulling their
weight. At a routine level this could involve 'telling off individuals, groups of
workers or even the whole line if the supervisor considered there was too
much talking or horseplay going on.
On other occasions, supervisors' action could be more severe. One
example here concerns the 'disciplining' of Dave. Dave is the operator
discussed in the previous chapter who was viewed by workers and the
supervisor as rather lazy and slapdash. After a day's absence, which the
supervisor though was unjustified, Dave was greeted on his return with a day
making lightguides. Lightguides were the most disliked task on the line. Not
only was the job very routine, it was a task that physically isolated the
operator from their workmates as the workstation was cut off from the rest of
the line, and it also meant standing and staring at a blank wall. In addition, the
lightguides machine was notoriously temperamental. In recognition of
operators' dislike of lightguides it was usual practice for supervisors to rotate
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lightguide duty between operators every couple of hours. Dave's banishment
to lightguides for the whole day on his return from absence was viewed by the
rest of the line as a punishment. As one of my eo-workers commented, "Jo's
done that to teach him a lesson - not to skive off', This was also the
interpretation put on the supervisor's action by Dave himself, as my diary
entry notes:
Talking to Dave in the canteen. He said he was on lightguides all day
yesterday as a punishment. He commented "I put a sign over the
machine saying 'sin bin', but somebody took it down".
By holding the line supervisors acted to draw boundaries round
employee fiddles. Although the actions of supervisors may not always have
generated the response they desired, as illustrated by the eontest over 'toilet
breaks', nonetheless supervisors did act as a constant reminder to operators
to be on their guard. Consequently, operators were often more circumspect in
some of their fiddles when a supervisor was in close proximity. Take, for
example, the practice of booking faults to 'other' rather than 'self, discussed
in the previous chapter. My diary notes how this fiddle was not always
applied:
Working on sub-assembly with Stuart again today, and made another
error. However, rather than advising me to book it to 'other', thus
avoiding a defect against my name as he did yesterday, he said in a
loud voice "sorry Gerry, but that one's down to you, you're going to
have to book that to 'self". The explanation of his change in response
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seemed to be that the supervisor was stood directly behind us when I
committed today's error and could see that the fault was clearly mine.
Holding the line is also of interest because it provides an illustration of
the limits to the supervisor's authority in their management of line staff. At the
day-to-day operational level, supervisors had considerable autonomy over
and responsibility for workers on the line; they allocated tasks, monitored
performance, organised 'training' and kept discipline. However, beyond this
operational level their authority was severely circumscribed. For example,
they did not have the authority to formally reprimand or dismiss operators, but
could merely make recommendations to the personnel department, or, as in
the case of Dave and the 'Iightguards', concoct some form of ad-hoc
'punishment'. This lack of formal authority was a source of frustration to the
supervisors. As Jo commented, "personnel do not delegate enough
responsibility down to supervisors". In some instances it was the very
accountability of supervisors for production that acted to circumscribe a more
strategic role in personnel matters. For example, one of the arguments for not
involving supervisors in the selection of operators was that they could not be
spared from the line.
Holding the line not only characterised the interaction of supervisors
with workers, but also, on occasions, of supervisors with management.
Supervisors would, from time-to-time, apply quality standards diligently as a
means of expressing to management the frustrations they felt with the
problems they faced. My diary records one such example:
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Frustrating day today. A lot of problems with blemishes on components
from suppliers. Operators were constantly going to Paul, the
supervisor, to ask if units were of an acceptable quality. In the
afternoon Paul came down to 'final inspection', where I was packing,
and said to Sharon (on final inspection), "all the ones with blemishes-
pass them all. If they come back from the customers then management
might appreciate the problems getting stuff out and QC might take
some action with these bloody suppliers."
Although this type of holding the line to try to 'prove a point', did occur it was
not common. While supervisors would frequently complain about the quality of
incoming parts, and at management for not doing anything about it, in the
main their actions were concerned with resolving and not confronting supply
problems.
The above account of supervisors' actions illustrates that they were
involved in a series of network relations with a range of 'actors' on the
shopfloor. The supervisory network will now be analysed using the three
categories of social relations: knowledge, reciprocity and identity.
Knowledge
Supervisors used their accumulated shopfloor knowledge both of
customers' standards and of the production process to achieve daily targets.
Knowledge of customers' standards was used in order to determine whether a
unit would meet the demands of a particular company. Supervisors made on-
the-spot judgments to pass or reject a unit based on their experience of
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quality levels previously accepted by customers, and also, in some cases,
through negotiation with the QC department. Varying standards were applied
between different lines (with standards being applied most stringently on up-
market car marques), and also, within lines in circumstances where a line
served more than one customer. Interestingly, although the application of
differing standards between customers is a feature of the clothing industry
(Edwards and Scullion 1982; Moule 1998), it does not appear in other
accounts of production in the motor vehicle sector.
Supervisors also used their knowledge of the production process to
short-circuit some of the formal operating procedures. They would base their
judgments on their knowledge of their line; where an element of a checking
function was undertaken at two points in the process then they might tell the
operator at the first station to miss out that function. Supervisors also used
their past experience and, where certain components had a history of being
'error-free', they would instruct operators to take short-cuts.
Supervisor's actions in deviating from official workplace practice were
significant factors in creating shopfloor norms whereby operators 'legitimised'
their own circumvention of formal rules and procedures. As was discussed in
the previous chapter operators would make their own decisions about visual
quality of units and also develop their own shortcuts. The justification often
used for both these fiddles was that they were not doing anything that the
supervisors did not do.
239
Reciprocity
Supervisors reached reciprocal arrangements with their peers, with QC
inspectors and with operators. Arrangements with fellow supervisors, such as
the loaning of staff to lines that were having particular problems, enabled
supervisors to resolve difficulties between themselves. Reciprocal
agreements with QC were also broadly co-operative. However, while QC staff
were strategiC allies, the relationship was not simply one of collaboration but
also one of 'hoodwinking', as demonstrated by the 'doctoring' of the 'end-of-
line' sample. At the heart of the supervisor-QC relationship is the issue of
what constitutes appropriate quality levels in the context of having to meet
output. The particular problem here is cosmetic, not functional quality.
General definitions of quality, such as 'fitness for purpose' are difficult to apply
uniformly here, because there is a degree of interpretation involved; cosmetic
standards are not totally objective or measurable. In most instances
supervisors and QC staff would attempt to resolve this issue of standards by
reaching an agreement as to what constituted appropriate quality levels.
However, the supervisor, through doctoring the 'end-of-line' sample,
attempted to ensure that QC were given as few opportunities as possible to
interpret quality standards in a way that would put pressure on the line's
ability to meet daily output targets.
Supervisors' key reciprocal arrangements were with workers. This
included instructing operators to contravene official procedures, such as
circumventing work methods, colluding in joint rule-breaking, such as
hoarding buffer-stock and turning a 'blind-eye' to workers' circumvention of
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operating procedures. However, not all of the relationship of the supervisors
with workers can be classified as reciprocal; in the case of holding the line,
supervisors sought to challenge and control worker actions. Thus,
supervisors' relations with workers embraced a range of positions from active
collusion in circumventing procedures through to attempts to discipline and
admonish operator rule-breaking. This raises the question of what explains
this seemingly contradictory relationship.
The key explanation is the potential impact of worker actions on
targets. Where worker circumvention of rules and operating procedures may
have made the achievement of output targets more attainable, such as the
hoarding of secret stocks or the passing of marginal units, these activities
were generally supported by the supervisor. On other occasions, when
operator actions threatened production, for example through non-attendance,
then supervisors would try to exert control to amend worker behaviour.
The level of accountability experienced by supervisors supports this
interpretation of their actions. The vast array of production data available to
management gave them access not only to production figures but also to line
defect rates and reject levels. It was the supervisor who was ultimately made
answerable for unsatisfactory performance. In these circumstances it
becomes logical for the supervisors to play an active role in massaging defect
figures, for example by passing marginal units rather than recording them as
unsatisfactory and conspiring with operators in the non-recording of some
worker errors. By contrast, supervisors would gain no comparable advantage
by supporting some other fiddles such as the contest over 'cleaning-up' time.
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In considering the actions of supervisors and the reciprocal
understandings they reached with operators, it is instructive to compare the
social relations of supervision at Telco with those at Nippon C.T.V. (Delbridge
1998; Delbridge and Lowe 1997). While supervisors at Nippon were under
pressures similar to those at Telco to achieve output targets, they operated in
an environment where uncertainty had been reduced, leading to a different
stand on worker fiddles. Nippon was relatively successful in obtaining
consistency of both quality and delivery of supplies, and also enjoyed a
comparatively protected and secure product market as supplier to their own
distribution division. This position allowed the production process to be
planned and controlled with greater assuredness, thus insulating the
shopfloor from significant sources of uncertainty. Consequently, unlike their
counterparts at Telco, supervisors at Nippon were rarely forced into reaching
accommodations with the workforce and, rather than acting as a key factor in
stimulating employee fiddles, supervisors were 'very important in
marginalising the impact of 'misbehaviour' (Delbridge and Lowe 1997:415). At
Telco, by comparison, the failure to guarantee the quality of supplies and the
stringent delivery demands of a competitive external market created tensions
and contradictions on the shopfloor which both facilitated supervisory
alliances with workers and provided the workforce with the legitimation to
engage in fiddles of their own devising.
This comparison raises the issue of the relationship between an
organisation's external operating environment and the collusion of supervisors
in circumventing operating procedures. Conventional analysis tends to link the
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toleration of fiddles to a company's influence over its customers (Lupton 1963)
It suggests, in the main, that supervisors are less likely to indulge fiddles in
competitive than in non-competitive or oligopolistic markets (Burawoy 1979).
The evidence from this study suggests that under JIT systems this
conventional analysis needs to be amended, as JIT scheduling makes
demands not only on price but also on quality and delivery. In the case of
Telco, the requirement to meet the JIT scheduling demands of powerful
customers exposed and magnified the problems of poor quality supplies
entering the company's own JIT system, thus creating difficulties for the
supervisor. In this situation, where it was impossible for supervisors to have
an effect on the major source of their difficulties, they turned instead to one of
the factors over which they had some sway, namely labour. Conspiracy with
workers presented supervisors with an achievable option in coping with the
demands of production in a situation where they were unable to influence one
of the root causes of the tribulations that beset the line. The demands to meet
output targets, coupled with poor quality supplies, underpinned reciprocal
agreements between supervisors and workers. This suggests that within JIT
scheduling the willingness of supervisors to tolerate or conspire in fiddles is
not determined solely by the influence a company holds over customers, but
by the organisation's market position with both suppliers and customers.
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Identity
Issues relating to the identity of the supervisor can be explored through
their relationships with managers (Armstrong 1983; Child and Partridge 1982;
Delbridge 1997). The question here is whether supervisors are most aptly
characterised as agents of capital, as representatives of labour, or men-in-the
middle between capital and labour. The supervisor-manager relationship at
Telco is complex and somewhat contradictory.
On the one hand, there are reasons to suggest that supervisors'
interests and identity did not coincide with those of management. Firstly,
management actions and systems were largely responsible for the difficulties
faced by supervisors. The poor quality of supplies, unreliable technology and
failures with internal logistics were all, at least in part, due to managerial
shortcomings. This supports previous research suggesting that the problems
supervisors face can be of management's making (Child and Partridge 1982;
Lupton 1963). Secondly, supervisors were given very little direct autonomy in
decision-making, for example the disciplining and dismissal of workers
remained a function of the personnel department. Thirdly, supervisors were
held accountable by management for reaching daily output targets.
Supervisors monitored workers and were, in turn, monitored themselves, thus
their experience of surveillance was as subjects as well as objects (Armstrong
et al. 1981). These three points suggest that it would not be appropriate to
view supervisors as agents of capital.
Set against this view is the evidence that supervisors at Telco seem, on
the whole, to have accepted and internalised the values of management, thus
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it might be suggested that they do act as the representatives of capital. This
line of argument is adopted by Armstrong in his study of supervisors at a shoe
factory, where he contends that although supervisors were tightly controlled,
their interests were linked to those of capital because the way in which they
tried to illustrate their value was 'by demonstrating their usefulness in the
function of capital' (1981: 355). This analysis has some resonance with the
situation of supervisors at Telco. Despite complaints that management were
not providing quality supplies, and, not withstanding occasional examples of
'defiance' through holding the line, supervisors strove on a daily basis to fulfil
management's demands and expectations. Even when supervisors formed
reciprocal agreements with workers and circumvented operating procedures,
these actions were in support of the goal of the organisation.
An alternative analysis of the identity of the supervisor at Telco
is that of the 'man-in-the-middle', which has characterised some studies of
supervisors (Fletcher 1969; Lowe 1993). As Fletcher comments:
Industrial supervisors, classically foremen, are men in the middle.
Wedged between workers and management they represent both, to
each other, and neither to themselves. Supervisors are constantly torn
by competing demands and loyalties. They have come up from the
ranks but are not part of management. Nevertheless they are the voice
of the front office that is heard on the shop floor (1969:341).
Supervisors at Telco exhibited some of these characteristics; they had mostly
been promoted from the ranks, and they were subject to competing demands.
To labour they represented management in that they were responsible for
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maintaining shopfloor discipline and for ensuring that managerially imposed
targets were achieved. Similarly, to management they represented labour as
they experienced scrutiny as 'subjects' of surveillance.
Given these conflicting perspectives, how is the identity of the
supervisor at Telco best categorised? The actions of the supervisors and the
outcomes of these actions suggest that their identity can be best seen as
representatives of capital, albeit subordinate ones. Their commitment to
production targets indicates that they were not 'in the middle' between
management and labour, but were firmly wedded to the objectives of capital.
When supervisors were faced with employee action which militated against
the achievement of production targets, then their response was to challenge
such behaviour. Put another way, when decisions had to be made supervisors
did not 'sit-on-the fence between management and labour, they chose to jump
on the side of fulfilling the objectives of capital. Also, notwithstanding
occasional attempts to 'hold the line', the supervisors' own rule-breaking was
pursed in the interests of capital.
However, the issue of identity is not merely determined by actions. As
was argued in the previous chapter on workers, the meaning actors attribute
to their behaviour is also important. The analysis of supervisors as
representatives of capital is muddied if we take account of the supervisors'
own view of their actions. In a number of instances supervisors saw their
actions as 'hoodwinking' management and bending rules to expedite their own
interests. The hiding of 'secret' buffer-stocks and the illicit use of the 'magic
paste' are examples where supervisors clearly identified themselves as
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defying management in order to protect themselves from censure. Therefore,
the data from Telco suggest that a simple uniform classification of the identity
of the supervisor is inappropriate. On the one hand, the supervisor can be
characterised as agents of capital through their actions, however on the other
hand, supervisors' own views of their actions do not support this analysis.
There is a parallel between the actions of supervisors at Telco and the
behaviour of workers at Nissan (Stephenson 1996). Stephenson argues that
workers act in a way that supports managerial initiatives, but follow this
course through self-interest and don't attribute any pro-company sentiments to
their actions. Stephenson calls this worker behaviour 'insincere compliance'.
Similarly, at Telco, although supervisors through their actions strove to fulfil
the demands placed upon them by management, their actions were driven by
self-interest within a context where they were critical of management.
Tentatively, supervisors at Telco might be characterised as 'insincere
capitalists', capturing the sense in which their action supports the goals of
capital, but that this was driven by self-interest rather than a strong sense of
identification with management.
Summary
The evidence in this chapter adds to the number of studies that
suggest a heightened role for the supervisor on the new shopfloor. But, their
responsibilities did not emanate from a strategic devolution of personnel
matters to line managers as advocated by proponents of HRM. Rather, it was
the accountability for team performance in the context of demanding
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customers and production uncertainties that shaped the supervisors' role.
This accountability was enhanced by the profusion of production data that
was available to management, and against which the supervisors'
performance could be quickly judged. Supervisors at Telco were engaged in a
range of 'shock-absorbing' activities (Bonnazi 1998), devising ways of coping
with ongoing, day-to-day shop-floor problems in order to meet output. This
involved supervisors in network interactions with staff at all levels in the
organization, and supports the view that the increased responsibility on
supervisors 'has led them to become involved in a widening network of
interaction' (Mallory and Mollander 1989:40).
Why did they respond in this way? Mallory and Mollander argue that
supervisors are evaluated in relation to performance measures 'over which
they have at best limited control' (1989:41). This analysis seems applicable at
Telco as they were charged with and evaluated on the basis of meeting
targets, but had little control over some of the key contingent production
difficulties. This left them with the options of using what influence they had at
the point of production, with workers, colleagues and QC.
They used their knowledge of operating procedures and
customers' requirements to manipulate operating procedures and quality
standards. This involved them in a series of reciprocal arrangements on the
shopfloor. They were often at least tacit conspirators in many of the fiddles
pursued by operators and, in some cases, actually instructed workers to break
official operating procedures. This manipulation of 'standards' ossified to
become a central feature of Telco's shopfloor culture. New recruits, like
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myself, quickly learnt to circumvent quality and control procedures both with
and without the consent of the supervisor. However, supervisors' relationships
with other shopfloor personnel were not always characterised by reciprocity.
For example, they also sought to constrain the boundaries of worker fiddles,
when these ran counter to their interests. This pattern of complicity and
confrontation that emerges between supervisors and operators indicates that
supervisors had a major impact upon the labour process at Telco.
The issue of reciprocity has shown that supervisors were involved in
complex and at times seemingly contradictory relationships with workers This
complexity and contradiction also characterised their relationships with
managers. The discussion of identity suggested that while the actions of
supervisors often supported capital, supervisors themselves saw their
practices as rule-breaking, thus leading to the classification of supervisors as
insincere capitalists. Also, supervisors' relationships with QC combined both
cooperation and 'hoodwinking'.
At a broader level, a key finding to emerge from this account of
supervisors is that it supports the theme of continuity and change evident in
the previous chapter. In the case of supervisors, change is represented by the
enhanced responsibility they were accorded with the devolution to teams of
quality and productivity targets, and also by the increased monitoring and
surveillance they experience through the plethora of production data. This is
consistent with other accounts of the evolving role of supervisors within
Japanese transplants (Morris 1999, Sewell and Wilkinson 1993). However,
the findings also caution against overemphasising disjunctures with the past.
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Evidence of supervisors conspiring with workers (Bensman and Gerver 1963)
and with quality control (Lupton 1963) occurred in accounts of workplace
relations more than two decades ago. Supervisors, in Telco at least, seem to
be using 'old' methods to cope with the problems of the 'new' shopfloor.
The problems faced by supervisors arose from the difficulties Telco
experienced in controlling the contingencies impacting upon production.
These included external contingencies, notably buyer-supplier relations, and
internal uncertainties such as technology and logistiCS. Buyer-supplier
relations have been identified as an important factor in influencing the labour
process (Rutherford et aI.1995); the data from Telco suggest that this analysis
can be usefully extended to account for the role and responsibilities of the
supervisor.
The problems experienced by Telco's supervisors raise questions
concerning the company's lack of control of its external and internal operating
environment. These issues form the basis of the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight
Commercial Networks
This chapter concerns Telco's commercial networks. Commercial networks
refer to relations with buyers and suppliers in the context of industry
environment in which a company operates. Commercial networks are of
interest in a study exploring the labour process for two linked reasons. Buyer-
supplier relations are a significant factor in transmitting social relations in
production between companies (Rutherford et aI.1995). Also, product market
conditions can also influence intra-firm management-worker relations (Kelly
1985; Lupton 1963; Ram 1993). Both these issues are important for this
study. As previous chapters have highlighted, commercial networks have
played a major influence on the actions of workers, supervisors and managers
at Telco.
This chapter presents a description and analysis of buyer-supplier
relationships at Telco. The chapter is organised in the following way. The first
section provides a brief outline of current developments in buyer-supplier
relations. The next section is a discussion focusing on Telco's relationship
with its suppliers and this is followed by an examination of the relationship
between Telco and its customers. The final section provides an analysis of the
company's commercial network using the three categories of social relations,
knowledge, reciprocity and identity.
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Recent developments in buyer-supplier relations
The last two decades have seen some significant changes in the
conduct of business between buyers and suppliers (Grabher 1993; Helper
1993). One of the major influences stimulating these changes has been the
growing interest by 'Western' firms in the seemingly more constructive
relationship between Japanese manufacturers and their supplier companies
than has traditionally existed in the West. Western supplier relations have
been characterised as typically market-centred. This involves short-term
contracts based on price-led competitive tendering, with little loyalty or
commitment from either side, often leading to problems with delivery and,
especially, quality (Morris and Imrie 1991). This relationship has been
desiqnated the 'arm's-length' contractual relationship (Sako 1992). In Japan,
by contrast, buyer-supplier relations have been described as 'obligational'
(Morris and Imrie 1991) or 'relational' (Sako 1992) which involve a series of
close ties between buyers and suppliers (Morris and Imrie 1991). These ties
are seen as generating mutual benefit, with suppliers obtaining relative
security of contract and buyers increased reliability over delivery and quality
(Sako 1992).
Japanese transplants locating in the West have reported unfavourably
on the performance of 'local' suppliers (Kumon 1994). One stimulus for the
establishment in America of Japanese first-tier suppliers to the automotive
industry was the inability of Japanese vehicle transplants to obtain
components of sufficiently reliable quality from indigenous companies (Kumon
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1994). This criticism from Japanese transplants, along with the need of
Western companies to compete on quality, has led to moves to transform
buyer-supplier relations in the West.
This has been especially evident in industries that have faced severe
competition from Japan, such as motor vehicles (Rutherford et aI.1995).
Recent developments in the British motor vehicle industry have included the
increase in tearnworking and cellular production in supplier companies in
response to pressure from their customers and the nascent development of
supplier clubs (IRS 1995). A similar range of developments has occurred in
home-based American vehicle manufacturers with the introduction of
initiatives such as Chrysler's embryonic kiertesu scheme (Dyer 1996), and the
more general use of 'voice' rather than 'exit' strategies (Helper 1993). That is
not to say that a complete transformation of buyer-supplier relationships has
occurred, rather that there has been a move towards greater co-operation,
albeit in a piecemeal and uneven fashion.
This move towards relational/obligation contracting raises the issue of
power relations between companies. While obligational/relational contracting
might be based on co-operative relations, this does not negate the
significance of relative degrees of power between buyer and supplier. As
Grabher comments in relation to buyer-supplier networks:
it is inaccurate and misleading to characterise networks solely in terms
of harmonious collaboration and concord ... each contract in a network
relation can be a source of conflict as well as of concurrence. Power
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may, at least temporarily be distributed unequally between network
partners (Grabher 1993:10).
Grabher, citing the traditional Japanese pyramidal structure of buyer-supplier
relations, argues that the power of the parties declines the further they are
from the pyramid's apex, suggesting that buyers are in a position to exert
power over their suppliers. There is also evidence from Japanese transplants
to suggest that buyers, especially final manufacturers, can wield significant
power over their supplier companies (Garrahan and Stewart 1992;
Stephenson 1996). That is not to argue that buyer-supplier relationships can
simply be reduced to one of supplier subservience. In some cases supplier
companies may be able to exert considerable power over their buyers, for
example, by having technical expertise which would be difficult to access
elsewhere (Rutherford et aI.1995).
Thus, while firms may be moving increasingly away from the
adversarial approach to contracting which has characterised Western buyer-
supplier relations they are not necessarily in a relationship of equals. Telco
offers an important opportunity to analyse recent experience in trading
relations. It is in a sector that has been at the forefront of developments in
buyer-supplier relations. Moreover, as a first-tier provider, it is both buyer and
supplier within the sector and thus provide an opportunity to assess power
relations from both positions. It is to these relationships that the chapter
addresses next.
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Telco and its suppliers
When Telco first became operational in Britain in 1987, approximately
85% of their supplies were imported from Japan. This figure has been
reduced, mainly by increasing the percentage of goods procured locally
(within the EC). Also in the case of printed circuit boards, Telco established
their own in-house production facility to alleviate the need to import from
Japan. Currently, Telco has approximately forty local suppliers and one local
sub-contractor. The company follow a number of procedures for the
accreditation of their suppliers. For suppliers of proprietary items Telco will
usually insist that the company has the industry standard 'kite mark' of ISO
2000. For 'key' suppliers of non-proprietary parts (around 25 companies),
Telco seemingly invoke a rigorous selection process. Telco's QC director
explained the procedure used and the stages involved. The first stage is an
initial audit by the QC department. This involves a review of a potential
supplier's customer base, an appraisal of the organisational structure and a
visit to look at the organisation of production, general cleanliness and the
plant and equipment. The second stage is a full vendor audit of quality
systems. This focuses particularly upon the capacity of in-house procedures
to ensure production processes are capable of delivering appropriate quality
levels. At the same time, Telco's purchasing department provide a technical
specification in order to generate a quotation for the component. This second
stage audit generates a supplier grade for the potential customer. An A grade,
of which there are none currently, indicates that Telco has complete
confidence in the company. B grade indicates an approved supplier who will
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usually be re-audited in three years time, while a C grade is also approved but
subject to annual audit. D grade indicates non-approval.
This initial selection and audit process forms part of a broader
programme of Telco's relationship with their suppliers. Approved companies
become part of Telco's supplier development programme. This usually
involves giving companies technical and staff assistance at product
development stage to ensure that they are capable of volume production at
appropriate quality levels. In an interview, the manager of Rig09, Telco's sole
sub-contacting company, indicated that they were given significant help by
Telco to reach required production standards, including training of Rigo staff,
and help and advice on production methods. Similarly, the sales manager at
Lamtec, one of Telco's suppliers, observed that Telco was a company that
tried to work with and support their suppliers.
The extensive selection criteria and the emphasis on support and
partnership would indicate that Telco favour an obligational rather than an
arms-length approach with their suppliers. Given the apparently rigorous and
ongoing nature of this buyer-supplier relationship it seems somewhat
surprising that poor quality supplies were recurring problem on the shop-floor.
That is not to say that all suppliers and supplies were unsatisfactory, but that
certain key components were causing difficulties. The QC director commented
that 'we have about six suppliers and twelve components which constantly
give problems'. This raises the question of why these supplier problems have
9 All supplier companies have been given pseudonyms
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emerged. There are two broad answers: market weakness and internal
systems. It is these issues which are discussed next.
Supplier problems - market weakness
Market weakness occurred when Telco entered into relations with
suppliers in which they, Telco, were in a disadvantaged market position.
There were a number of situations in which this occurred. In some instances
Telco's suppliers were large multi-national companies for whom Telco's
orders represent only a fraction of their total business. This left Telco
somewhat powerless to exert any significant influence on these supplier
companies. A member of the QC department commented:
In a lot of instances you're dealing with companies that are vastly
larger than Telco, people like Panasonic, Toshiba, you know, and you
can bang the table with those sorts of people all you like, the amount of
business we take off them is a drop in the ocean to them. So you can't
make demands of those sorts of people.
In other instances Telco were left with no options concerning their sources, as
their customers dictated the second-tier supplier to be used. A member of the
QC department cited one such instance where a customer:
insisted that we buy it from a company called Acco in France. Now
then, because this is a customer request, or a customer lnsistence, we
have to go to Acco in France to buy this cable and if Acco in France
mess us about, we have problems ...... You know, saying "well, I'm
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sorry, you can't have any more cables for another four weeks". And
there's nothing we could do about it at all. It would stop our production.
A final situation where Telco faced market weakness was in dealing
with oligopolistic second-suppliers who provided them with specialist
components. This situation was particularly apparent with Lent Plastics, a
specialist printing company that were one of the few European firms able to
supply Telco with the part they required.
Telco's market weakness created a situation where the company was
in a high-dependency relationship with some of it suppliers but was unable to
create a reciprocal dependency. In some cases they attempted to retrieve this
position by 'exiting' from relationships as the QC director explained:
There are some areas where you tend to be over a barrel because
there only tends to be maybe one or two suppliers of a certain product
and you're stuck with it. And you may have bad quality and you may
have bad deliveries, you've got to cajole them along and try and get
them to supply you because they're the only people doing that kind of
thing. Then you've got to seriously think about risk management and
what do you do if this company fails. Now we've got one or two areas
where we've tooled up with Japan in parallel with our suppliers
supplying us here. We've said we don't have any faith in this company
any more, we're tooled up in Japan unknown to them and we just
switch them off. "Sorry, we've tried to work with you but we're not
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getting anywhere". From the self-preservation point of view we've had
to put some of this business back to Japan.
This was, however, an extreme example. In other cases market weakness
continued to represent a significant problem for Telco in its relationship with
suppliers. However, this is not the sole explanation of supply difficulties, the
failure of internal systems is also a significant factor.
Supplier problems - failure of internal systems
'Failure of internal systems' refers to the inconsistent application of
Telco's own procedures with suppliers, and the difficulty in tracking rejects
emanating from problems with the materials planning system. An example of
inconsistent application of procedures with suppliers concerns supplier audits.
As was explained earlier, key suppliers were supposedly subject to a full
audit. Indeed, company documentation states:
As part of the supplier sourcing procedure, all potential suppliers will
undergo a quality assessment which will be undertaken by Telco QC
staff.
However, the system as described by the QC director and outlined in the
documentation is not always applied in the same way in practice. During a
discussion with a member of the QC department I outlined the audit process
as it had been explained to me. His observation was:
That's the theory behind it but to actually carry out an assessment like
this in the majority of the companies that we deal with is probably at
least a week's work for one person and two people are usually
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involved. So it's a fairly high investment of resources to carry out this
assessment. So what we do, we tend to make an initial visit, get a feel
for the place and you can generally say "yes, we're going to go with if
or "no, we're not going to go with if. So, we may go ahead with various
projects with the supplier and then we go and do a systems
assessment later on down the line.
One reason for the lack of resources to undertake full audits relates to a
change in policy by the parent company, concerning local suppliers.
Originally, the company planned to transform its supplies base over two
years, moving from a situation of 85% sourcing from Japan to 85% EC or in-
house sourcing. However, the spiraling value of the yen caused a revision of
this target to 85% localisation within six months; little wonder perhaps that
procedures 'slipped'.
There is other evidence to suggest that supplier audits were not
applied consistently. In a discussion relating to the quality problems
emanating from some suppliers, the QC director commented:
To get faults down to 75 parts per million you've got to get the process
that can actually give that and a lot of them don't have processes that
can ..... their processes are not capable. So they get down to final levels
by 100% inspection, and 100% inspection is not 100% accurate; you
miss things with 100% inspection.
These comments raise the question, how did these supplier companies
survive the supplier audit? The Telco supplier assessment manual contains
sections relating to quality assurance in production, inspection and test, and
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quality co-ordination. These sections ask specific questions, such as "is on-
going process capability monitored during production?" "what methods are
used to guarantee conformance of parts during production?" and "what
documented procedures for corrective action, response and reporting exist?"
It seems somewhat unlikely that if the complete audit had been applied
rigorously, these supplier shortcomings could not have been forecast.
This example of the lack of appropriate quality systems in second-tier
suppliers reflects the experience of Supplier Co, a small second-tier supplier
in the motor vehicle sector (Roper et aI.1997). Supplier Co's solution to the
quality and delivery demands of their main customer was to resort to 100%
inspection which did not resolve quality problems. What Supplier Co did
provide was a relatively flexible and cheap source of components. It may be
that Telco hoped for the same advantages with some of their suppliers but
were finding the consequences somewhat fraught.
This issue of inconsistent application of supplier audits arose during
discussions with one of Telco's supplier companies. The company concerned
was Rigo Plastics, a small firm situated less than a mile from Telco who act as
a sub-contractor for Telco, putting together sub-assembly units. The manager
of Rigo stated that, while Telco's audit of them was 'fairly exhaustive', he felt
that it was tinged by more than a shade of pragmatism:
I think they were fairly exhaustive but, I do feel as though they may
have actually made their mind up beforehand. I know that they were
perhaps in a situation where they felt they needed to find an answer
quickly and I think that we met the criteria and they didn't perhaps
261
compare us with what else was available too closely. I think that the
situation was, and this is only my own personal view, that they probably
felt that they hadn't got the staff; they were falling behind with their
schedule and they saw us as an ideal avenue to get over their problem.
My own visit indicates that on at least one criterion, namely, house-
keeping and facilities, Rigo would struggle to meet even any moderate
benchmarks. My post-visit notes made the following observations:
The work environment seemed somewhat crowded and chaotic. Boxes
were stacked everywhere and we had to move some of the boxes to
talk to the operators. The floor was not clean, it had polythene foam
and empty crates on it. Operators wore their own workware and shoes.
On the corner of one desk were two telephones and a fax machine
used to send through the Telco production schedule. It seems an age
away from Telco.
Under the criterion of house-keeping and facilities, one of twelve in the Telco
supplier assessment manual, the questions asked are: "are good house-
keeping practices encouraged by active company policy?" "are handling
facilities adequate to maintain product quality?" "is the appearance of the site
appropriate to the product manufactured?" At the time of my visit the answer
to all three questions would have been 'no'. It may of course have been the
case that Rigo had 'doctored' its premises prior to the audit. But, as there
were regular visits by Telco's QC staff to Rigo's premises, it seems unlikely
that the conditions of production could have been disguised permanently,
suggesting that the condition of Rigo's production environment was known to
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Telco. The visit to Rigo would indicate that, as in other practices, Telco's
commitment to quality was compromised by their need to achieve output.
In addition to the seemingly lax application of audit criteria, Rigo
provided other examples of Telco had seemingly failing to follow its own
procedures. At the behest of Telco, Rigo included a 'traceability' docket with
each batch of sub-assemblies, which allowed quality problems to be tracked
back to their origins. However, the situation developed where:
We found the empty cases were coming back from Telco with our
dockets still in them. So we would find that they were taking the cases
out to finish the assembly and they wouldn't be doing anything with the
paperwork.
A further departure from agreed procedures concerned monthly 'quality'
meetings. Telco had initiated these in order to discuss quality issues on a
regular basis. But these meetings had atrophied; Telco staff said they were
unable to attend, citing staff shortages and pressure of work as reasons.
This seemingly lax attitude of Telco to audits and other supplier-liaison
procedures was not, however, supported by evidence from another of Telco's
suppliers, Lamtec. The sales manager of Lamtec commented of the audit by
Telco:
It was a very in-depth look at the way we do things. They basically
came along with video cameras and still cameras, took pictures of the
machines, took pictures of the processes. We took the machines apart
and they took pictures of the inside of them.
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The sales manager expressed the view that the audit was rigorous because
Lamtec were using a technique that was not practised in Japan, therefore
prompting Telco to proceed with some caution. Thus, Telco seems to have
followed their own policies in individual cases where there were specific
reasons to do so. More generally, it appears that Telco's application of its own
policies regarding suppliers was patchy.
The problems of Telco's internal procedures does not only relate to
audit data and other related supplier-liaison systems, the internal information
generated by Telco's material resource planning systems also caused
difficulties with suppliers. One problem stemming from this information has
been illustrated in the previous chapter, with the mysterious disappearance of
several thousand screws. A further consequence of this inability to track
materials adequately was to create difficulties in determining the correct level
of rejects which, in turn, undermined negotiations that Telco's staff held with
suppliers. A member of the QC department recounted one such instance:
Now we had an example 12 months ago or so, where a particular
supplier, and they're our worst supplier, was giving us huge problems
and we were told the line are finding 2 or 3% defects, maybe more,
maybe as high as 10% defects. Go and hammer the table with them.
Okay, yeah, fine. What I did, I sort of put together some figures that I
was given by people went into the supplier, hammered the table saying
you're supplying us with 5 or 6% defects overall. They immediately
slapped. figures on the table that showed that actual parts returned to
them were running at 0.7,0.8%. So it immediately blew my figures
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straight out the water, I couldn't argue against them, you know, it made
me look very, very small. What we've found is that the actual number of
parts being used on the line doesn't tally with the number of parts that
are being sent in by the supplier. The supplier is sending in vastly more
quantity, a vastly higher quantity of parts than we're actually using.
We're losing parts. We don't know where, we don't know how, we don't
know why, but we're losing parts.
While the QC director claimed that Telco's quality procedures
represented "the Bible" as far as how the company operates, a very different
picture emerges; one of the failure of internal systems either to be applied
consistently or to function appropriately, generating significant problem in
ensuring supplier quality. These systems deficiencies seem to represent a
failure to either monitor, resource or construct robust policies with suppliers.
As such, management must assume at least some responsibility for the supply
problems faced by Telco.
Having cited managerial culpability, it is interesting to note that the
issue of allocation of responsibility for supply problems was one that caused
some internal friction at Telco, especially between the production
management and QC staff. It is this final aspect of supplier problems which is
discussed next.
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Supplier problems - Internal Friction
One consequence of the poor quality supplies was the emergence of
'internal friction', characterised by the blaming of one department or group of
workers by another for poor quality supplies. The overall responsibility for
supplies lies with the QC department and consequently members of that
department were targeted for not doing enough to resolve supply problems.
The senior production manager in particular derided them as being weak. His
view was that they were not aggressive or confrontational enough with
suppliers and that they should 'bang the table' more with them, as Telco's own
customers did.
For their own part members of the QC department argued that poor
quality of supplies was, at least in part, due to production. One interviewee
claimed that the production manager would blame the QC department but that
a more significant problem was the failure of operators under the senior
production manager's control to apply standards consistently. The conflict
inherent in this 'blame culture' was encapsulated by the comment of another
member of QC:
We also have a problem whereby we've had many, many units
returned to us with purely visual faults, it works perfectly but there's
dust inside it or there's a lens is missing, all sorts of silly things
happen. And these are things that basically should be picked up by the
operator on the line and they haven't been. And we, the QC
department are saying to production, "look you should be picking these
things up". Production are saying "you're right. but, if we were supplied
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with parts in the first place we wouldn't have to have these problems",
and you start to get into a bit of a vicious circle here.
In identifying internal friction as an issue the point being made is not to
try to achieve some apportioning of responsibility for supplier problems, but
simply to illustrate that these problems are themselves a source of internal
dispute and conflict. More broadly, this internal friction provides another
example of the lateral conflict between departmental managers indicated in
previous chapters.
Having discussed Telco's relationships with its suppliers, this chapter
now moves on to discuss the company's relationships with its own customers.
Telco and its customers
Telco's relationship with their customers seems to be one of
subordination. The QC director commented that:
The clout that the major car companies have on the first tier suppliers
is tremendous. We just, we go through hoops, we jump to attention,
we're there on their doorstep if they've got a problem.
Other evidence from Telco supports this view of total customer power. The
production manager referred to customers 'banging the table' if they
experienced any problems. Also, on the line, any visit from a customer (either
actual or potential) was preceded by a frenzied bout of 'housekeeping'.
During interviews with staff at one of Telco's customers this impression
of buyer power was confirmed. This is illustrated by the comments from a
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buyer who was concerned that Telco were being a little reluctant in
responding to customers' changing needs:
Last year we said (to Telco), you have got to start looking at this
(emerging) technology, otherwise you can forget any more business-
it's as harsh as that. We had a meeting with the U.K. people and
basically told them that we wanted their Japanese managers to attend
so that they would appreciate that we weren't prepared to be messed
around. We can't afford to waste time on people who can't give us any
benefits.
G.P. Have you got the power to summon people from Japan?
We have when it's business ..we have to be ruthless ... it's a very cut-
throat market.
During my time with this 'customer' I was given the opportunity to interview a
buyer in the company who had recently joined them from Telco's supply team.
When asked about the difference between working for the motor manufacturer
and Telco his response was 'now I get to do the kicking instead of being
kicked'.
This raises the issue of Telco's performance, and how frequently they
were 'kicked'. According to interviewees at the motor manufacturer, Telco's
record as a supplier was good. Telco had not only gained preferred supplier
status, they had also won supplier awards. This is not to say that problems did
not occur, and when they did they generated heavy penalties. For example,
this customer discovered quality problems, Telco were required to send their
own staff to rectify the defects. In such instances Telco would also be debited
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for the cost of any other components that might be damaged or scrapped
during the rework process. This form of arrangement occurred between Telco
and all of their customers.
The difficulties Telco faced in achieving customer demands have
several sources. They are in part due to the problems discussed earlier, such
as: poor quality supplies, the materials planning systems and temperamental
technology. They are also a reflection of two further related issues, Telco's
customer base and an under-resourced QC department. Concerning the
customer base, Telco began their British operation with just one customer.
Since that time they have expanded and now supply motor vehicle
manufacturers in Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands and other
Japanese companies in Britain. However they still remain in the
disadvantaged position that confronts many SME's, namely that they:
Do not face product markets made up of hundreds or thousands of
customers, but instead have relatively few customers with whom they
regularly do business. Commonly these customers are much larger
organisations who potentially have a great deal of power over their
suppliers (Kinnie et al. 1998:7).
One example of this power imbalance and the problems that it caused was
that Telco felt obliged to respond to any last minute changes in production
scheduling from its customers. However, as the previous chapter illustrated,
Telco's limited stock-hOlding meant that complying with last minute demands
might involve the use of non-dedicated parts, with the consequent possibility
of quality problems.
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Moreover, while Telco's customer base had not grown sufficiently to
overcome their relatively disadvantaged position, its rapid expansion had
created problems through stretching the limited staffing of the QC department.
The unwelcome consequences of this limited staffing were highlighted in the
case of an Italian customer rejecting over one thousand units which did not
meet an agreed standard. To understand why this occurred requires a brief
explanation of the role of the QC department. Each customer has a member of
Telco's QC department as their liaison officer and these meet at least once a
month. The QC member is the customer's de-facto representative on the shop
floor. They will agree speCifications with the customer and try to ensure that
these are met. This is a particularly significant role because, as Telco's
product requires standards of visual as well as functional quality, a degree of
subjective assessment is involved As a member of QC argued, quality in the
case of Telco involves more than simply 'fitness for purpose'. The QC staff
have key functions in agreeing quality standards, transmitting these to
production areas, monitoring quality standards and acting as final arbiters in
quality decisions. For this procedure to operate effectively, requires close co-
ordination between the shop-floor and QC staff; someone has to be available
to arbitrate on the question "is this unit acceptable for the customer
concerned?" The expansion of the customer base meant that QC staff were
not always available and that line staff (especially supervisors) were being
forced into making quality decisions, leading to a situation where there was, in
the words of one interviewee, 'quality slippage'. This explains the difficulties
with the Italian customer; the QC representative had not been available to
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arbitrate on standards and the decision was made to 'pass' the units. These
were rejected by the customer who complained that they were not of the
quality that had been agreed by QC staff. Subsequent discussions at Telco
confirmed that the customer was right, the units dispatched did not reach the
agreed standard.
The expansion of the customer base thus created difficulties within a
context of limited human resources. As one of Telco's suppliers commented,
lithe QC department is small for the size of the company". Also, the systems
themselves must be questioned as the placing of total responsibility for
determining quality in the hands of a single person seems, at best, a fragile
and high-risk strategy.
The previous two sections have explored Telco's relationships with its
buyers and suppliers. The consequence of supply problems and pressure
from customers led the assistant managing director to refer to Telco's position
as the 'meat in the sandwich'. This position is a consequence of a range of
internal and external factors. These will now be analysed using the three
categories of social relations: knowledge, reciprocity and identity.
Knowledge
'Knowledge' is a key feature in gaining a degree of control over
external contractual relationships. Telco had established a number of systems
to help them generate the knowledge to manage their customer and supplier
relationships. An exhaustive audit process had been devised to 'weed out'
potentially unreliable suppliers. Also, a mechanism for systematic liaison with
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customers had been developed to ensure that their needs were met. What is
striking about all these systems is the manner in which they failed to generate
the knowledge which they were established to provide.
There are a number of reasons for this shortcoming. In some cases it
represented a failure to implement systems in the appropriate fashion, as the
partial or delayed application of supplier audits exemplifies. The effect, in this
case, of the lack of articulation between official procedure and actual practice
seems to have been an accidental regression from an audit model of buyer-
supplier relations with verification based on ex-ante assessment of suppliers
to a demands model premised on ex-post verification (Sinclair et at. 1996).
While ex-post verification may help resolve short term difficulties it can bring
problems of its own especially when, as in the case of Telco, components are
used with no pre-inspection. A further reason for the failure of systems to
provide the requisite knowledge was that they were inadequately resourced,
especially in the context of rapid expansion. This is illustrated by difficulties in
meeting agreed standards in the absence of QC staff. Finally, there are
occasions when the systems themselves did not appear sufficiently robust, as
was the case with the materials tracking system.
There emerged, therefore, a significant disparity between the planned
and the actual operation of knowledge-generating systems. While a number of
reasons have been identified for this disparity, these can be traced to a
common underlying cause, namely a Significant failure of manaqernent at
Telco. These areas of managerial shortcoming can be specifically identified
as the failure to build robust information systems, the failure to resource
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established procedures effectively and the failure to monitor audit methods
adequately. While accepting that management had to cope with commercial
decisions over which they had no control, such as the expansion of the local
supplier base, there is little evidence to suggest that they have made any
adequate response to these problems. Managerial fallibility is, of course,
nothing new; Lupton wrote on the topic three decades earlier:
It is assumed that the main impediment to the fulfillment of
management expectations lies in the informal relationships in the
workshop. It is not admitted that expectations may not be fulfilled
because of the lack of ability by management to translate plans into
actual output (1963: 187).
This quotation seems particularly pertinent in the case of Telco, given the
'problems' that customer/supplier relations generated on the shop-floor.
Reciprocitv
Reciprocity has become increasingly important in buyer-supplier
relations. Under 'arms-length' contracting, checks on incoming supplies and
the short-term nature of contracts countered the need for significant levels of
reciprocity. The move towards obligational contracting with longer term
contracts and no pre-inspection creates a situation of high dependency,
requiring the establishment of reciprocal obligations if one partner is not to
take advantage of this relationship (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992)
The data indicate that the creation of reciprocal obligations was a
significant difficulty for Telco, in that they appeared to be in a position of
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subservience in relation to their customers, but were unable to exert the same
influence on some of their own suppliers. The significance of this position and
the difficulties it created for Telco can be illustrated by applying the model of
buyer-supplier relations developed by Sinclair et al. (1996), which is shown in
figure seven
Customer's
importance to
supplier
Figure 7
The Importance of Business Relationships
High Dependence Strategic
Leverage Partnership
Low Market Exchange Dependence
Management
Low High
Importance of Supplier to Customer
Source: Sinclair et al. 1996: 60.
As a supplier, Telco's limited customer base and desire to expand
quickly created a situation where the customer's importance to Telco was
high. By contrast, it can be argued tentatively that Telco had a relatively low
importance to its customers given the power these customers were able to
exert over the company and the lengths to which Telco went to retain their
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business. This combination of high customer importance to supplier and low
supplier importance to customer places Telco in the top left hand cell of the
diagram, dependence leverage. This is a position that 'allows the customer to
exercise leverage over the supplier' (Sinclair et al. 1996:60).
This is in contrast to Telco's position as a customer, where the need to
meet quality standards means that their suppliers can be characterised as
highly important to Telco. However, in some cases, where Telco's orders
constituted only a small proportion of the suppliers business, or where their
suppliers were in an oligopolistic position, then Telco's importance to their
customer is low, a combination which places Telco's relationship with its
suppliers in the bottom right cell, dependence management. This position is
one that for customers 'indicates the need for the dependency relationship to
be carefully managed' (Sinclair et al. 1996:60).
Figure 8
Telco's dependency relationships
Customers TelcoDependency
leverage
~
Dependency
management_.
Suppliers
As figure eight illustrates, this analysis indicates Telco's vulnerable
network position. On the one hand they were subject to leverage from
customers with whom they had a high dependency, while simultaneously they
were in a situation where their relationship with suppliers was one which had
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to be carefully managed. But, crucially for Telco, they were unable to manage
this dependency relationship with at least some of their suppliers.
This location of Telco at the nucleus of a network of buyer and supplier
relationships illustrates the importance of 'market reciprocity'. 'Market
reciprocity' represents the extent to which an organisation's obligations and
needs are met across relationships with all other trading partners. A
characteristic of Telco's position was their inability to generate equitable
market reciprocity, as their customers made demands upon them which they
were unable to transfer to trading relationships with all their own suppliers.
An example of this unequal market reciprocity is in the disparity
between the penalties applied to Telco and those it was able to impose on its
own suppliers. If a unit supplied to a motor manufacturer malfunctioned during
the warranty period, the motor company would charge Telco for the cost of the
replacement unit and the labour involved in replacing it. On the other hand,
although Telco was gradually managing to write a similar penalty in the
contracts of some of its suppliers, there were still a number of companies that
refused to accede to such a penalty. Here the failure to generate reciprocal
agreements across the span of its market activities placed Telco at a financial
disadvantage.
The significance of unequal market reciprocity extends beyond
financial penalties; it was a major factor in explaining the nature of the labour
process. The previous chapter has argued that it was the interaction of both
customer and supplier relationships, namely, the difficulties caused by poor
quality supplies and demanding customers, that led supervisors to tolerate
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and conspire in fiddles with operators. Similarly, it was unequal reciprocity
that explained managerial manipulation of standards, such as the changing of
tolerances. This managerial 'rule-breaking' was used by workers to justify
their own circumvention of operating procedures. Also, the production
problems that characterised the factory floor and which stemmed, at least in
part, from unequal market reciprocity, created a climate of uncertainty which
made fiddles easier for the workforce to sustain.
Identity
This section explores the question of identity in relation to the group of
Telco's employees most closely involved with buyer-supplier interaction, the
staff of the QC department. One Significant issue related to identity concerned
the role conflict experienced by QC staff. While they were the customers' de
facto representatives with a role of ensuring appropriate standards, they were
also Telco's employees with a responsibility and interest in ensuring that daily
output targets were achieved. This dual obligation was a potential cause of
tension when judgments had to be produced on units of marginal quality. If
they took a 'hard line' and identified solely with their customers' interests then
production could be jeopardized. One member of the QC department
observed:
You're put in a position where a decision is demanded of QC, of the
QC department, saying it is OK or it is no good, bearing in mind if these
parts don't go out tonight our customer line stops. "Now, you tell me if
they're okay or no good". And it's like, all the responsibility is on your
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shoulders. If the customer line stops you feel, you're made to feel as if
you are the one that has stopped the customer line.
A further tension for QC staff arose from their responsibility for liaison
and negotiation with Telco's suppliers. Where problems of faulty parts
occurred the QC staff were identified, by production, as the source of the
difficulty. As a member of the QC department commented:
In practice, what happens, you get a batch of parts come through to
production, and, as there's no goods inwards inspection, the first time
we hear of a problem is when the line stops, or the line is in danger of
stopping. So what happens, we get the production manager, pick the
phone up, ring us with a very strong phone call saying "The line is
going to stop because of your parts. What are you going to do about
it?"
The identity of the QC department staff can be summed up in the words
of one interviewee who observed that "we're wearing two hats all the time and
that can cause tensions". The responsibilities and obligations to Telco on the
one hand and customers and suppliers on the other, created a contradictory
situation for QC staff, and one where they were viewed, by other departments,
as a source of production difficulties.
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Summary
Much has been written about the developments of new buyer-supplier
networks and claims have been made for their efficacy (IRS 1996), with the
phrase 'supply chain management' becoming part of the new business lexicon
(Harland 1996). But, as this chapter illustrates, for first-tier suppliers in what is
generally perceived as a leading-edge industry, these evolving buyer-supplier
relationships are not unproblematic. This conclusion is consistent with other
evidence from the UK motor vehicle industry which suggests that although
recent developments in buyer-supplier relations have produced some positive
consequences for first-tier suppliers, such as the generation of long-term
contracts, the major vehicle manufacturers still hold the 'whip hand' in these
relationships (Danford 1998a; Turnbull et aI.1993).
The analysis of reciprocity has drawn attention to the manner in which
Telco's market weakness has caused difficulties in attempting to manage
buyer-supplier relations. The difficulties experienced by Telco support the
assertions that power relations remain important within evolving systems of
buyer-supplier relations (Grabher 1993), and that these power relations
cannot simply be reduced to one of supplier subservience (Rutherford et
aI.1995). The concept of market reciprocity seems particularly important in
explaining Telco's difficulties. While their buyers were in a position to exercise
dependence leverage, they could not replicate this leverage with all suppliers.
Reciprocity is however only one source of Telco's difficulties. The issue
of knowledge illustrated that lack of managerial competence impeded the
generation of information which would have helped manage buyer-supplier
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relations. Although Telco had many of the systems in place to provide
appropriate data, in practice these did not function as required. This illustrates
the importance of looking behind formal designations of procedure to
investigate processes in practice.
Finally, the issue of identity has been applied to explore the impact of
customers on the staff most closely involved with buyers and suppliers,
namely members of the QC department. This has illustrates the tensions that
role conflict has generated for QC department staff. At a broader level it is
interesting to note that QC staff seem to be 'invisible men' (and women) in
debates relating to 'Japanisation', meriting, at best, an occasional aside
(Roper et a1.1997; Taylor et aI.1994). It appears to be assumed that the
advent of TQM , with the delegation of responsibility for quality throughout the
organisation, has negated any significant role for specialist QC staff. The
evidence from Telco suggests that this assumption may be incorrect and that
the disappearance of QC staff from the Japanisation literature is a significant
omission.
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Conclusion
This study has presented research on the labour process in a British-
based Japanese manufacturing company. It has also set the analysis in the
context of embedded ness, thus developing and applying a new analytical
framework to workplace relations in Japanese transplants. In seeking to draw
conclusions a number of specific questions arise. Firstly, how does the
identified framework of embeddedness and the related holistic analysis help
to explain the labour process at Telco? Secondly, how do the findings from
Telco add to the academic analysis of Japanese transplants, and labour
process theory more generally? Finally, what are the issues for future
research? This chapter addresses each of these questions in turn.
The embeddedness framework and Telco
Two related aims of this study were to devise an analytical framework
for understanding the labour process within Japanese manufacturing
transplants, and to develop a holistic analysis of workplace relations. The
analytical framework developed to meet the first aim was based upon
Granovetter's concept of embedded ness. The framework presented here
developed Granovetter's use of embedded ness by specifying four network
structures and three categories of social relations and applying these
speCifically to workplace relations. Turning to the second aim, a 'holistic'
analysis is one which includes the actions and motives of all the constituents
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within the organisation, workers, supervisors, support staff and managers.
Also, a holistic approach demands that the organisation is studied in its wider
economic and political context and that the company's product and labour
markets form part of the analysis.
These two aims help to develop an understanding of the labour
process at Telco. By developing linkages between the various networks
structures and categories of social relations it has been possible to track the
impact of policies on the labour process, to explore the complexity of forces
influencing workplace relations and to account for the seemingly contradictory
behaviour.
The 'tracking' of policies refers to the need to explore, rather than
merely assume the actual outcomes of policies. Through the embeddedness
framework it has been illustrated that the objectives management allocates to
policies are not always achieved. Relatedly, the tracking of policies has
allowed labour to be reinstated into the labour process in the 'new workplace'
as active agents in shaping workplace relations. For example, the discussion
of workgroup networks has shown how workers were able to use their
knowledge and to engage in reciprocal agreements in order to circumvent
managerial intentions concerning surveillance. Although Telco can be
described as a high-surveillance workplace workers were able to engage in
fiddles to evade surveillance. Tracking policies has also highlighted the
conflicts and tensions between policies and the manner in which these have
fed through to social relations. To cite an example from personnel networks,
the conflict between 'good' HRM practice and the demands of production led
282
to the constant cancellation of training sessions which, in turn, sent an
unambiguous message to the workforce that their knowledge and input was
not required. This tracking of policies highlights the dangers of simply
inferring the outcome of policies from their managerially-defined objectives.
The connections between the various network structures and
categories of social relations has also emphasised the complexity of
influences upon workplace relations. For example, it has been established
that supervisors playa key role in shaping the labour process through the
reciprocal arrangements they developed with operators. Supervisors engaged
in these relationships because of the difficulties that they faced due, at least
in part, to Telco's inability to exert control over its commercial networks. In
turn, the problems Telco experienced in managing relationships within its
commercial networks have been attributed to managerial fallibility and
unequal market reciprocity. This explanation moves the analysis away from
compartmentalized explanations of workplace relations towards a more
comprehensive account which explores the inter-relations between different
actors and sets these relationships in a broader organisational context.
The framework also allows the seeming inconsistencies of workplace
relations to be explored. One example here is the way in which the workgroup
offered reciprocal support to most of its members, but in the case of one
operator, Dave, this was denied. The motives of the team in excluding Dave
from this support were embedded in a tacit view amongst his colleagues of
what constituted acceptable levels of attendance, effort and propriety. A
further example concerns the manner in which supervisors support some
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worker fiddles but try to clamp down on others. This was explained by setting
supervisors' actions in the context of the expectations placed upon them and
the contingent conditions they faced. By investigating relationships between
actors both within and across networks the analysis can move away from
broad-brush generalisations about the actions and motives of workers to
explain what appears contradictory behaviour.
Telco in context
This section brings together the three aims of the study. It uses data
generated through the embeddedness framework and holistic analysis to
inform debates concerning workplace relations in Japanese transplants and
labour process research more broadly. More specifically this section has three
objectives. First, to discuss recent theoretical issues concerning resistance
and the labour process debate. Second, to use comparative study to draw
some conclusions concerning the relative significance of factors affecting the
labour process within Japanese transplants. Third, to offer a critique of a
number of perspectives in the Japanisation literature. The section is
organised under three headings: the analysis of resistance, management in
context and whither Japanisation.
The analysis of resistance
The factory floor at Telco exhibited much of the social and technical
organisation of production associated with high-surveillance regimes. It has
been claimed that these high-surveillance regimes have effectively eliminated
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informal forms of resistance (Delbridge and Turnbull 1992; Sewell and
Wilkinson 1993). The evidence from this study challenges these findings.
Workers at Telco engaged in resistance by pursuing both individual and
collective fiddles in order to make time and evade surveillance. This supports
the contention by Thompson and Ackroyd (1995) that workers have retained
the capacity to engage in informal action in support of their own interests.
Whilst supporting Thompson and Ackroyd's basic premise relating to
the continuation of employee 'misbehaviour', the data from this study
progresses their analysis by addressing two shortcomings in their
misbehaviour thesis. These two limitations relate to the inadequacies of
misbehaviour as a theoretical construct and the authors' neglect of causal
analysis of resistance. It is these two issues of labour process theory and the
contingent nature of resistance that provide a structure for this section on
resistance.
Turning first to the theoretical shortcomings, the point of departure is
the concerns raised by Martinez-Lucio and Stewart (1997) in what they
describe as the 'paradox of contemporary labour process theory'. This
paradox arises from a critique of Thompson and Ackroyd's (1995) initial use of
'misbehaviour' to characterise and understand the oppositional behaviour of
workers. Martinez-Lucio and Stewart argue that the notion of 'misbehaviour'
underplays the collective nature of employee action and, relatedly, ignores
collective labour as a category in favour of the more individualistic term of
employee. The data from Telco illustrate both the significance of collective
action and the salience of labour as an analytical construct.
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Dealing first with the issue of collective action, the evidence from Telco
supports the view that worker resistance has not been reduced to individual
acts of dissent; collective action was clearly identified as a feature of
resistance. Within the workgroup network, workers were able to use their
knowledge of the production process collectively to both make time and evade
surveillance. Moreover, where individual resistance occurred it was
sometimes premised on the collective will and capacity of workers to share
their knowledge of fiddles. Workers had become neither atomised nor totally
incorporated into a regime of self-surveillance, but had developed a series of
reciprocal arrangements within the workgroup to facilitate fiddles. The role of
the workgroup in facilitating collective resistance emphasises the necessity for
labour process theory to recognise the potential contradictions within
managerial initiatives to reconfigure the social organisation of work. At Telco
the main managerial purpose of the team seemed to be to act as an
instrument of accountability and, as such, of surveillance and discipline. What
the team actually provided was a mechanism through which collective
loyalties could be constructed and discharged. Even in what is arguably the
most barren condition for collective action to germinate, a non-unionised
company on a greenfield site, workers have not simply accepted managerial
efforts to engineer control through the restructuring of production
arrangements. The examples from Telco suggest that workers' capacity for
collective action in support of their own interests has not been expunged. The
focus on workgroup networks and the accompanying categories of social
relations have reaffirmed the significance of collective worker action.
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A further outcome of the recognition of collective action is that it helps
to explain some of the complexities of workplace relations. In particular, the
ways and circumstances in which collective support can be withdrawn from
specific members of the workgroup illustrates the manner in which compliance
and resistance are interwoven within the labour process. It is not simply a
case of associating collective action with resistance per se; collectivist
concerns and action can also shape the limits of resistance.
The second key theoretical issue raised by Martinez-Lucio and Stewart
is Thompson and Ackroyd's focus on workers as employees rather than more
collectively as labour. This, they argue, removes the debate concerning
resistance out of its proper location, viz. the wider social relations of the
employment relationship. Martinez-Lucio and Stewart contend that resistance
is rooted in something more than individual attempts to manipulate the effort-
bargain, as is implied by 'misbehaviour'; rather, it needs to be understood in
terms of a structured antagonism (Edwards 1986) between labour and capital.
The embedded approach has illustrated the manner in which employee
resistance is motivated not only by instrumental concerns, but is located in
wider issues around management's treatment of the workforce. At one level
the analysis of resistance at Telco as strategies to evade surveillance and
make time may be seen as reducing resistance simply to action related to the
effort-bargain, albeit that these concerns are expressed collectively. However,
resistance at Telco was grounded in more than worker self-interest, it was
based on and motivated by a broader opposition to management and
managerial actions. This has been most clearly illustrated through the manner
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in which the personnel network created a lack of trust in management and a
view from the workforce that managers rarely considered their interests. This
antagonistic relationship was further extended through the autocratic
behaviour associated with personal control. The consequence of this
antagonistic relationship was that many workers developed an identity which
was constructed in opposition to management. Management action became
associated with shoddy treatment, lack of concern and commitment and
inconsistent and ad-hoc application of policies. In this sense resistance at
Telco can be seen as action by labour, not merely because it was collective,
but also because it was located in employee experience of social relations in
which their value and significance to management was defined solely in terms
of their contribution to meeting output. By their own measure employees at
Telco were subjects of social relations which confirmed to them their lack of
status and significance. This is not to treat worker actions as a proxy for class
struggle, but to stress the collective view of workers as labour which should
be seen in the context of the structured antagonism that underpins labour
process theory.
Having discussed the way in which this study supports and addresses
theoretical criticism of misbehaviour, the second major shortcoming of
Ackroyd and Thompson's work is now addressed, that of their neglect of the
contingent nature of resistance. This criticism stems from the somewhat
modest agenda that Ackroyd and Thompson have set themselves in their
most recent work. They comment:
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Our purpose is not to re-examine or indeed to create causal
explanations for conflict and resistance in the workplace, but to
produce a provisional mapping of the misbehaviour that many
managers and social scientists have neglected (1999: 11).
This overt neglect of the causal explanations for resistance is somewhat·
surprising given that they also observe 'the real question is how and why the
organisation produces misbehavior' (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999:11). The
contingent nature of resistance has long been recognised (Lupton 1963), and,
while the classification of workplace activities by Thompson and Ackroyd is
valuable, ignoring the causal explanations does seem to be evading 'the real
question'. It is this issue about the explanation of resistance that is the
concern of the remainder of this section. Using the data from the
embeddedness framework to compare Telco with the ethnographic studies
first of Delbridge and then of Graham, the contingent nature of resistance will
be discussed.
Delbridge's work has been referred to extensively in other chapters, so
it will be summarised briefly here. In his study of the labour process at Nippon,
Delbridge (1998) argues that management has been successful in imposing a
regime which has intensified work and increased operator accountability
through extensive surveillance; effective worker resistance to this production
regime has been marginalised. The key determinant in marginalising worker
resistance is the company's ability to isolate the production systems from
uncertainty. The 'bounded JIT' system ensured appropriate quality supplies,
the technology was reliable and the position of supplier to its own distribution
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division provided a stable product market. This is in stark contrast to Telco
where the shopfloor was bedeviled by uncertainty. One major source of
uncertainty arose from Telco's commercial networks which placed the
company at the hub of a network of buyer and supplier relationships, but it
was a position in which the company was unable to generate equitable
'market reciprocity'. Whilst being subject to leverage from customers on whom
they had a high dependency, they were unable to replicate this dependency
leverage with at least some of their suppliers.
This uncertainty was compounded by ambiguities concerning
definitions of quality. At Nippon quality systems described by Delbridge were
focused solely on functional definitions. The purpose of checking and
surveillance procedures at Nippon was to ensure that when the product
reached the end of the line, it worked properly. At Telco, standards involved
more than mere functional effectiveness; the cosmetic appearance of the unit
played a significant part in determining quality. The varying quality standards
accepted by different customers added to the element of subjective judgment
in the determination of quality. Also, in contrast to Nippon, the uncertainty that
surrounded the shopfloor at Telco was further exacerbated by temperamental
technology and internal logistical difficulties. The difficulties experienced in
meeting output in this context of shopfloor uncertainty produced an operating
environment where workers were able to engage in fiddles.
While workers at Nippon functioned within a regime which had
marginalised uncertainty on the shop floor, operators at Telco performed
within a climate of constant vicissitude. Consequently they were able to prise
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open the pores of the manufacturing system in practice and to exploit these
tensions and contradictions to their own advantage. These uncertainties
helped to facilitate fiddles in a number of ways. Supply problems and
production demands led to a situation where workers would take shortcuts
and pass marginal units knowing that they were unlikely to be reprimanded for
those actions. Also, the lack of clarity concerning the definition of quality
meant that operators would make their own decisions on whether to 'pass' of
'report' units of marginal quality, arguing that it was a practice which both
supervisors and managers engaged in. The climate of uncertainty at Telco
also meant that the supervisor had a key role in facilitating fiddles. The
difficulties supervisors faced in achieving their primary task, that of meeting
output, led to compliance with workers in circumventing operating procedures.
In some instances this compliance involved 'turning a blind eye' to fiddles, in
others instances it involved a much more active role through instructing
operators to contravene official systems. Finally, the transgression of formal
procedures by supervisors and also by managers which arose from
production uncertainties, acted as a legitimisation by workers to pursue their
own rule-breaking.
One issue that arises from this discussion of uncertainty is the
relationship between resistance and a company's market environment.
Conventionally, the capacity of workers to engage in resistance has been
linked to the company's market position with its buyers, often with fiddles
being more difficult for workers to sustain within price-competitive markets
(Brown 1973). The evidence from Telco and Nippon suggests a slightly
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different approach, that within JIT systems it is the organisation's relationship
with both its buyers and suppliers that is a key determinant of worker capacity
to sustain fiddles. Where companies operate within a JIT system as a first tier
supplier in highly competitive markets, they have to respond not only to
demands on price but also on quality and timing of supplies. If, as in the case
of Telco, this pressure is compounded by an inability to control the quality of
incoming supplies, it creates an environment in which worker rule-bending is
both more likely to occur and also more liable to be condoned.
More broadly, this comparison between Nippon and Telco illustrates
that surveillance systems embodied in the technical and social organisation of
production do not in themselves eliminate resistance. The conditions of
production in which control systems are embedded are fundamental factors in
facilitating or disabling resistance. This supports arguments which caution
against an approach to workplace relations that is based upon technological
determinism (Wilkinson 1982).
A further distinction between Nippon and Telco concerned the actions
of operators in using their tacit shopfloor knowledge to make time by shaving
seconds off operating procedures. Delbridge argues that at Nippon any such
knowledge was appropriated by the supervisor who would use this to 'tweak
up' line speed in order to achieve the targets set by management. Supervisors
at Telco certainly did use operators' capacity to complete tasks under the
standard time as a way of meeting targets, indeed they sometimes instructed
operators in these fiddles. But, this knowledge was certainly not appropriated
totally by the supervisor. In many cases, such as the examples of the heating
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process and the 'Iumo' room, workers themselves remained the beneficiaries
of their own shopfloor knowledge. The difference between Nippon and Telco
is not easily accounted for, as in both companies supervisors and operators
were subject to management pressure to achieve targets. One tentative
explanation for the difference is again linked to the differing degrees of
uncertainty that characterised the shopfloor in the two companies. Although
the supervisors at Nippon were under pressure to achieve targets, the smooth
running of the production system meant that they were not forced into informal
accommodations with the workforce on a day-to-day basis (Delbridge 1997).
At Telco by contrast, supervisors relied on the active engagement of workers
in fiddles to meet output, and in this situation it makes sense to leave workers
some latitude to engage in fiddles that were not counter to the supervisors'
interests. Turning a 'blind eye' in these circumstances means that supervisors
do not antagonize staff upon whose co-operation they rely.
Two key points arise from this discussion of operators' tacit shopfloor
knowledge. First, despite the Taylorisation of work as manifested in the timing
of jobs, the identification of the 'one best way' (as embodied in the work
standards) and the fragmentation of operations so that tasks lasted less than
half a minute, workers retained some ability either collectively or individually
tomake time. Worker ingenuity has not been engineered out of the production
process. Second, the ability of workers to benefit from their tacit knowledge
seems to be linked to worker-supervisor relations. This adds further evidence
to support the view that the role of the supervisor is central to understanding
and determining workplace relations.
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The contrast between Telco and Nippon has raised key issues
concerning the contingent nature of resistance. This analysis can be extended
by comparing Graham's data from Subaru (Graham 1994; Graham 1995), with
both Nippon and Telco. One significant difference between Nippon on the one
hand, and Telco and Subaru on the other is the generation of vertical conflict
as evidenced in operators' attitudes towards management. Delbridge
contends that although workers at Nippon distanced themselves from
management, the workplace was not characterised by operator hostility
towards management. This was certainly not the case at either Telco or
Subaru; in both companies worker attitudes towards management were
characterised by mistrust and antagonism.
At Subaru, worker hostility towards management was the consequence
of the physical stress of the JIT system and the perceived difference between
the 'promises' made during training and induction and the reality of life on the
line. Workers felt that they had been both exploited and misled by the
company, and these grievances set the foundations for worker resistance. At
Telco, worker distrust of management stemmed from somewhat different root
causes. This was not grounded in complaints about physical injury or the pace
of work, but was focused on the operators' perceptions of the way in which
they were (mis)treated. The autocratic personal control of the production
manager and the arbitrary implementation of sanctions created an
atmosphere of anger and antagonism towards management. Similarly, the
cancellation of the company council, training sessions and kaizen schemes
was interpreted by operators as a signal that management had little time or
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use for employees' views and opinions. Neither the formal nor the
psychological contracts were being fulfilled, generating a situation where
workers created an identity which was couched in terms of opposition to
management.
At Subaru, this employee hostility towards management directly
influenced employees' strategies of resistance. In the case of Telco, it is more
difficult to demonstrate, in the sense of drawing an undisputable causal link,
that antagonism towards management was a significant contributory factor in
promoting resistance. Making time and evading surveillance were not directly
attributed to the discontent with management that was articulated by many
workers. Or, put another way, it cannot be proven that if worker perceptions of
management had been less hostile then resistance would have diminished.
However, what can be categorically stated is that from the point of view of the
majority of the workforce a 'them and us' attitude prevailed. Not only was there
no evidence of any willing commitment by the workforce to management
goals, management were clearly identified as unreasonable, unsympathetic
and lacking care and consideration. Using a worker's words, Telco was 'a shit
place to work' and the reason for this was that management made it so. In this
situation it does not seem unreasonable to offer the conjecture that due to the
way they were treated workers would seek to pursue their own interests and
engage in activities that ran counter to managerial diktat. In this way it can be
argued that worker hostility to management was a motivating factor in
generating resistance.
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A further point of comparison between Telco and Subaru is the nature
of resistance in the two companies. In the case of Telco resistance took the
form of fiddles; at Subaru, by contrast, workers also engaged in more direct
confrontational acts against management. One tentative explanation for this
difference is that because workers at Telco were able to use fiddles to 'get by'
and exert some control over their working day, then more direct conflict with
management was avoided. But, at Subaru, antagonism towards management
coupled with a seeming restricted ability to engage in fiddles may have
stimulated more overt and direct conflict.
From this discussion of Telco, Nippon and Subaru some conclusions
can be drawn about what conditions promote or restrain resistance. One
tentative line of analysis is to divide this question into two separate but related
issues, why workers resist and how this resistance is achieved, and then to
explore factors relating to each of these sub-issues. The factors explaining
how workers are able to resist can be termed 'enabling' factors whilst those
explaining why workers resist can be termed 'motivational' factors.
Turning first to enabling factors, a comparison of Nippon and Telco
identified the degree of uncertainty that characterised the factory floor at
Telco as they key factor in enabling fiddles. This uncertainty stemmed from
Telco's inability to establish equal reciprocal dependency within its
commercial networks, unreliable technology, the failure of internal systems
and the ambiguous definition of quality. With reference to the second
category, motivational factors, Subaru and Telco were both characterised by
employee resistance and worker antagonism towards management,
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suggesting that hostility towards management may explain why workers resist.
The comparison between Telco and Subaru also indicates tentatively that
where motivational factors are present but enabling factors to permit fiddles
are absent, then the outcome is more direct confrontation.
So far this section has focused on resistance, but the limits of this
resistance also need to be recognised. The study has established that
workers' behaviour also constituted compliance through the ways in which
they 'policed' the actions of both their workmates and supervisors. The non-
support of Dave and the demand that supervisors countersign defective units
are illustrations of the manner in which boundaries were drawn around fiddles.
The structures that supported fiddles, both within the workgroup and through
operator supervisor collaboration, can similarly be mechanisms of
compliance. Compliance therefore co-exists with resistance. Moreover as
Collinson (1993) observes it can stem from the very same practices.
In discussing resistance and compliance at Telco one further key issue
needs to be addressed, namely the significance for patterns of workplace
behaviour of Telco's location as a first-tier supplier. It has been argued that
Telco's relationship with its customers represented a position of 'high
dependence' and that Telco struggled to meet the twin targets of JIT
scheduling demands and product quality. The tensions arising from this high
dependency 'fed through' to the labour process in ways which influenced both
resistance and compliance.
Turning first to resistance, the primacy accorded to meeting output
helped to facilitate worker fiddles. For example, workers were aware that
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official quality standards were manipulated by supervisors and managers in
order to achieve daily targets and so developed their own initiatives to
circumvent quality standards, in order to make time and avoid surveillance.
The actions of the end-of-line supervisor in doctoring the QC sample provides
one instance of such practice. Furthermore, the pressures on the supervisors
to achieve daily targets explains why they conspired with operators, in some
cases in contravention of formal operating procedures. The priority allocated
to daily output targets also influenced personnel practice in that it was cited
as the reason for the continued cancellation of training sessions. This, in turn,
was seen by the workforce as one of a number of examples where they were
accorded a low priority by the company, and which contributed to the creation
of an anti-managerial ethos amongst many of the workers.
Telco's relationship with its customers also helps to explain compliance
as well as resistance. The boundaries that were drawn around fiddles were, at
least in part, a consequence of the manner in which customer demands
impacted on the factory floor. For example, workers' insistence that
supervisors sign units of marginal quality usually resulted in these units being
consigned for rectification, as per formal operating procedures. It was the
unwillingness of workers to risk being blamed for ignoring customers' quality
standards that underscored this compliance with company standards.
The demands of customers thus influenced the labour process in an
informal manner (Kinnie et al. 1998). This interaction between labour process
and the influence of powerful customers is consistent with other studies of
first-tier suppliers in the motor vehicle industry (Danford 1998a, Stephenson
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1996). However, it is important not to reduce this relationship to one of a pre-
determined trajectory. In some cases the demands of powerful customers
gives employees leverage to exert some control over the labour process. For
example, at Ikeda-Hoover a strong union and skilled workforce were able to
extract concessions from management (Stephenson 1996). In other instances
management are able to use the threat of customer power to intenSify work,
as Danford's (1998a) study of CarPress illustrates.
This raises the question of why customer pressures impact upon the
labour process in different ways. One tentative explanation is in the
interaction between labour markets and customer pressures. At both Telco
and Ikeda-Hoover, workers were in a relatively strong position, albeit for very
different reasons: the existence of skilled workers at Ikeda-Hoover and the
buoyant local labour market in the case of Telco. In the case of CarPress,
workers faced a situation of employment insecurity in a geographical area of
diminishing work opportunities. Employment levels at the plant had fallen by
almost two thirds over the last two decades, and management threatened
workers with further job losses if they failed to meet customer requirements. In
this situation employees are more likely to accede to task accretion and less
able to engage in acts of resistance. This line of analysis is somewhat
speculative, although it is supported by case study evidence from outside the
motor vehicle industry (Newsome 1996). Future research would be helpful in
clarifying the interaction between customer-supplier relations and the labour
process in first-tier suppliers.
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In summary, the evidence from Telco suggests that workers retained
the capacity to engage in resistance, although this was interwoven with
compliance. The capacity to engage in fiddles stemmed mainly from the
uncertainty that pervaded the factory floor. The motivation for fiddles arose
not merely as a way of manipulating the effort bargain and evading
surveillance but also from a mistrust of management by workers generated by
the manner in which they were treated.
Management in context
It is axiomatic that management will have an impact on the labour
process, the question is what this influence is and how it is transmitted. One
of the significant findings of this study is the key role of management
incompetence. This was evident through the manner in which production
difficulties stemmed from supply problems and internal systems malfunctions.
Whilst recognising that Telco's difficulties were not all of their management's
making and also that management had, at best, limited control over some
policies, the company's problems were also the consequence of managerial
failure to support and monitor organisational operating procedures. It was
these production difficulties that created a climate of uncertainty which
allowed workers to engage in fiddles and also pushed supervisors into
accommodations with operators. A further managerial shortcoming was the
inconsistent application of personnel policies, which, at least in the opinion of
many operators, led to unfair censure. This seemingly arbitrary
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implementation of policy created a climate of mistrust of management on the
factory floor.
This issue of management incompetence is not raised as a celebration
of the failure of agents of capital, but as an attempt to add balance to debates
concerning Japanese management. The failings of management should not
be surprising, as management is a complex process that attempts to resolve
competing demands and address complex problems; managers are often less
than strategic in their attempts to solve ongoing tensions and difficulties
(Hyman 1987). There has however been a tendency to either 'deify' Japanese
management (Pascale and Athos 1982) or endow them with an omnipotence
which suggests that their policies are both coherent and successful (Sewell
and Wilkinson 1992; Wickens 1987). It is possible that Telco is different from
powerful Japanese transplants such as Nissan, because of the extent of
uncertainty that it faced; uncertainties which crated significant difficulties and
pressures for Telco's management. However, the difference may be one of
degree rather than substance, for management fallibility (or at least tensions
and contradictions) may found to be more extensive than currently implied by
the literature when more studies look for it. This assertion is supported by a
small number of cases which suggest that managerial incompetence is not
restricted to Telco alone (Grant 1996; Taylor et aI.1994).
Management had a further impact on the labour process through the
control strategies adopted. The surveillance systems certainly shaped
employee behaviour, but, rather than acting to secure compliance, they were
in many instances the focus for worker resistance. Also, surveillance systems
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did not generate lateral tension, as suggested in some accounts, but quite the
opposite, as evading these systems often proved the rationale for co-
operation between workers. Moreover, not only did surveillance systems
generate lateral co-operation, they also sustained some degree of vertical co-
operation between workers and supervisors. Supervisors were themselves the
subjects of surveillance and monitoring. One way in which they were able to
alleviate the impact of these systems was to conspire with workers to 'doctor'
the information that management received.
Management control systems also played a role in the generation of
antagonistic workplace relationships through the personal control strategies
employed by the production manager. Delbridge (1998) argues that at Nippon
the efficacy of the monitoring and control systems negates the arbitrary
exercise of authority in the form of personal control. The data from Telco
challenge the generalisability of this interpretation. Notwithstanding
differences between the two companies, the monitoring and surveillance
mechanisms in both Telco and Nippon produce a significant amount of quickly
and readily available data. This can be used to facilitate personal control
should management chose to follow this option. That is not to argue that
personal control will be a feature of all high surveillance organisations, nor
that it was a characteristic of Nippon, but that high surveillance and personal
control can be complementary rather than conflicting strategies.
One issue that arises from any study of management and workplace
resistance is the extent to which management were aware of workers' actions.
At Telco there is evidence to suggest that fiddles occurred with at least the
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knowledge and tacit approval of some members of management. The British
senior production manager had 'risen through the ranks' from supervisor to
his current post. Given that supervisors played a key role in many of the
fiddles, it seems unlikely that he was unaware of these practices. In addition,
operators were more stringent in applying quality standards when Japanese
managers were 'patrolling' the shopfloor than was the case with British
managers, This was based on the common perception that British managers
were more likely to turn a 'blind eye' to fiddles, while their Japanese
counterparts insisted on official procedures being observed.
This raises the question of why management allows worker fiddles to
continue. One way to address this issue is to consider the effect of a
campaign by management to 'clamp down' on fiddles. At Telco the likely
consequence would be that without fiddles the daily production targets would
not be met. If, for example, workers were to query every unit of marginal
cosmetic quality, then the company would have neither the staff nor stock of
parts to meet customer's demands. Managerial tolerance of fiddles at Telco
would support the long-established conclusion that worker resistance is not
necessarily contrary to the interests of capital (Burawoy 1979).
But, whilst recognising that management may gain from fiddles, it is
important not to adopt the purely functionalist view that fiddles operate at all
times to support capital and the interest of management. This functionalist
account of workplace relations underplays the complexity of worker-
management interaction and 'spirits away' both practical problems that may
face management arising from fiddles and the ideological conflict that
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underscores them. At Telco fiddles were not always in the interests of
management, as evidenced by attempts to impose control over 'cleaning up'
time. Moreover, as argued above, fiddles were employed by operators within
an ideological terrain of mistrust of management. They had been devised both
with and without managerial and supervisory compliance and had ossified into
the unofficial shopfloor practices of all operators. This suggests that operators
had established some tentative control over their right to engage in fiddles,
irrespective of tacit approval by management. Put another way, it is not
certain that management, even if they had wanted to, could have eliminated
fiddles successfully. In this sense viewing fiddles as simply in management's
interests is unacceptable because they involved workplace behaviour over
which management had limited control.
A final conclusion relating to management is that significant tension
seemed to exist between different functional groups of managers. Conflict
arose between the production and personnel department, amongst managers
of shop-floor and 'white collar' workers and involving quality control and
production managers. Again, this is a picture which differs from the coherent
and relatively unproblematic implementation and operation of policies
portrayed in some accounts (Trevor 1988; Wickens 1987). Nor is it simply a
contrast in managerial styles and expectations between Japanese and
indigenous managers as reported in some transplants (Broad 1994b; Grant
1994); the conflicts identified were all between British managers. Most of the
managerial tensions arose out of the difficulties associated with meeting
targets and production uncertainties. Managerial conflicts also arose however
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from seemingly unproblematic policies and issues such as those surrounding
single status. The significance of these tensions was felt beyond the ranks of
managers themselves as the conflicts helped to shape the labour process. For
example, the continued cancellation of training at the insistence of the
production department acted to sustain employees' negative opinions of
management.
In summary, management have made an impact upon the labour
process but not in the manner identified by advocates of Japanisation nor,
indeed, by many of the critics. Telco's situation does however bear strong
similarities to the case of Renco, another British-based Japanese transplant
(Grant 1994; Grant 1996; Grant 1999), where managerial shortcomings and
the inconsistent application of personnel policies led to an environment in
which workers pursued their own interests and held a very negative view of
management. Telco, therefore, cannot be simply written off as a sole example
of managerial fallibility within transplant companies. More generally, the
findings from Telco bring into question the lack of recognition of managerial
dilemmas, shortcomings and failures which has permeated the Japanisation
literature. They also suggest that a more critical perspective on managerial
fallibility needs to be employed in future research.
Whither Japanisation?
This section considers the evidence from Telco in the context of a
number of perspectives on Japanisation. The data present a very different
view from those accounts of Japanese transplants that have stressed synergy
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between personnel and production policies (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992;
Reitsperger 1986; Trevor 1988). The argument that there is congruence
between personnel and production policies is premised on the supposed
'high-dependency relationship' between management and labour. In this
analysis companies rely on workers for a creative input into the production
system and this is guaranteed through a personnel policy that stimulates
commitment, with institutional arrangements such as company councils acting
as proxies for terms and conditions operating in Japan. At Telco,
management's dependency upon the workforce was limited in the main to a
requirement for the operators to turn up regularly and on time. Although there
had been some attempts at consultation and involvement, these had
atrophied, echoing the findings of Delbridge that workers were merely 'a pair
of hands'. Even the more modest claims that work in Japanese transplants
represents some form of democratic Taylorism (Adler 1993) seem little more
than wishful thinking. Moreover, despite this limited dependency upon the
workforce, personnel and production policies could not be characterised as in
synergy, quite the opposite in many instances. On issues as diverse as
recruitment, training, sick pay, bonuses and single status, there was a tension
between personnel policies and practice and the demands of production. In
sum, this study adds to the literature that suggests it is inappropriate to view
the policies of transplants as necessarily possessing functional synergy
(Grant 1996; Eiger and Smith 1998). The Japanese company abroad is as
likely to be characterised by inconsistencies between policies as by
coherence.
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One consequence of the contradictions between personnel and
production policies at Telco was that policies were amended over time, a
feature which has been referred to in chapter four as 'the process of
adjustment'. This process of adjustment develops the Japanisation debate
beyond analyses which focus simply on the extent of initial transfer of
indigenous policies, which are often premised on management's capacity to
strategically 'cherry-pick' appropriate policies that cohere to produce a
strategic hybrid organisation (Abo 1994). The concept of adjustment
recognises that a more fluid, problematic and contested organisation is the
outcome of transfer. 'Fluid', because policies evolve and mutate, so that the
initial transfer of policies is merely one stage in an organisation's 'life-cycle'.
Thus, the policies which a company pursues several years after 'start-up' may
not be those that were initially introduced (Leopold and Hallier 1995).
'Problematic', because bundles of policies contain their own internal
contradictions stemming from the competing priorities of different functional
specialisms and from commercial pressures. Thus, what might constitute
'good' HRM practice will not necessarily meet the demands of production.
'Contested', because workers are not mere recipients of pollcles, but are
active agents in shaping shopfloor relations.
It may seem obvious that organisations adjust over time, but it is a point
worth making given that, with a few exceptions (Wilkinson and Ackers 1995;
Eiger and Smith 1998), research has failed to address the issue of
amendments to policies in Japanese transplants, thus presenting a static
view. Moreover, even when adjustment is recognised there is a tendency in
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some accounts to celebrate this as a reflection of managerial 'best practice',
with change being the consequence of a careful evaluation of current policies
and resultant amendments stemming from a process of thorough consultation
(Doeringer et aI.1998). This interpretation may be correct in some instances,
but it is certainly not the case at Telco. Adjustment appears to be an on-going
process of ad-hoc decision-making driven primarily by the need to respond
quickly to specific problems, rather than a strategic or coherent process. To
use the terminology of Doeringer et al. Telco seems more 'hodgepotch' than
'hybrid'. The implications for the Japanisation debate are that company policy
is not the consequence of one-off decisions regarding transfer. Also, crucially,
the process of adjustment is not necessarily strategic or coherent but is a
(sometimes piecemeal and short-term) response to the organisation's
commercial environment, to inter-departmental tensions and to the activities of
labour. Adjustment must, therefore, be contextualised within a wider economic
and social framework, and the potentially contested nature of both social and
commercial relations needs to be recognised.
A further interpretation of Japanisation sees it in essence as
representing an extension of managerial hegemony as a high surveillance
regime (Morris et al. 1993; Proctor and Ackroyd 1998; Sewell and Wilkinson
1992a). There is some, albeit limited, support for this view from this study.
Operators at Telco were subject to extensive surveillance, and one of the
major differences identified between Telco and UMEC, a case study
conducted prior to the potential influence of Japanisation, was the extent of
shopfloor scrutiny. There are however a number of caveats to be added to this
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interpretation. One caveat is the need to decouple surveillance and control
from work intensification per se. Proponents of the high surveillance
interpretation have invariably associated managerial strategy with an
intensification of work effort. The evidence from Telco suggests a more
complex picture. There was some closure of the porosity of the working day.
For example, bell-ta-bell working meant that operators were on the factory
floor for all their specified working time. However, in relation to the pace of
work, by the operators' own admission it was not unremittingly harsh. It varied
with the workstation and the model involved. Certainly there were no
instances of workers having to work 'down the line' to insert parts because
they could not complete their tasks in the allocated time, as has been reported
in some studies (Fucini and Fucini 1990; Graham 1995). This difference
between Telco and these studies has two possible explanations. First, as
different Japanese companies based in their indigenous environment have
varying levels of work intensity (Cusumano 1986), then it seems reasonable to
assume that transplants will also exhibit that pattern. Second, surveillance
and control systems in different companies might not have the same
objectives. The surveillance systems at Telco were, in the main, directed at
ensuring product quality. While this is somewhat ironic given the
circumvention of these systems by staff at all levels in the company, it does
indicate a requirement to move away from a pre-judged linkage between
surveillance and work intensification.
A further caveat to the high surveillance interpretation is that a
distinction needs to be drawn between policy intention and outcome; high
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surveillance strategies do not always achieve the goals set for them by
management, as the evidence from Telco illustrates. Workplace relations
cannot simply be abstracted from their social context and reduced to a bundle
of techniques, or managerial intentions, but they need to be understood and
researched as a contested terrain in which workers are not mere recipients of
managerial diktat but active agents in shaping life on the factory floor. Thus
while the concept of Japanisation as high surveillance has value as a
description of the procedures and (given the reservations discussed in the
previous paragraph) of managerial intentions, it tells us little about the
processes of implementation.
So, what assessment can be made of Japanisation as it applies to
Japanese transplants? First it needs to be recognised that policies of
Japanese transplants are not always successful, and, as others have argued,
cannot be seen as a universal manufacturing panacea or a 'one best way'
(Eiger and Smith 1994; Stewart 1998). It is as important to view the policies of
transplants as much through their contradictions as their coherence. Second,
and relatedly, it is important to look beyond transfer as the policies of
Japanese transplants evolve over time. This corporate mutation is driven by
commercial exigencies and also the active involvement of workers in the
labour process. Third, the continuities with previous production regimes need
to be recognised. Workplace relations, in Telco at least, bear a significant
similarity to cases reported several decades earlier. Moreover, management
have certainly not resolved the 'problem' of worker behaviour as implied by
studies which stress either the generation of mutual commitment or the
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demise of resistance. That is not to say that nothing has changed;
Japanisation can be associated with heightened shopfloor surveillance and
changing buyer-supplier relations stimulated by the demands of JIT. But,
crucially, the outcomes of these policies cannot simply be read off from their
existence. Rather, the outcomes of the policies of Japanese transplants are
rooted firmly in the individual company's social and economic context.
Of the future
In this final section some issues which should be part of a future
research agenda are discussed briefly. The findings from this study highlight
several lines of enquiry for future research on developments in the labour
process. The first point is that studies must continue to write labour, both
individually and collectively, into accounts of workplace relations. That is not
to claim that resistance will be a feature of every factory floor, but that in
circumstances where resistance may have been marginalised, this has to be
explained in a rigorous manner, rather than merely being 'read off from
accounts of managerial practice.
Second, the policies and practices of companies need to be explored in
terms of their inconsistencies as well as their coherence. Inconsistencies here
may represent the manner in which the objectives of managerial policies can
be reinterpreted by workers in their own interest. Inconsistencies can also
arise from tensions between the needs of different functional areas within an
organisation and from managerial fallibility. Furthermore, the manner in which
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these inconsistencies feed through to the labour process needs to be
discussed and recognised.
Third, a holistic approach to labour process analysis needs to be
adopted. In explaining the complexity of workplace relations the behaviour
and motives of all actors workers, supervisors, management and those with
specialist functions such as quality control all need to be identified and
discussed. Moreover, this holistic approach must also include issues external
to the point of production, and in particular an organisation's relationship with
its buyers and suppliers. While the relative influence of these features will
vary between companies, it is important that the potential significance of these
factors is not discounted.
A further distinct, but related way in which the future research agenda
might be shaped is to develop the embedded approach posited here, by
considering how it might be extended beyond this study. This can be
undertaken by applying the embeddedness framework to indigenous
organisations and to companies in other sectors. It would also be interesting
to explore the framework within a unionised environment or one in which
issues of race or gender are more apparently significant.
If the embedded ness framework can provide a rigorous analytical tool
for discussing and explaining the labour process in workplaces in the twenty
first century, than this study will have achieved its main objective. It is my
belief that it can, but it is for others to judge.
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APPENDIX 1
MY LEAVING 'DIPLOMA'

Decoding the Diploma
The detail in sentence three refer to the following:
'able to scratch lens' - my lack of skills in some tasks
'lose pencils' - my absent-mindedness
'assemble light guides in your sleep' - the boredom of that particular task
'the bored room' - the incident when I dozed off during a training session in the
board room.
APPENDIX 2
COMPANY MEMORANDUM: MISCELLANEOUS
ITEMS REQUIRING CLARIFICATION
,. .,";" ,
J.
YOUR REF NO:
OUR REF NO: DATE: PAGE'
18 November 1994
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS REQUIRING CLARIFICATION
1. COMPANY UNIFORM
It is Company policy that all Employees wear the full Company Uniform. Failure to
do so will result in disciplinary action being taken.
It should be noted however, that there is no objection to employees wearing the
Uniform to and from work, although all employees should wear outdoor shoes outside
the premises and change into trainers or other suitable soft-soled footwear on entering
the building.
2. CLOCKING IN/OUT TIME ALLOW ~NCE
There is no time allowance for clocking in/out as there is in some companies (e.g. 3
minute change of clothing allowance - after official start time/before official finish
time, etc.)
The official start time at present is 8.00 am and finish time is 4.30 pm (2.45 pm on
Friday). Clocking in after 8.00 am and before finishing time is subject to the
quartering rule and treated as 'time lost'.
3. RADIO
Radios are not allowed in any of the working areas in the factory. Background music
would be a distraction in certain areas, and therefore Company policy is not to allow
music to be played during working hours.
4. SMOKING/CONSUMPTION OF FOOD & DRINK
It is Company policy that smoking be restricted tothe Canteen only in the specified
area. Food and drink should also only be consumed in the Canteen.
5. SHOP FLOOR OPERATORS - REQUIREMENT TO STAND AT WORK PLACE
It is Company policy that all Shop Floor Operators stand at their work bench/machine
during working hours. No seating will be provided.
Only in exceptional circumstances (such as pregnancy) will seating arrangements be
considered.
6. PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALLS
Personal telephone calls will only be put through in cases of extreme urgency,
otherwise messages will be taken and passed to employees. This policy has been
introduced to avoid interruption of work, especially on the production line.
7. FRONT CAR PARK
It should be noted that the car park at the front of the building is for the use of visitors
and for cars to be used on company business only. All employees should therefore
park their vehicles in the Employee Car Park situated at the rear of the premises.
8. CARS PARKED IN EMPLOYEE CAR PARK
Cars parked in the Employee Car Park are parked at 'Owners Risk', i.e. any
damage/theft of parts of car/the car itself should be dealt with through the individual's
insurance company. will only be held responsible for damage
incurred as a result of the Company's own negligence. (N.B. It should be noted that
activity on the rear car park is monitored by close circuit T.V. to serve as a deterrent to
intruders).
9. THEFT OF PROPERTY - GENERAL
Employee's personal property is left on the premises at 'Owners Risk'. The Company
will not be held responsible for items which go astray. A locker is provided for each
employee to store all personal effects.
10. PROBATIONARY PERIOD
There is a 13 week Probationary Period for all employees. At 10 weeks of the
Probationary Period having been completed, a review is made by the employee's
Supervisor of attendance/performance to date. If review is satisfactory, no action is
taken. If unsatisfactory, employee's probationary period may be extended or other
. action, as deemed necessary by the Supervisor, may be taken.
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CHANGES IN EMPLOYEE SICKNESS BENEFITS
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6. ABSENCE THROUGH ILLNESS OR INJURY APPENDIX 20.3.92
(a) The sick pay year comme~ces 1st January for employees
with 1 year ser~ice.
(b) Other than any e~titlement you may have to Statutory
Sick Payor National Health Insurance Benefits, you will
not be entitled to any pay for any day you are abse~t
from work as a result of illness or injury during the
first 26 weeks of your employment with the Company.
(c) After completing 6 months service a ~3" or "CH rating will
be allocated to each employee based on 6 months attendance
record.
(B = 0 - 4.99% absence
C = 5.00% abse~ce or greater)
( d ) from 6 to 12
period Wi' 1
months
be as
se r : ice,
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APPENDIX4
THE NEW ESP SCHEME
HOW THE EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION SCHEME WORKS
~
~
~
~
~
YOU WILL BE TOLD W'HETHER OR NOT YOUR "
SUGGESTION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ' x.
,-----_ ";_
MARKED ESP FOR..'v1IS RETlJ"RNED TO HR DEPARThfENT.
RESULT IS RECORDED
/
PUT YOUR ESP FOR.,\I IN THE YELLOW BOX IN THE
CANTEEN
BOX IS EMPTIED BY HUMAN RESOURCES (HR)
DEP, RT\I[ENT
YOUR SUGGESTION IS LOGGED BY THE HR DEPARTMENT
YOlJR ESP FORM IS SENT OUT BY THE HR
DEPARTMENT FOR MARKlNG
IF YOUR SUGGESTION IS ACCEPTED IT WILL NOW BE
IMPLEMENTED
HR DEPARn!ENT :\R.E NOTIFIED WHEN SUGGESTION IS
IMPLEMENTED
HR DEP,AJUMENT WILL CREDIT YOU WITH POINTS FOR
YOUR SUGGESTION
YOU WILL BE TOLD HOW .\1ANY POINTS YOU HAVE
BEEN AWARDED
YOU WILL RECEIVE.-\ REWARD FOR YOCR POINTS ONCE
EVERY QUARTER
I.,
~
,
,
--.~..-,-. _ .
HO\V TO USE YOUR E.S.P.
Step 1 - Think of an Idea
While you are at work you have many opportunities to think of small improvements that
will benefit the Company. You may come up with an idea whilst doing your day-to-day
job: whilst working on TPM or 5Cs; or you may just see something going on in the
factory and think to yourself 'I'm sure that could be done better'.
Or reduce: Cycle-time
Component costs
Scrap
Wastage
Anv idea that will improve: Quality
Safety
Efficiencv
Productivity
is a worthwhile idea.
Remember: i) ~o idea is too small
ii) You know your job better than anyone else - don't assume that
someone else will have thought of the same idea and put it
forward.
Step 2 - Fill in an ESP Form
So. now that you've got an idea. tell us about it.
Take a yellow ESP form from the canteen and fill in the front side. Please provide as
much detail as possible as this makes it easier for us to decide whether or not your
suggestion will v....ork. The use of drawings and diagrams will also help to make things
clear.
If you find it difficult to put your ideas down on paper ask your Chargehand, Supervisor
or Manager to help you. Alternatively. ask a friend for help. or. if you prefer. ask a
member of the ESP Committee to help you out.
Remember: By filling in a suggestion form you lose nothing but stand to gain a lot.
Step 3 - Put your Form in the ESP Box
Once you have tilled in a form you must put it in the yellow ESP Box in the canteen.
This is the only way or making sure that your suggestion \v ill be 'officially' received.
It is uc to 'nu ,0 make sure that your rorm goes into the box. You will get no credit tor
"our suggestion ir' you ask someone else to put it in the box and they forget'
Step'" & Step 5 - Your Form is Collected and Logged
The yellow box in the canteen will be emptied every day and all ESP forms will be taken
to the Human Resources Department.
Your suggestion will then be given a unique serial number and a record will be made of
when it was received.
Step 6 & Step 7 - Your Form is sent to the Appropriate Individual(s)
for Consideration
The HR Department will pass your suggestion to the most appropriate persorus) for
assessment. This may be your Supervisor or Manager. or it may be the ESP committee.
In addition. your suggestion may also have to be assessed by someone from another
department. such as Quality Control. Finance or Production Engineering. This is so that
we can check that your suggestion will be cost-effective and work well in practice.
At this stage you will be contacted by whoever is assessing your suggestion and told
whether it has been accepted or rejected.
If it is rejected you will be told the reason why.
If it is accepted it will be awarded a number of points. the total of which will depend upon
the cost-savings. benefit to the Company. the originality of the suggestion. and how much
effort you put into making it. We will not be able to tell you at this stage how many
points you have been awarded. That will come later.
Step 8 - Outcome of Assessment is Recorded
When your suggestion has been assessed the ESP Form will be rerumed to the HR
Department who will record the markings.
If your suggestion is accepted the next stage is implementation. If your suggestion is
rejected your ESP Form will be filed and kept for future reference.
Step 9 - Your Suggestion is Implemented
No points will be credited to you until your suggestion has been put into practice and
been seen to work. This is because an idea which sounds good on paper can
occasionally. for one reason or another. either not work at all or not work as well as
expected in practice. As the ESP Scheme is self-financing, awards can only be made ror
suggestions that are of proven benefit to the Company.
The result of all this is that you mJY have to wait a little while before discovering how
many points you have been awarded for your suggestion. In many cases this will be ;0
your advantage. This is because during implemcnrauon other. unexpected. benefits or
your suugestion may come to light. which means that you will be awarded even more
points.
Steps 10. 11 & 12 - You are Awarded Points
Once your suggestion has been tried out and we have seen what benefits it has for the
Company, it will be given a final award of points. You will be told by your Supervisor
how many points have been awarded.
Step 13 - You Get Rewarded
The number of points that you build up from all the suggestions you make in a three
month period will be converted into a monetary value and 'paid-out' in gift tokens during
the third week of September. December. March and June.
Grievance Procedure
If. at any time. you are unhappy with any aspect of the Employee Suggestion Programme
or with any decision made about one of your suggestions. please tell your Supervisor or
Manager that you wish to raise an 'ESP Grievance'. They will then notify the ESP
Committee who will be happy to discuss the matter with you. We will do everything
possible to make sure that the Scheme is fair for everyone.
Damian Pearce
ESP Committee Member
June 1995
APPENDIX 5
MY PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING PLAN
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APPENDIX 6
COMPANY MEMORANDUM RELATING TO
THE TRAINING BADGE
9 March 1990
TRAINING BADGE
New employees should wear 'T' Badge during their probational)' period.
1. PURPOSE OF BADGE
a) Define employees position who are on probational)' period. They need
Manager, Supervisors and skilled people's help.
b) In order to keep good quality it will call their attention.
2. POSITION OF BADGE
Badge should be worn on the left sleeve of uniform. During working time, badge
should be worn on their working uniform, if they take off their jacket they should
move the badge to their shirt.
a) JACKET - On left sleeve, about 1 inch under UK-NSI emblem.
b) SHIRT - On left sleeve, about I inch above bottom of left sleeve.
NOTE:
1. If the Manager feels it necessary for the trainee to remove the badge for any reason this
is acceptable.
2. After probationery period, badge should be returned to Administration Department.
~l
Planner
"APPENDIX 7
MANAGEMENT LIST OF SUPERVISOR'S
RESPONSIBILITIES
Supervisor Responsibilities
.27.06.96.
1) Output Ensuring the target is met, overtime.
2) Efficiencv Maintaining the required efficiency.
3) Quality Ensuring the quality of the finished product.
4) PapmMl'k Presentation, accuracy, filing.
5) HousekH!!iar Clean, tidy, organised, clearly marked, H&S.
6) Line 1Df'9l!I'PaIi!a Work standards, model lists, setting sheets.
7) Training Emsuring operators know and understand. ,
8) Timekeeping Start up, deI- breaks, lunch etc.
9) Defects/Scrap Daily analysis, action, communication. .
10) Operators Attitude, talking, waiting, effort, caring.
11) Finish Time Work until4.30, clean for 5 minutes.
12) Resource Use other departments, don't accept poor service..
13) Management Use the resources available, don't do low level jobs.
I~) Chargehands Communicate, train, delegate, monitor.
15) Appraisal Performance of the above will be monitored.
